A STUDY OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA:

An English Translation And Annotation of The PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA, BOOK I

A thesis presented

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

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ERRATUM

Vs. 66 (p. 75) has been numbered by error, and the given objection is part of Vs. 67.

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INTRODUCTION

I. DHARMAKĪRTI and BOOK I OF HIS PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA

The present work is an English translation and annotation of Book I, "Pramāṇasiddhi," of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. Dharmakīrti, who lived, according to the latest account[1], in the 7th Century, composed the Pramāṇavārttika as a commentary on Diṅnāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya[2], an important work on Buddhist epistemology and logic. In spite of the great importance of the Pramāṇavārttika for the study of Buddhist philosophy, the text had long been unavailable in the original Sanskrit. However, in the course of three journeys to Tibet, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana recovered not only the Sanskrit text but three Sanskrit commentaries as well; Manorathanandin's, which covers the whole of the work, Prajñākaragupta's, which covers what are properly Books I, II and IV, and the commentary of Dharmakīrti himself on Book III. All these texts have now been published[3].

According to Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, the order of the four sections of the work as found in the Sanskrit and Tibetan MSS. is as follows: "Svārthānumāna," "Pramāṇasiddhi,"

"Pratyakṣa," and "Parārthānumāṇa." The reason for this unnatural order is that the place of honor has been given to that section, the most difficult of the whole work, on which Dharmakīrti himself wrote a prose commentary.[4] The natural order, and that which accords with the Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Diṅnāga, is: Book I "Pramāṇasiddhi," Book II "Pratyakṣa," Book III "Svārthānumāna," and Book IV "Parārthānumāna."

Book I lays the foundation for the work on epistemology (Book II) and logic (Books III and IV) which follow by furnishing arguments in favor of the saving power of the Buddha's teaching. This soteriological introduction is given in the form of an elaborate commentary, or one had better say, a series of essays, on Diṅnāga's introductory verse to the Pramāṇasamuccaya.[5]

According to Bu-ston,[6] the Tibetan historian, Diṅnāga cut this verse on a rock in token of his resolution to write the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Alas, the inscription has not been recovered, nor is the complete verse preserved in any Sanskrit MS. But Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and H.R.R. Iyenger have offered reconstructions of it.[7] Of the reconstructions Rāhula's adheres closer to the Tibetan text and seems preferable. One may translate the verse into English as follows:

"Having paid reverence to him who is valid knowledge-instrument incarnate [pramāṇabhūta], who desires the good of the world [jagaddhitaiṣin], the teacher [śāstṛ], the Blessed One [sugata], the savior [tāyin], I shall make a compendium of my views (which have been expressed) in sundry places, in order to show what valid knowledge-instrument really is."

In this verse of Diṅnāga's, each of the five epithets given to the Buddha, which I have underlined, furnishes Dharmakīrti with subject matter for a separate section of Book I of the Pramāṇavārttika. In arranging Book I in five sections according to the above-mentioned five epithets, Dharmakīrti has evidently made great use of Diṅnāga's svavṛtti (auto-commentary) on the Pramāṇasamuccaya which informs us of Diṅnāga's own interpretation of the above verse. The svavṛtti, which is also preserved only in the Tibetan,[8] may be translated thus:

"The utterance of praise, at the beginning of this treatise [prakaraṇa] is intended to generate devotion, (the praise is) of the Reverent One [Bhagavat], who is valid knowledge-instrument incarnate [pramāṇabhūta] because he is perfect in cause and in effect [hetuphalasampat].

"Of these (cause and effect), the cause (of his teaching) is perfect intention and application

[āśayaprayogasampat].[9] His intention [āśaya] is a desire for the good of the world [jagaddhitaiṣitā],[10] and his application [prayoga][11] is his state of being a teacher by teaching the world [jagacchāsanācchāstṛtva].[12]

"The effect (of his teaching) is perfect benefit for himself [svārthasampat] and perfect benefit for others [parārthasampat]. The perfect benefit for himself is (what has been gained) by him as the Blessed One [sugata] and it is regarded as of three sorts: (1) praiseworthiness [praśastatā] as in a beautiful figure [sarūpavat],[13] (2) lack of recurrence [apunarāvṛtti] as in a well-cured disease [sunaṣṭajvaravat],[14] and (3) completeness [niḥśeṣatā], as in a completely filled jar [supūrṇaghaṭavat].[15] These three (virtues) are intended to distinguish the perfected benefit for (the Blessed One) himself from the non-Buddhists who are detached from passion [bāhyavītarāga],[16] those who are undergoing training for Buddhist saintship [śāikṣa][17] and those who have attained Buddhist saintship [aśaikṣa].[18] The perfected benefit for others is salvation [tāya]; its purpose is the delivering (sentient beings from suffering).

"Having paid reverence to that teacher who possesses these (three) virtues, I shall now make a compendium on the valid knowledge-instrument [pramāṇasamuccaya] out of the

collection (of fragments) from my own treatises, such as Nyāyamukha etc., in order to establish the valid knowledge-instrument. It is for the purpose of refuting the valid knowledge-instrument (as defined) by others and showing the excellence of the valid knowledge-instrument (as defined) by us, because, although the understanding [pratīti] of an object [prameya] depends on the valid knowledge-instrument [pramāṇa], there are many erroneous views on that (viz., valid knowledge-instrument)."

From this svavṛtti by Diṅnāga, we can show the intended scheme of the introductory verse to the Pramāṇasamuccaya as follows:



In composing Book I of the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti adopts this scheme in its exact form. Thus the arrangement of the contents of Book I of the Pramāṇavārttika is shown as follows by verse numbers which have been rearranged throughout the contents in accordance with the sense.

Introductory verse to PV ..... Vs. 1, p. 1

Motive for composing PV ..... Vs. 2, pp. 2-3

Pramāṇabhūta ..... Vss. 3-38, pp. 4-40

Jagaddhitaiṣitva ..... Vss. 39-141, pp. 41-135

Śāstṛtva ..... Vss. 142-148, pp. 136-140

Sugatatva ..... Vss. 149-154, pp. 141-147

Tāyitva ..... Vs. 155, p. 148

Catvāryāryasatyāni
- duḥkhasatya ....Vss. 156-190, pp. 149-175
- samudayasatya...Vss. 191-202, pp. 176-186
- nirodhasatya....Vss. 203-218, pp. 186-200
- mārgasatya.....Vss. 219-294, pp. 201-252

Recapitulatory verses.....Vss. 295-200, pp. 253-259

II. AN OUTLINE OF BOOK I OF THE PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA

As it has been shown in the previous section, the scheme of Book I of the Pramāṇavārttika is so designed as to give support to Diṅnāga's introductory verse to his Pramāṇa-samuccaya by way of expounding the five epithets given to the Buddha in that verse.

In support of the first epithet 'who is valid knowledge-instrument incarnate,' Dharmakīrti says that the Buddha is

a valid knowledge-instrument for his teaching possesses the two characteristics[19] of a valid knowledge-instrument; (1) it is free from contradiction, (2) it reveals the Thing-in-Itself [svalakṣaṇa] which is unknown to others.

Of these two characteristics, freedom from contradiction, says Dharmakīrti, consists in invariability of purposive action [arthakriyā]. Although 'purposive action' gives rise to many shades of epistemological interpretation as shown in the next section, Dharmakīrti's basic theory is that the instrumental validity of a cognition can be tested only by means of its conduciveness to purposive action. And such a test of the instrumental validity of a cognition can be done only by reference to the empirical world [vyavahāra][20] for, according to Manorathanandin's interpretation,[21] nothing exists but pure consciousness [vijñāptimātratā] in the ultimate real. The Buddha's teaching possesses this first characteristic of a valid knowledge-instrument. That is to say, in the realm of the ultimate real [paramārthataḥ] there is no distinction of bondage and liberation, nor is there any one liberated.[22] Nevertheless, the Buddha's teaching holds its validity in so far as it is conducive to purposive action, viz., liberation in the empirical realm in which we distinguish bondage and liberation.

The second characteristic of a valid knowledge-instrument is its capability of informing us of the Thing-in-Itself [svalakṣaṇa] as a basis for the said purposive action. The Thing-in-Itself, in the epistemology of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, means the bare reality devoid of all mental construction, a point-instant, unique, disconnected from any sort of identity or generalization. The Buddha's teaching possesses this second characteristic of the valid knowledge-instrument as it teaches us the bare reality of the empirical world.

Thus the Buddha is proved to be valid knowledge-instrument incarnate because he teaches the Four Noble Truths which are free from contradiction because they are conducive to liberation in the emperical sense and which teach us the bare reality of the empirical world as a basis of the intended liberation.

Having expounded the Buddha as valid knowledge-instrument incarnate in the above manner, Dharmakīrti proceeds to expound the Four Noble Truths as teaching the bare reality, in support of the other four epithets, by way of contradicting various presumptive objections of the non-Buddhist schools against the Four Noble Truths. The bare reality, according to the Buddha, is that all existents are momentary and produced by the law of interdependent causality, and as

such there is no permanent entity whatsoever. Then what is the mundane existence [saṃsāra] of which the Buddha speaks of? The mundane existence is an ungrounded phantom because it is produced by nescience [avidyā] characterized by the false view of the eternal self [ātmadṛṣṭi] and by the consequent craving [tṛṣṇā] in the form of karmic force. However, as long as its cause, though unreal, is not d destroyed, the mundane existence appears to continue as if it were real, in the form of thought-series as the abode of karmic force and somatic aggregates which are mutually dependent.

Accordingly, this worldly existence that is substantially unreal is destroyed by the practice of the view of soullessness that is real. The view of the self that is of ungrounded illusory nature is invariably overcome by the view of soullessness that is of true nature, because truth is substantially stronger than untruth. Just as the notion of a snake imposed upon a rope, to use Manorathanandin's simile, if destroyed by the knowledge of the reality of the rope, does not reappear.[23]

Dharmakīrti expounds the Four Noble Truths as aiming at the state in which worldly existence is extinct. However, his main task in Book I of the Pramāṇavārttika consists in giving a new significance to the Buddha's

teaching by characterizing it as a valid knowledge-instrument. As it has been explained, the Buddha's teaching as a valid knowledge-instrument holds its validity in so far as it is conducive to liberation and teaches reality as a basis for liberation in the empirical realm.

Accordingly, the infallibility of the Buddha as valid knowledge-instrument incarnate is supported by the perpetual practice of his teaching in the empirical realm and not by his transcendental nature. It is on this very account, says Dharmakīrti, that Diṅnāga distinguishes the Buddha from the non-Buddhist saints, those who are under training for Buddhist saintship [śaikṣa] and those who have attained Buddhist saintship [aśaikṣa], as the sole purpose of these is the attainment of their own liberation. (See Diṅnāga's auto-commentary and PV: 283a as numbered in M. = 282a as numbered in P.) In other words, the Buddha is proved to be valid knowledge-instrument incarnate [pramāṇa-bhūta] because he exerts himself as the savior [tāyin] of the world by means of teaching the world [śāsana] out of his desire for the good of the world [jagaddhitaiṣin], although he himself has attained liberation as the Blessed One [sugata].

To summarize: Dharmakīrti, who has composed the Pramāṇavārttika with the intention of expounding Dinnāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, shows first in Book I the ultimate purport of Dinnāga's epistemology and logic. According to Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Dinnāga's system is solely intended to prove the Buddha as valid knowledge-instrument incarnate, in virtue of which the Buddha's teaching finds its significance in its practice in the empirical realm. And such a characterization of the Buddha's teaching as a valid knowledge-instrument can be met only by the Boddhisattvayāna (= Mahāyāna) in which one who is qualified for the ultimate realm retains his existence in the empirical realm to teach those who are under suffering out of compassion, and not by the Śrāvakayāna (= Hīnayāna) in which personal desire for liberation plays the chief part.

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FOOTNOTES

[1]cf. H. Nakamura, Shoki no Vedānta Tetsugaku, pp. 104-105.

[2]For biographical accounts of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, cf. E. Obermiller tr., Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, Part II, pp. 149-155; A. Schiefner tr., Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus, pp. 126-134 and 171-195; Satischandra Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, pp. 271-319; Th. Stcherbatsky, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik, pp. 254-258.

[3]The first two texts are given in the section of works of reference. The third one: Pramāṇavārttika (Svārthānumāna-pariccheda) with Dharmakīrti's Svavṛtti and Karnakagomin's Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā, edited by Rāhula Saṅkṛtyāyana. (Allahabad, 1943)

[4]cf. Rāhula's preface to M. and Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, pp. 38-39.

[5]Tōhoku Catalogue, No.4203 [Ce.1b[1]-13a[7]], tr. by Vasudhararakṣita.

[6]cf. E. Obermiller tr., Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, Part II, p. 150.

[7]Tibetan tr.; tshad. mar. gyur. pa. ḥgro. la. phan. par. bshed / ston. pa. bde. gçegs. skyob. la. phyag. ḥtshal. nas / tshad. mar. sgrub. phir. raṅ. gi. gshuṅ. kun. las / btus. te. sna. tshogs. ḥthor. rnams. ḥdir. gcig.

bya // Rāhula's: Pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe / praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ / kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ // (M., p. 108) Iyenger's: Pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe / praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svakṛtiprakīrṇanāt / nibadhyate viprasṛtam samuccitam // (See Diṅnāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter I, ed. and restored into Sanskrit by H.R.R. Iyenger, p. 1). The Sanskrit text of the first half of this verse, as pointed out by E. Obermiller, is preserved in Yaśomitra's Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā, cf. Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra ed. by Wogihara, Book I, p. 7. For other translations of this verse, cf. E. Obermiller tr., Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, p. 150 and A. Schiefner tr., Tāranātha's Geschichite des Buddhismus, p. 132.

[8]Tōhoku Catalogue, No.4204 [Ce.14b[1]-85b[7]], tr. by Vasudharaṛakṣita.

[9]The Tibetan translation of Diṅnāga's svavṛtti on the introductory verse to the Pramāṇasamuccaya: ḥdir. yaṅ, rab. tu. byed. paḥi. daṅ. por. rgyu. daṅ. ḥbras. bu. phun. sum. tshogs. pas. tshad. mar. gyur. pa. ñid. kyis, bcom. ldan. ḥdas. la. bstod. pa. brjod. pa. ni. gus. pa. bskyed. par. bya. baḥi. don. duḥo // de. la. rgyu. ni. bsam. pa. daṅ.

sbyor. ba. phun. sum. tshogs. paḥo // bsam. pa. ni. ḥgro. ba. la. phan. par. bshed. paḥo // sbyor. ba. ni. ḥgro. ba. la. bstan. pa. ston. paḥo // ḥbras. bu. ni. raṅ. daṅ. gshan. gyi. don. phun. sum. tshogs. paḥo // raṅ. don. phun. sum. tshogs. pa. ni. bde. bar. gçegs. pa. ñid. kyis. te / don. gsum. ñe. bar. glaṅs. par. byaḥo // rab. tu. mdses. paḥi. don. ni. skye. bu. gzugs. legs. pa. bshin. no // phir. mi. ldog. paḥi. don. ni. rims. nad. legs. par. byaṅ. ba. bshin. no // ma. lus. paḥi. don. ni. bum. pa. legs. par. gaṅ. ba. bshin. te // don. gsum. po. de. yaṅ. phyi. rol. gyi. ḥdod. chags. daṅ. bral. ba. daṅ / slob. pa. daṅ / mi. slob. pa. rnams. las. raṅ. don. phun. sum. tshogs. pa. khyad. par. du. bya. baḥi. phir. ro // gshan. don. sun. sum. tshogs. pa. ni. sgrol. baḥi. don. gyis. na. skyob. pa. ñid. do // de. lta. buḥi. yon. tan. can. gyi. ston. pa. la. phyag. ḥtshal. nas / tshad. ma. bsgrub. par. bya. baḥi. phir. raṅ. gi. rab. tu. byed. pa. rigs. paḥi. sgo. la. sogs. pa. rnams. las. ḥdir. gcig. tu. btus. te / tshad. ma. kun. las. btus. pa. brtsam. par. byaḥo // gshan. gyi. tshad. ma. dgag. par. bya. baḥi. phir. daṅ / raṅ. gi. tshad. maḥi. yon. tan. brjod. par. bya. baḥi. phir. te / gaṅ. gi. phir. gshal. bya. rtogs. pa. ni. tshad. ma. la. rag. las. pa. yin. la / ḥdi. lalahaṅ. log. par. rtogs. pa. maṅ. bas. naḥo /

[9], [10], [11], [12]cf. P., p. 116, line 5 ff.

[13], [14], [15]cf. M., Vs. 141b and M.'s Vṛtti on it. One should read apunarāvṛttiḥ sunaṣṭajvaravat / niḥśeṣatā ca supūrṇaghaṭavat.

[16], [17], [18]cf. Vs. 283 (as numbered in M. = 282a as numbered in P.)

[19]cf. Vss. 3 and 7 (as numbered in M. = 1 and 5 as numbered in P.)

[20]cf. Vs. 7 (as numbered in M. = 5 as numbered in P.)

[21]cf. M., p. 4, line 8.

[22]cf. M., Vs. 194b and M.'s Vṛtti on it.

[23]cf. M., Vs. 210a and M.'s Vṛtti on it.

P R A M Ā Ṇ A V Ā R T T I K A

BOOK I PRAMĀṆASIDDHI

I. Author's Introductory Verse

1. Reverence to him who has shaken off the snares of mental construction, him of profound and lofty embodiment, wholly auspicious, whose light shines everywhere. [1:0]

M. (pp.1-2) Mental construction [kalpanā] means the superimposition (of the differentiated forms) of subject and object (upon the ultimate real). 'Shaken off the snares of mental construction' refers to the Buddha's ultimate truth-body [dharma-kāya] since there is no duality in the realm of the ultimate real [dharmadhātu]. 'Being profound' because he is beyond the reach of the pratyekas and śrāvakas (= Buddhist saints in the sense of Hīnayāna Buddhism), and 'being lofty' because he penetrates the real meaning of all objects. Thus, these two expressions refer respectively to the Buddha's enjoyment-body [saṃbhogakāya] and the Buddha's transformation-body [nirmāṇakāya].

II. Author's Motive for Composing The Pramāṇavārttika

2. A man attached to worldly things, of insufficient intelligence (for religious works), generally not only shows indifference to well-arranged speech (such as Diṅnāga's), but hates it when he hears it because (his heart is full) of the impurities of envy. And thus I* fear that this will be of no use to others, but still my heart longs (to write this commentary), its natural inclination strengthened by long study (of Diṅnāga's) masterpiece. [2 : 0]

*M. interprets na paropakāra iti naś cintāpi differently by transposing na and naś. But this is grammatically impossible.

Note: Verses 1 and 2 in M. are lacking in P. Dharmakīrti wrote his auto-commentary on the svārthānumāṇa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. For this reason, according to the account of Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, the editor of the text, the svārthānumāṇa chapter has been separated from the other three chapters by the commentators and made the first chapter of these two verses therein.

Thus Rāhula gives these two verses in M. as well as in the text of svārthānumāṇa with Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary (1943, Allahabad).

III. Pramāṇabhūta

3. M. (p. 3, lines 9-11): The master (Dharmakīrti), about to compose a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of the great master (Diṅnāga), has composed his own introductory verse to the Buddha. Now in commencing his treatise, in order to expound Diṅnāga's introductory verse, he first gives the general definition of valid knowledge-instrument [pramāṇa].

A valid knowledge-instrument [pramāṇa] is a cognition free from contradiction.

Freedom from contradiction consists in invariability of purposive action [arthakriyā].* [3a-first half of 3b: 1a-first half of 1b]

*Note on purposive action [arthakriyā]: Arthakriyā has given rise to many shades of interpretation. P. takes it here to mean "the accomplishment of an intended action (with respect to the thing cognized), such as burning, cooking etc." That is to say, we have a cognition of fire. If this is followed by our burning the fuel or cooking

the dinner with fire, it has been a valid knowledge-instrument.

This doctrine differs from the Mimāṃsā doctrine of self-validity by the fact that the validity is not determined at the time of the initial or indicatory cognition [sādhakajñāna], but must await its proof until the purposed action [arthakriyā] has taken place. As P. puts it in p. 4, lines 4 ff., "The purposed action comes at a later time. How could its connection (with the indicatory cognition) be known simply from our consciousness of the cognition?"

However, arthakriyā may be taken in a much broader sense, for which see note following Vs. 8.

4. (There is instrumental validity) in a verbal cognition too, in so far as it informs us of the speaker's purpose. [Second half of 3b : second half of 1b]

M. (p. 4, lines 12-15): In a verbal cognition, that is, a cognition derived from (another man's) words, there is validity because it gives information, that is, it accomplishes a purpose, the

purpose being (to transmit this information) with regard to such objects as smell (taste, color) etc. Purposed action is sometimes apprehended in its own form (as when we actually cook with fire after we have seen fire in the indicatory cognition), sometimes in some other form (as when we understand the purposed action of some other man through his words) depending on how objects in the empirical world happen to occur.

5. The opponent may object as follows, (M., p.4, line 16): But since words are not bound to things, there can be no validity of words. And yet one needs this validity, for we infer on the basis of words. In answer to this objection, the author says:

> The validity of a word (i.e. of a verbal cognition) consists in the fact that the thing which forms the object of the speaker's activity (viz. his communication) appears in the (hearer's) mind; this validity does not depend on the object's being a real thing. [4:2]

M. (p. 4, lines 20-21) Herein consists a word's validity and its probative value. For from the uttered word we infer a constructed notion on the part of the speaker representing the intended object.

6. The opponent may object as follows, (M., p. 4, lines 23-24): But it is when a man acts on the basis of such a (constructed) knowledge as "this is a jar" that he comes in touch with the jar. It is such a knowledge that is valid. In answer to this objection the author says:

> A united cognition [sāṃvṛtta, a verbal identification] is not regarded as (valid knowledge-instrument), since it apprehends what has already been apprehended. [First half of 5a: first half of 3a]

7. > Instrumental validity belongs to the cognition (not to the sense-organs etc.), because cognition is the principal element in (bringing about) the activity toward what we should avoid and what we should gain,

because the different apprehensions (of objects) are due to the differences of the cognition-form of objects and because the apprehension of an object takes place only where the (cognition) form of the object is present. [Second half of 5a-first half of 6b: second half of 3a-first half of 4b]

8. From the cognition itself we understand the nature of the thing, but not the instrumental validity of the cognition. This (viz. the instrumental validity of the cognition) we understand by reference to the empirical world [vyavahāra]. [Second half of 6b-first half of 7a: second half of 4b-first half of 5a]

Note: Both commentators note that up to Ns. 8 the instrumental validity of cognition has been explained as its ability to bring about actions for persons who seek results in the empirical world. In Ns. 8 validity is considered as the ability of a cognition to furnish the appropriate result in the form of understanding.

This raises the problem of the extended use of arthakriyā (See Ns. 3 note). It is natural to

suppose that many of our cognitions are true without their necessarily leading to any action. Two sorts of such cognition may be considered. As an example of the first, I may have a cognition of fire, following which I do nothing with the fire. My cognition may be as valid as if I had gone on to cook my dinner. What is more, I may feel sure of the validity of this cognition. Accordingly, Dharmottara speaks of a valid knowledge-instrument as one which brings about our gaining or understanding an object which is susceptible of a purposed action [arthakriyā-samārthārtha-prāpti-nimittaṃ jñānaṃ. NBT, I.1]. And M. speaks of 'presumptive validity' [prāmāṇya-yogyatā]. "Thus, when we envisage an object by a certain cognition but do not initiate any action with regard to this object, or having initiated action, do not attain to [adhigacchati] the object because of some hindrance, this also may be a valid knowledge-instrument from our here having non-contradiction in the form of presumptive knowledge. One may ask how presumptive validity can be determined if the action is not accomplished. The answer is that it is sometimes determined by the indicatory perception

[sādhanādhyakṣa] itself as when from frequent experience a man is aware that the object of his cognition is other than erroneous by the simple perception of it, just as an experienced person may determine the genuineness or artificiality of gems and money at a glance. In the case of inference such validity may be determined immediately by the absence of any doubt as to the concomitance of probans and probandum. ...But as regards cognition in a situation where one lacks experience or practice, and so is doubtful of the validity of one's cognition, this may be determined by (the later) cognition of purposed action (really carried through) or by an inference (M., pp. 3-4)."

However, there is a second sort of cognition that may be valid but more difficult to bring under the definition. Suppose I have a cognition of a blue colorr in a painting. I cannot use this blue colorr to cook with or to carry water or in the performance of any such physical action. In such cases Dharmakīrti says that the purposed action is simply the understanding [or consciousness, pratīti] that I gain of the blue colorr (NB, I.19). That is to say, a cognition is a valid

knowledge-instrument if it leads to an understanding of blue where there is blue and of red where there is red (See Vs. 8 above). Accordingly, he includes the word 'abhrānta' (free from contradiction) in his definition of valid perception (NB, I.4). But the validity of the cognition of blue color cannot be determined [niścita, vyavasthāpita, avadhṛta] from the cognition alone nor from the understanding, but only by reference to the empirical world, i.e. by conversation with other persons or by empirical experiment.

There is no difficulty with this interpretation so long as one understands it from a realist's point of view. Many difficulties arise, however, if one takes an idealist's viewpoint, and this is certainly the ultimate viewpoint of Dharmakīrti. How the cognition of fire is interpreted idealistically may be seen from M. "This definition of valid knowledge as absence of contradiction is common to (Buddhist) realists and (Buddhist) idealists. But the idealists [vijñānanaya] understand agreement [saṃvāda, i.e. non-contradiction] to mean that the cognition appearing as purposed action [arthakriyā-nirbhāsajñāna] follows upon that

which appears as indicatory cognition [sādhana-nirbhāsajñāna]. Thus, although nothing exists but pure (i.e. from an ultimate point of view, undivided) cognition [vijñāptimātratva] there is still no confusion in the empirical world between what is valid knowledge and what is not (M., p. 4, line 6 ff)."

Further difficulties arise. In the idealist's view, the cognition of a blue color becomes identical on one hand with the blue color itself (cf. M., p. 5, line 11; "differences of form of objects, that is, differences of [cognition-] forms which are as it were objects"; similarly P., p. 22, lines 28-29, where it is followed by the idealist's alternative), and on the other hand, identical with our resulting understanding or consciousness. At this rate every cognition of which we are conscious becomes valid. P. goes to the extent of stating, "The distinction between dream and non-dream is purely empirical" (P., p. 5, line 7). In the realm of ultimate truth the distinction of validity and non-validity cannot appear. And this is what one would expect in a metaphysics that postulates a single undifferentiated reality, pure cognition. Thus "where one comes by the nature of a thing-to-

be-known, there is action; just as by the mere sight of a picture its purpose is accomplished. In these cases, no other purposed action is apprehended than the mere consciousness of the nature of the thing itself. A cognition of such an object does not become valid by reference to anything else. In all knowledge this thing-in-itself, this pure consciousness, is involved, and to the extent that it is, there is no chance for empirical criteria of validity (P., p. 5, lines 21 ff)."

But while every cognition, from the ultimate idealist's point of view, is valid, its validity is not determined. Within this area of ultimate truth there is no verbalized judgment [vikalpa] such as to tell us 'this cognition is a valid knowledge-instrument.' Such a judgment is possible only within the empirical world and only by means of a test. This is what Dharmakīrti means in saying, "From the cognition itself we understand the nature of the thing, but not the instrumental validity of the cognition. This we understand by reference to the empirical world."

9. The opponent may raise the following objection: (M., p. 7, lines 15-17): But now if persons operating in the empirical world can determine validity by the cognition itself in the case of an indicatory cognition to which they are accustomed since they can there rule out error, and if the validity of an indicatory cognition to which one is not accustomed can be determined by empirical test, then the composing of treatises would be useless. In answer to this, the author says:

A treatise (is intended) to remove ignorance.
[Second half of 7a : second half of 5a]

M. (p. 7, lines 19-21): If validity could (always) be determined by empirical means there would not be the many mutually contradictory treatises on the definitions of things (as there are). Thus, a treatise gives definitions on a matter so that ignorance thereon may be removed; and by doing so, the other world and the summum bonum, which are not to be established by empirical means, may be established.

10. M. (p. 7, line 23): Having defined valid knowledge-instrument as that which is "free from contradiction", the author now adds another definition.

Or, (a valid knowledge-instrument) is that which reveals unknown objects. [First half of 7b : first half of 5b]

11. The cognition of generic character (= a united cognition, see Vs. 6) which follows upon the apprehension of the thing-in-itself only seems to fall under this definition (but does not really do so); for what is meant here is the cognition of an unknown thing-in-itself because it is the thing-in-itself that is sought (as a basis for purposed action). [Second half of 7b-8: second half of 5b-6]

12. Such a valid knowledge-instrument is the Blessed One. The words 'who is' are to rule out what is not (= what is invalid). Instrumental validity implies the accomplishing of something; hence it belongs rightly to

him. [9 : 7]

Note: The reference is to Diṅnāga's introductory verse (cf. introduction), which begins pramāṇabhūtāya 'to him who is valid knowledge-instrument incarnate'. M. (p. 8, lines 12 ff): "The Blessed One is such a valid knowledge-instrument, because the Four Noble Truths are free from contradiction (See Vs. 3) and because he has revealed them when they were unknown to others (See Ns. 11)."

'What is not' [abhūta] means literally 'what has not come into existence'. M. interprets fancifully as meaning 'eternal' [nitya]. The Blessed One is called bhūta [what has come into existence] to distinguish him from the (fancied) eternal knowledge-instrument (of the Mīmāṃsa: the Veda). P. (p. 32, line 10): "'what is not' is to rule out what is false."

'Hence it belongs rightly to him', that is, "it belongs to the Blessed One and not to the Veda, for the Veda exhibits no knowledge-instrument that can lead to any purpose (P., p. 32, line 11)."

13. There is no such thing as an eternal knowledge-instrument, for a knowledge-instrument is always a cognition of a thing; because, since the things-to-be-known are not eternal, the cognitions of them cannot be lasting and because* it is inadmissible that things should arise consecutively from that which is eternal, for the eternal (viz. God) cannot be dependent on (auxiliary causes). [10-11a : 8-9a]

*The second reason is given as an answer to the presumptive objection, "We will grant that the cognition of a non-eternal object is not eternal, but the cognizer (viz. God) to whom that cognition belongs might be eternal (M., p. 10, lines 14-15)." These are ancient Buddhist arguments: If an eternal God, always of one and the same nature, were capable of producing things, he must produce them all at once. It is impossible that he should produce them consecutively, for one would need to adduce some contingency or auxiliary cause [atiśaya or upakārin] to explain the succession. If one does so, then these auxiliary factors become the real cause of production and God ceases to be God. Cf. AbhK (p. 37, fol. 3-p. 38, fol. 1; LVP, II,

pp. 311-313); SDS, II, 48ff; TS and TSP, 56-93 and 153-170; H. Nakamura, Shoki no Vedānta Tetsugaku, pp. 194-197 (for English tr. of this section see HJAS, vol. 18, 1955, pp. 84 ff.); S. Yamaguchi, Seshin-no-Jōgōron, pp. 228-229.

14. | And since he (viz. the God of the non-Buddhists) cannot be aided in any way, he cannot furnish a valid knowledge-instrument even if he were not eternal. [11b : 9b]

P. (p. 34, lines 11 ff.): "Even if God were not eternal, he could not be a valid knowledge-instrument (for us). Why is this? Because he cannot be aided. One who may be somehow aided by others or hurt by them can experience passion and the other (failings of man). In his case there is the possibility of enlightenment which opposes passion and these other failings and so he may teach. Out of love for creatures and pity for them, such a one may teach, and because of this possibility he can be a valid knowledge-instrument for the world. But such an instrument cannot come from pure existence.

It has no such understanding. For, as they say, no one becomes wise without meeting with reverses."

15. (In inferring the existence of God) from action following rest[1], from the particular arrangement of objects[2] and from the fact they serve our purpose[3], you either prove what is already proved or you conclude with an impossibility or your argument leads to doubt. [12 : 10]

[1]When the axe splits the tree, the axe requires an intelligent agent for it to be brought from rest into motion. The motion of the objects in nature likewise require an intelligent agent, which can only be God. [2]Again there is a particular arrangement of objects. The eye sees, the ear hears; we do not hear with our eyes or see with our ears. This argument is formally stated by Uddyotakāra, NV, IV.I.23 (p. 959, lines 9 ff), but probably goes back to a Vedānta or theistic Sāṃkhya source, for the older Nyāya took the particular arrangement of the senses etc., just as the Buddhist does, as an argument that karma is the

cause (See NS and NSB, III.I.39). [3]Finally everything has been arranged and put together for our benefit in a way that could only have been done by God.

All these arguments, says Dharmakīrti, are fallacious. True, they may be used to prove the existence of a conscious cause of what is found in the world. But this is already proved. The Abhidharmakośa (IV.I., quoted by P., p.36, line 1) attributes the variegation of the world to karma and states that this karma is conscious [cetanā]. If the theist goes on to insist that "these effects which cover all space and time could not have been effected by a cause which is not eternal, all-pervading and omniscient" (M., p. 12, lines 9-10), he is then seeking to prove an impossibility. There is nothing which is eternal, all-pervading and omniscient. Furthermore, we can easily explain the facts by postulating a number of causes. The arguments from action following rest and from the fact that objects serve our purpose lead to doubt because if God were the cause of these actions in nature we would still have to explain what causes him to rest and then act (instead of causing them

all at once). And if he causes objects so that they may serve our purpose then he is dependent upon us (and so ceases to be God). (This note follows M., p. 13)

16. When a particular arrangement etc. is proved to be concomitant with a certain master, it is proper to infer (only) that particular (master) from such a (particular arrangement). [13 : 11]

M. (p. 13, lines 16-20): Perception does not support an inference that every arrangement will be the product of such a master.... No one with any sense for empirical facts, on seeing that a pot is made by a man will infer that dishes etc. are made by that same man. Only if he sees dishes being made by him will he conclude that the man makes dishes also.

cf. TS, 63: anvayavyatirekābhyām yatkāryam yasya niścitam / niścayas tasya taddṛṣṭav iti nyāyo vyavasthitaḥ //

Note: This verse is quoted by Nārāyanakaṇṭha, MTT, p. 23, and by Rajanaka Utpala Deva in PKV, p. 5.

17. When property X can be proved in a thing (by the presence of property Y, it is wrong to infer the presence of X from Y^1 which is the same in name (only) with Y. For example, a white substance (smoke) occurs in fire (but we cannot infer smoke wherever we see a white substance). [14 : 12]

Note: Substituting the terms of the theistic syllogism, when 'possessing an intelligent creator' can be proved of a pot by the presence of 'a particular arrangement of parts', it is wrong to infer (for the whole world) the character of 'possessing an intelligent creator' from the presence of 'arrangement in general'.

This verse is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra on NS, V.I.38 (NVTT, p. 1151, lines 28-29) and by Nārāyanakaṇṭha in MTT, p. 23.

cf. TS, 68: dhūmātmā dhavalo dṛṣṭaḥ pāvaka-

avyabhicāravān / sitābhidheyatāmātrān na himād api tadgatiḥ //

18. Otherwise by a potter's being the cause of a pot which is a particular derivative of clay, one might infer his manufacture of anthills. [15 : 13]

This verse is quoted by Rajanaka Utpala Deva in PKV, p. 5.

cf. TS, 65: tādṛśaḥ procyamānas tu sandigdhavyatirekatām / āsādayati valmīke kumbhakārakṛtādiṣu //

19. Introductory note: The following verse is intended to free the Buddhist from a charge of sophistry and will be clear if we review the argument. The theistic syllogism runs thus: 'All things have an intelligent creator because they have a particular arrangement of parts, like a pot.' This was shown to be wrong because a particular arrangement, viz. the arrangement

exhibited by a pot, can lead only to a particular conclusion. The particular arrangement of parts in a pot has nothing in common with the particular arrangement of parts in a mountain or a human being but the name 'particular arrangement of parts'. However, the theist may say that he means any particular arrangement of parts. Such a probans, being general, will imply the general conclusion 'possessing an intelligent creator'. To deny that it does so is to perpetrate a sophistry of the kāryasama variety, as listed by NS, V.I.37. This sophistry takes its name from its most famous example. The Naiyāyika says, 'Words are non-eternal because they are effects [kārya] like a pot'. The Mīmāṃsa opponent says, 'Some effects like pots result directly upon effort [prayatnānantaro-utpatti]. Other things like words are manifested directly upon effort [prayatnānantarābhivyakti]. There being a difference, the example of pot can prove nothing with regard to words'. The Naiyāyika calls this a kāryasama sophistry because a manifestation is the same as the effect [kāryasama]. When analyzed, the sophistry appears as a case of splitting a probans which is a general term into

two parts depending on its loci and saying it cannot prove A which occurs in locus X because it proves B which occurs in locus Y. Hence the objection to the theistic syllogism, when this is phrased so that its probans is general, might be stigmatized as a kāryasama sophistry.

To avoid this charge Dharmakīrti first defines the kāryasama sophistry (Ms. 19) and then repeats his original charge, Ms. 20 being simply a rephrasing of the charge made in Ms. 17. This charge is that the probans in the theistic syllogism is not really a general term. It only appears so because we give the same name to different things. Accordingly, the probans is not pervaded by the probandum and the syllogism is therefore inconclusive [anaikāntika].

Kāryasama is a fault of logic that consists in making a distinction (in the property 'being an effect') based on the distinction of its loci, when effect in the general sense is a probans pervaded by the probandum. [16 : 14]

cf. TS, 69: sāmānyapratibandhe tu viśeṣa-

āsrayaṇī yadā / codanā kriyate tatra jātyuttaram udāhṛtam // (jātyuttara = kāryasama)

Vs. 19 is quoted by Vācaspati in NVTT, p. 1151.

20. (Whereas our charge against the theistic syllogism is that) it is wrong when property x can be proved in one class of things (by the presence of property y to use a probans (y^1) simply because one finds it to have the same name. For example, it is wrong from the gotva (gotva means both 'cowness' and 'wordness') of words to infer words have horns. [17 : 15]

cf. TS, 70: gośabdavācyatāmātrād digādīnāṃ viṣāṇitā / saṃsiddhyed anyathā hy eṣa nyāyo nāśrīyate yadi //

21. Since there is no control on what we wish to say, where do words not exist? (i.e., One can always find a word to suit one's intention.) If object were proved simply by the presence of a word, any man could prove anything. [18 : 16]

22. Hereby the Sāṃkhyas' non-sentiency (of the intellect etc.) which they deduce from its non-eternality is brought in question and so is Jainas' sentiency (of the tree etc.) which they deduce from its death when its bark is removed. [19 : 17]

Dharmakīrti intends to show here two examples of the uselessness of a probans which is based on a word rather than on a fact. The two syllogisms which are criticized may be formulated as follows:

1. Sāṃkhyas

   The intellect is insentient (i.e. the intellect is not part of the soul) because it is non-eternal.

2. Jainas.

   The tree is sentient (i.e. the tree has a soul) because it dies when its bark is removed.

The first of these is an example of what Dharmakīrti elsewhere calls svayamvādino 'siddha fallacy (cf. NB, III.62 where the same example is given). That is the probans is impossible by the

very doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas themselves, for they do not admit that anything is non-eternal, at least in the proper (Buddhist) sense of non-eternal, viz. perishing without a trace [niranvaya-vināśitva]. In formulating their syllogism they are using the word 'non-eternal' in an improper sense, viz. as 'disappearing without departing from its former essential nature' [apracyutaprācyarūpasya tirodhāna]. Thus words can be made to prove anything. (TS, 303-305 deals with the same example. For a similar example and criticism see NSB, I.2.6)

The second syllogism is an example of what Dharmakīrti calls a prativādy-asiddha fallacy (cf. NB, III.61, where the same example is given). The probans is impossible by the doctrine of another school, in this case the Buddhists. The Buddhists use 'death' in the sense of 'cessation of cognition, sense-organs and span of life' [vijñānendriyāyur-nirodha], and cognition etc. are not found in trees.

23. This principle (of criticism) holds only so far as the probans is not found to exist in the paksa (minor term) as it really is. If the probans does exist there,

another property (claimed to belong to the pakṣa) does not invalidate the inference even if it be not found. For example, 'residing in space' as claimed of sound (does not invalidate the Vaiśeṣika influence). [20 : 18]

The Vaiśeṣikas argue against the Mīmāṃsakas as follows: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect.' But the Vaiśeṣikas also believe that sound inheres in space (or ether), a property [viśeṣaṇa] of sound which the Buddhists deny. The false attribution of this property, however, does not affect the validity of the Vaiśeṣika inference, "for perception shows that words exist and inference shows that they are effects (M., p. 16, line 13)."

24. Objection (M., p. 16, line 15): But suppose the word is unproved and the thing is proved; what then?

Though the word be unproved, if the thing is proved, the probans is valid; thus the 'possessing of mūrti' is probans (of the non-eternity) of Aulūkya's (atoms) when argued by the Buddhists. [21 : 19]

The syllogism argued by the Buddhists against the Vaiśeṣikas is:

Atoms are non-eternal,

because they possess mūrti,

like a pot.

Here the probans as word is not proved. That is, according to the Buddhists 'mūrti' does not refer to the property called 'mūrti' by the Vaiśeṣikas (substantial size of less than universal size), while according to the Vaiśeṣikas it does not refer to the property called 'mūrti' by the Buddhists (tangibility). But since both schools admit that there is such a thing as tangibility and that it is found in atoms, the probans as thing is proved and the syllogism is valid.

25. (But this principle cannot be reversed. That is to say, one cannot claim that the syllogism is valid when the word is correct even if the thing is not correct. The reason is as follows:)

But if the (probans as) thing be not concomitant (with the probandum), even though the (probans as) word

is concomitant, the probans must be known to be faulty. For one proves a thing by a thing (not by a word). [22 : 20]

M. (p. 21, line 10): Thus the syllogisms which prove the existence of God by a word which is devoid of meaning but as a word is pervaded by the probandum are false.

26. The Tibetan here has an extra verse missing from the Sanskrit texts:

/ ḥgro . baḥi . phyir . daṅ . lag . ldan . phyir /
/ rva . can . glaṅ . po . shes . sgrub . byed /
/ ḥdi . yi . sgra . yi . rjod . bya . ni /
/ grags . pa . yin . gyis . brjod . ḥdod . min //

27. M. (p. 17, line 12): But now what proves that God does not exist? [So far we have merely shown that the standard proofs that God does exist are fallacious.]

If a thing is a non-cause (i.e. God before the time

of creation) in just the same way (with no alteration of properties) as it is a cause (i.e. God at the time of creation), how is it that when it is a cause it is not a cause? [23 : 22]

Such is the natural interpretation of the verse and that given by M. But P. (p. 48, lines 9 ff) finds a double sense: "There is no distinction between space etc. and God as regards eternality whereby one should be cause and the other non-cause. Hence the text says, 'The thing which is cause is just the same as the thing which is non-cause etc.' Just as the properties omnipresence, unity, etc. belong to God, so also they belong to space etc. Since they are the same, how can there be this distinction that God is cause and space etc. is not cause? ....Or (one may interpret as follows): Just as God was a non-cause before creation, just so should he be a non-cause at the time of creation, for there is no difference in his nature, etc."

28. M. (p. 17, line 19): Or, if you allow God as

qualified in his causeless state to become a cause, (the author says:)

> When Caitra's wound is healed by the application of the weapon or of medicine, why not suppose that a post, which has no connection with the wound, could likewise cause a cure? [24 : 23]

Note: For the widespread use of the weapon in curing the wound, cf. Sir James Frazer, The Magic Art, vol.I, pp. 201 ff. The examples he there gives are of applying medicine to the weapon in order to cure the wound (contagious magic). Dharmakīrti's verse could be interpreted in conformity with this. But M. seems to understand it as meaning the application of either medicine or the weapon to the wound. The latter process would be a case of homeopathetic magic.

29. M. (p. 18, line 3): In case it be objected that there is a difference between God's causal state and his causeless state, this difference being brought about by his entering into action,

the author says:

> And activity cannot be connected with (God) unless his nature be (already) changed. And since there is no time when an external substance is absent, (God's) causal competence cannot be confirmed. [25 : 24]

As M. (p. 18, line 10) puts it: "A cause is that in the absence of which the effect is absent." Since God, according to the definition of the theists, is never absent, one can never establish the fact he is a cause.

30. > When (an effect) comes into existence upon the existence of certain factors, if one assumes that which is different from these factors to be the cause of the effect, there will be no end of causes whatsoever. [26 : 25]

This verse is quoted by Nārāyanakaṇṭha in MTT, p. 23.

P. (p. 49): When the object desired (e.g.

a pot) comes into existence upon the existence of a potter whom one sees and a certain activity, if one assumes (God) as an extra factor, then there will be no end of causes for each and every effect.

cf. TSḥ, 90: yeṣu satsu bhavaddṛṣṭam asatsu na kadācana / tasyānyahetutākḷptāv anavasthā katham na te //

31. Objection (M., p. 18, line 18): But the earth is a cause of sprouts, yet remains unchanged from the state of being a non-agent. (So may it be with God.)

This objection accords with Uddyotakāra's view as shown in TSP, vol. I, p. 78, lines 19 ff.: The action of God cannot be for the sake of amusement. Rather, God operates just as the earth and other elements do, in their very nature, toward the birth of their effects. Only a transformation of its nature is earth etc. a cause of the production of sprouts, for we see the alteration [viśeṣa] of the earth in its culture. (cf. NV, p. 949, lines 21 ff.)

If it be urged, "Let (God) be a cause (without alteration of his nature), just as the contact of object with sense-organ, without alteration of either, is a cause of cognition*," we reply: Not so, because there is alteration even in that case. [27 : 26]

*According to the Nyāya, perception is caused by contact of object with sense-organ (cf. NS, I.1.4). But according to the Buddhist there is an alteration here, produced from the immediately preceding moment, and consisting in a momentary consciousness capable of producing the new cognition.

32. If there were no variation [atiśaya]* in the nature [svabhāva]** of (the object and the sense-organ) which are severally incapable (of producing perception), they would still be incapable even when coming into contact. From this fact, a variation is proved. [29 : 28]

*atiśaya (= khyad . par) here means 'variation', 'additament or diminution', 'extra factor which arises under a new circumstance and permits a

change to take place' etc. For the usage of atiśaya in this sense, cf. SDS, II.77-80, with La Vallée-Poussin's note thereon in Muséon (1901, p. 65, note 28); Śankara in BSB on II.1.4 calls cetanā niratiśaya (BSB, p. 356, line 14, Govindānanda, Vācaspti and Ānandagiri respectively gloss here, 'utkarṣāpakarṣaśūnyatvāc cetanānāṃ mitho nopakārakatvam ity āha niratiśayā iti', upajanāpāyavaddharmayogo 'tiśayaḥ, tadabhāvo niratiśayatvam' and 'upajanāpāyadharmaśūnyatvaṃ niratiśayatvam'); so also NSB calls the ātman niratiśaya, (NSB, 264, 4; 906, 9; 909, 7).

**P. reads santāna, while M. and Tibetan read svabhāva, which I followed.

33. Accordingly, it is factors severally incapable of producing an effect, but in which we infer a (new) quality when they are brought together, that are causes; not God, who must remain unchanged. [30 : 25]

34. Dharmakīrti now establishes the validity of

the Buddhas's teaching by its practicability. He begins his discussion by contrasting the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas according to whom no teaching is invariably valid except that of the Veda, which is so because it rests on no human authorship.

> Some (viz. the Mimāṃsakas) maintain that being a valid knowledge-instrument means (furnishing) a knowledge of what is beyond the senses. No one can practise the means to such knowledge, for there are no such means. [31 : 30]

P. (p. 50, lines 23-26): For one who is not omniscient to become omniscient he must have a knowledge of what is beyond the senses. What means are these thereto? We find no method whatever in the practice of which a man might know everything. ....It is impossible for all things which are beyond the senses to be revealed directly, for (direct) sensual knowledge can only extend to what is nearby. (cf. SDS, XII, 167 ff)

35. P. (p. 51, lines 14-15): On this point the

author says that what is sought as a valid knowledge-instrument is not a man who knows everything. So long as he does not deceive us let him be one who tells us simply what we need to know. (32 : 31]

(But we would say) that what we seek, fearing deception in the instruction given by the ignorant, is a man of knowledge, that we may practise* his teaching.

*pratipatti = nan . tan . bya . ba = the anusṭhāna of the preceding verse.

36. Accordingly we should consider his knowledge only in so far as it may be practised [anuṣṭheyagata]. If he knows the number of insects in the world what use would this knowledge be to us? [33 : 32]

Dharmottara in commenting on NB (NBT, pp. 4-5) speaks of two kinds of accomplishment [siddhi]. Accomplishment that is linked to a (physical) cause is called birth [utpatti]; accomplishment linked to a cognition is called practice or application [anusṭhāna]. This practice, when the

preceding cognition is a valid knowledge-instrument means the actual avoidance of what one wishes to avoid and the gaining of what one wishes to gain. Hence practisability or the test of avoidance and gain is the criterion of the validity of a teaching. (Compare Vs. 8)

37. (Thus,) he (viz. the Buddha) who knows precisely what we need avoid (viz. Suffering [duḥkha]) and what we need gain (viz. Cessation of Suffering [nirodha]) together with the means to each (viz. The Origin of Suffering [samudaya] and The Path to Liberation [mārga]) is to be sought as valid means of knowledge, not one who knows everything. [34 : 33]

38. It matters not whether one sees far or not, so long as one sees the truth that is needed. If all we demand of our authority is distant vision, come, let us go pray to the vultures. [35 : 34]

IV. Jagaddhitaisitva

39. Note: Up to Vs. 38 Dharmakīrti has discussed the Buddha as valid knowledge-instrument incarnate [pramāṇabhūta], i.e., the first epithet given to the Buddha by Diṅnāga (See introduction). He now proceeds to discuss the second epithet, i.e., "who has the desire of the good of the world" [jagaddhitaisin] which is interpreted by him to be synonymous with 'one who is compassionate' [karuṇikatva] for the world in misery.

> Compassion is a proof (of the Buddha's validity), and this (is completely natural to him) from long-repeated exercise. If (the materialists) hold that long-repeated exercise (of compassion) is impossible (because we have only one life) since thought [buddhi] is dependent on the body, we reply; not so, because we deny that (the body is) the source [āśraya] (of thought). [36 : 35]

The meaning of this elliptical verse becomes clear in the course of Dharmakīrti's work, especially from (Vs. 133 and on). The main points to

bear in mind are as follows: The teaching of the Four Noble Truths can be explained only as due to the Buddha's compassion [karuṇā]. But this compassion of the Buddha is something quite beyond the powers of ordinary humans. It could not have been gained in one life-time, for we see how little we can accomplish ourselves in one life-time of practising compassion. We may have moments of pity for others, but this feeling never becomes svarasavāhin (T, p. 54, line 4, completely natural, carried along by its own current). For compassion to reach this degree requires many lives of dedication to the good of others and long-repeated exercise. The first objection to this doctrine which Dharmakīrti considers is the objection of the materialists [Cārvāka or Lokāyata] who deny that we live more than one life. The buddhi (thought, personality) lives no longer than the body.

M. (p. 21, lines 19-22) interprets their argument as follows: Thought depends on the body because it is its effect, just as light depends on a lamp, or because it is its power, just as the intoxicating power depends upon the wine, or because it is its quality, just as whiteness depends upon

the cloth. In all these three cases, the dependent perishes when its source perishes. Hence from where could further life come? Or how could there be long-repeated exercise of compassion etc.? Such is the Cārvāka's view.

For the doctrines of the Cārvākas, the chief sources are: (1) SDS, Book I, (2) Tattvopaplavasimha, Chapter VII (this is now translated in Rādhakrishnan and Moor's Source Book of Indian Philosophy, 1957), (3) TS and TSP, 1857-1964, (4) A. Hillebrandt's article in Festschrift für B. Kuhn, 1916, p. 24, offers a convenient summary, although he was unaware of sources 2 and 3 listed above, (5) 護法 (Dharmapāla), 大乘廣百論釋論 (Taishōzōkyō, vol. 30, p. 195): 復次順世外道作如是言。----

40. The materialist may be supposed to object as follows (P., p. 54, lines 21-23): The sense-organs etc. are always connected with the parents' bodies etc., both positively and negatively; (x possesses

sense-organs if his parents possessed bodies; if not, not;) and since the nature of the body consists in the gross elements, the senses have them (ultimately) as their source. Nor have we any perception that the sense-organs are otherwise, as, that they should come from a former life. So how could your 'other-world' theory [paralokavāda] be supported?

To deny this the author says:

> The origin of inhalation [prāṇa], exhalation [apāna], sense-organs [indriya] and thought [dhī] does not come simply from the body; for such a theory involves an absurdity [atiprasaṅga]* in regard to what would originate. [37-first half of 38a : 36-first half of 37a]

*The absurdity is made explicit by M. (p. 22, lines 12-14): If the inhalation etc. took their origin simply from the gross elements, they would derive from the gross elements everywhere and the whole universe would consist of living beings. But this is not the case. Accordingly, the sense-organs, though they do derive from the body, do so in dependence on homogeneous factors of a previous

birth. In this way their connection with a previous birth is certain.

41. Dharmakīrti next shows that not only must former birth be postulated, but future ones also.

> (And) that (viz. the breath etc.) which is seen to have had a power for re-assembling [pratisandhāna]*, what extra property could it have had, by lack of which in the future it should not re-assemble (again)? [Second half of 38a-end of 38 : second half of 37a-end of 37]

*pratisandhāna (mtshams . sbyor . ba, 結生) means the gaining one's next birth through the intermediary state [antarbhāva]. cf. (A) AbhK, (p. 46, fol. 3; LVP, III, p. 51). 故施設論有如是說。時健達縛於二心中隨一現行。謂愛或恚。彼由起此二種倒心。便謂己身與所愛合。所憎不淨泄至胎時。謂是己有便生喜慰。從茲羯厘中有便沒生有起已名已結生。(B) AbhK (Kārikā III, 24): sa bhaviṣyad bhavaphalaṃ kurute karma tad bhavaḥ / pratisaṃdhiḥ punar jātir jarāmaraṇam avidaḥ //

42. But the materialist may say (M., p. 22, lines 21-22): There is no absurdity in my theory. I do not say that the breath etc. come from the elements pure and simple, but that they come from a particular transformation of the elements known as the body. The elements in any other form are incompatible with the origin of breath etc. In the same way some rocks are the seed of gold and some are not. To this the author says:

> There is no portion of earth etc. in which creatures (of some sort) born of sweat or otherwise may not originate. So everything could be called the seed (of life). [39 : 38]

M. (p. 23, lines 7 ff) points out that whether rocks are called the seed of gold or not amounts to no more than whether or not they contain atoms of gold. He continues "'But', says the materialist, 'even though transformations may originate without distinction from the elements pure and simple, why should these still not be a difference between what transformations cause breath etc. and what do not?' The answer is that we see living things

everywhere."

In other words, the fault with the materialist theory, as Dharmakīrti sees it, is that it does not explain why the particular sorts of life originate in the particular places that they do. Either all sorts of life should arise everywhere or these should be some sorts of life that can arise, a possibility which Dharmakīrti denies.

43. The following three verses refute the argument that breath or thought is a power (or chemical product) of the body. M. (p. 23, lines 13-16) puts the argument more explicitly than the text: "'But,' says the objector, 'the gross elements, in so far as they possess many and various distinctions within each major class, may produce various transformations.' (To which the Buddhist will say,) 'No. To begin with, a distinction could not arise from the elements pure and simple, for (if it did) the (same) distinctions would arise everywhere, and one would not be absent where another is found. On the other hand, we (Buddhists) regard karma as an auxiliary cause [sahakārin], and various

effects can be accounted for by the variations of it (viz. karma).' In order thus to refute the doctrine of that breath etc. is a power (of the body), the author says":

> If the eyes etc. were born thus, independently of the preceding homogeneous causes, then the transformation (we find in the case) of one would be the same as that of all (others), for there would be no distinction. [40 : 39]

44. Nor is the body the source of thought, because:

> There is no disturbance of mental cognition [manomati*] even if one of the sense-organs is disturbed. However, when mental cognition is injured, we see that there is injury to the sense-organs. [41 : 40]

*M.: manomati = vikalpabuddhi

P. (p. 58, line 13): When mental cognition is disturbed by fear, grief, joy or anger, we can

see modifications in a man's eyes etc.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 528: tathāhi śārdūla-śonitādibībhatsaviṣayadarśanādibalenāpi kasyacit-kātaramanasaḥ saṃjāyata eva mohādilakṣaṇo manaso vikāraḥ,,na caitāvatā sā manomatis tadāśritā bhavati / kāmaśokādivitarkeṇa ca manasy upahate dehavikāradarśanād dehasyāpi tadupādānatāprasaṅgāt kintu niyamena sākṣāc ca yasyaiva yo vikāram anuvidhatte sa tad upādāno yuktaḥ / na ca rāgādilakṣano vikāro niyamena śarīraposādito bhavati.

45. Accordingly, the source of the continuity [sthity-āśraya] of thought [buddhi; P.: 'namely karma which is characterized as conscious'] depends solely on thought (and not on the body).

Some of this* (viz. karma) is an environmental cause [nimitta] of the eyes etc. Therefore the eye etc. derives (ultimately) from thought. [42 : 41]

Note on the above verse: Thought [buddhi] is really nothing but a series of momentary, discon-

tinuous cognitions [vijñānāni]. But it has a certain continuity [sthiti] despite this discontinuity. There is a patter, a chain of causation between former and latter instants. Vasubandhu says, "What is called continuity [sthiti] is the stream which is continuous because a like moment follows upon a like (quoted and interpreted by Yaśomitra in AbhV, p. 175, line 3)." This continuity in discontinuity was a favorite butt of anti-Buddhist philosophers. But the Buddhists were satisfied that the difficulty could be solved by karma. Each cognition produced a mental karma which in turn produced a new cognition. Thought, to use a modern illustration, is like a line which is composed of discrete points, but we may say that each point in the line gives direction to the point which follows.

Now, this mental karma acts not only to produce new cognitions. It acts also as a conditioning element for new sense-organ moments, for these moments are derived from preceding sense-organ moments in dependence on mental karma.

*Not all the mental karma is employed in this way, however. The sense-organs belong to the

rūpadhātu (the material world) and only part of the mental karma takes effect in this area, the rest being in the ārūpyadhātu (the immaterial world; cf. AbhK [p. 41, fol. 1, 無色界中都無有處。··· LVP, III, pp. 4 ff]).

The above is the manner in which P. (p. 59, lines 12ff) interprets the verse. M. (p. 24, lines 11-12) construes kaś cit differently, giving the following sense: "Accordingly the source of the continuity of thought must be something [kaś cit] dependent on thought etc." But P.'s interpretation seems preferable.

Note on Dharmakīrti's karma theory: All the Buddhist schools speak of three types of karma, viz. mental karma [cetanā-karma], physical karma [kāya-karma] and verbal karma [vāk-karma]. However, they vary in interpreting how these three karmas are interrelated and each characterized.[1] The Sarvastivāda[2] school maintains that physical karma and verbal karma alone are respectively subdivided into vijñāpti (manifesting) type and avijñāpti (latent, i.e., latent as energy for later manifestation) type, but not mental karma. Their account

of this is as follows: both physical karma and verbal karma, when they arise, take the gross elements [mahābhūta] for their source [āśraya] and continue to exist as avijñāpti karma through a homogeneous gross element-series. But mental karma which depends upon thought [buddhi] cannot be characterized as avijñāpti karma, for thought cannot continue in the form of a thought-series.

The Sautrāntika school disapproves of such distinctions of vijñāpti and avijñāpti as attributed only to physical karma and verbal karma. According to this school, the distinction of physical karma and verbal karma is simply due to the different conditioning factors [ālambana], viz. body etc., which thought takes.[3] Thus it is thought [buddhi], says the Sautrāntika school, that gives rise to karma, and that karma continues in the form of a thought-series of which the Sarvastivāda did not approve. The Vijñānavāda (or Yogācāra) school[4] accepts this karma theory of the Sautrāntika school and admits the continuity of homogeneous thoughts.

Dharmakīrti may be seen to follow the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras' karma theory in Vs. 45 where he says that the source of the conti-

nuity of thought depends on thought and not on the body.

[1]Funahashi, Gō no Kenkyū, pp. 38-68.

[2]Abhidharmanyāyānusāra (or 阿毘達磨順正理論, Taishōzōkyō, vol. 29, p. 531, fol. 3): 復有何緣。唯身語業。表無表性。意業不然。以意業中無彼相故。謂能表示故名為表。表示自心令他知故。意無是事。故不名表。---如是一旦制意業非表。亦非無表。以無表業初起必依生因大種。此後無表生因雖滅。定有同類大種為依。故後後時。無表續起。諸意業必依於心。非後後時定有同類心相續起。可意無表依止彼心。多念相續。以心善等念々有殊。設無表思。同類續起。如何依止前心意業。可隨後念異類心轉。非有意業心不相應。故意業中。亦無無表。是故唯有身語二業。表無表性。其理善成。

[3]AbhK (p. 68, fol. 3; LVP, IV, p. 12): 既執但用假立身業。復立何法為身業耶。若業依身[kāyādhiṣṭhāna]立為身業; AbhV (IV, p. 351, lines 12-15): 'kāyādhiṣṭhānam' iti kāyālambanam ity

arthaḥ. yasya hi kāyaḥ pravartyaḥ 'tat' kāyādhiṣṭhānam 'karma'. tenāha yā cetanā kāyasya tatratatra praṇetrīti 'yathāyogaṃ veditavye' iti. vāg-adhiṣṭhānaṃ karma vāk-karma. manas-karma tu manasaḥ karma.

[4]vijñāptimātratāsiddhiśāstra (成唯識論, Taishōzōkyō, vol. 31, p. 4, fol. 3): 故身表業定非實有. 然心等因。令識所變手等色相生滅相續轉趣餘方。似有動作表示心故。假名身表。語表亦實有聲性。一刹那聲無詮表故。多念相續便非實故。外有對色前色破故。然因心故。識變似聲生滅相續似有表示。假名語表。於理無違。表既實無。無表寧實。然依思願善惡分限。假立無表理無違。謂此或依發勝身語善惡思、種增長位立。或依定中止身語惡、現行思立。故是假有。

46. Thought will be productive [ākṣepikā] of karma hereafter in just such a way as it was productive (in the inception of this life). [43a : 42a]

The point made by this half verse is the same as that of Vs. 41.

*ākṣepaka -°ikā means productive of karma, referring to that characteristic of a thought-instant which determines future instants. cf. AbhK (p. 71, fol. 3; LVP, IV, p. 37): 論曰。表無表業等起有二。謂因等起。刹那等起。在先爲因故。彼刹那有故。如次初名轉。第二名隨轉。謂因等起 [hetusamutthāna] 將作業時。能引發 [ākṣepaka] 故說名發轉 [pravartaka]。 AbhV (IV, p. 364, lines 25-29): 'hetusamutthānam' iti. samuttiṣṭhate 'neneti 'samutthānam'. 'hetuś' ca sa 'samutthānam' ca tat 'hetu-samutthānam'. ..... 'ākṣepakatvād' ity utpādakatvāt.

47. Dharmakīrti has now denied that the body is the source [āśraya] of thought (cf. Ns. 39), meaning thereby that thought does not simply grow out of the body, as the materialist would have it. But the Buddha has said, "The body and thought are mutually dependent [anyonyavidhāyitvam kāyacittayoḥ, P., p. 59, last line; M., p. 25, line 3]," and this

would seem to imply that the body is the source [āśraya] of thought, just as thought is the source of the body. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti now states the precise sense in which the body may be said to be the source of thought, a sense which is not incompatible with the denial of Ns. 39.

Thought is said to have its source in the body simply because it is conditioned by cognitions of the body. [43b : 42b]

48. Even if, (as the materialist insists), thought could not come into existence without the sense-organs, neither can the sense-organs come into existence without thought. Thus, there is a mutual causal relation [anyonyahetutva] (between the two), and this being so, (thought and body) become causes of each other. [44 : 43]

M. (p. 25, lines 12-15): If the sense-organs derived from the elements pure and simple, they would arise everywhere, from all elements (see Ns. 42). Thought and body are causes of each other in this life and are in a beginningless series of

just the same sort (viz. anyonyahetutva). This proves the existence of another world.

49. That which is produced consecutively does not derive from what is not consecutive. For, what is not altered (viz. what is eternally unchangeable) cannot depend on (any auxiliaries to produce its effects consecutively). (Accordingly,) thought being produced from the body successively, shows that the body too comes into existence consecutively. [45 : 44]

cf. Vs. 13 note

50. (This being so), if at every moment the preceding moment (of the complex: thought, sense and body) is the cause of the following moment, then this sort of cause should be accepted for all moments (viz. not only in this life but also hereafter, thus proving the 'other world' to exist). [46 : 45]

51. The opponent may object as follows (M., p. 26,

lines 12-13): If the 'other world' is proved to exist by the inference that one will be reborn in just the same way since the body is always accompanied by thought, why can you not equally well make an inference that there will be no reaggregation of further thought, because one's last thought dies, like the last thought of a Buddhist saint? To answer this objection, the author says:

> What contradiction is there between a thought's being a person's last thought and the reaggregation of a further thought (in a new body)? And why should you suppose that the last thought of a Buddhist saint [arhat] does not re-assemble? [47 : 46]

The above-shown objection of the materialist is basically the same as TS, 1863: sarāgamaraṇaṃ cittaṃ/na cittāntarasandhikṛt / maraṇajñānabhāvena vītakleśasya tad yathā // TSP: sarāgasya maranacittaṃ cittantaraṃ na pratisandhate, maraṇacittatvād arhaccaramacittavad iti vyāpakaviruddhaupalabdhiḥ.

Note: It is frequently mentioned in AbhK. that

the last thought [antya-citta] of a Buddhist saint [arhat = aśaikṣa] is not re-assembled because it is free from impurities [kleśa]. cf. (1) AbhK (p. 4, fol. 2; LVP, I, p. 33): 若爾無學最後念心應非意界。此無間滅後識不生。非意界故。此已住意性故。闕餘緣故 [anyakāraṇa-vaikalyāt] 後識不生 [nottaravijñānasambhūtiḥ]. AbhV, I, p. 39, lines 33 ff: 'anyakāraṇavaikalyād' iti / paunarbhāvikakarmakleśakāraṇavaikalyāt / 'nottravijñānasambhutir' iti / na punarbhava-pratisaṃdhivijñānam ity abhiprāyaḥ / (2) AbhK (p. 36, fol. 2; LVP, II, p. 300): 除阿羅漢涅槃時最後心心所法諸餘已生心心所法。是等無間緣性 [samanantarapratyaya].

If the materialist raises an objection against Dharmakīrti's citta-santāna (thought-series) theory, by using the last thought of a Buddhist saint, which does not reassemble, as the example in his syllogism [maraṇacittam cittāntarāpratisandhānam maraṇa-cittatvād arhaccaramacittavat], the Buddhist may ask, "On what grounds do you suppose that the saint's last thought brings his whole thought-series to an end?" M. (p. 26, line 20) adds, "You

materialists do not believe in saints. All your effort has been to disprove their existence." M. (p. 26, Lines 21-23) adds more than this, lest it be supposed that Dharmakīrti is taking unfair advantage of the materialist, "As for us (Buddhists) who accept the theory that the saint is not reborn, the non-aggregation is due to the fact that the saint's last thought is free of all impurity, and to no other reason. The last thoughts of ordinary mortals are not of this sort, so there is no reason why they should not cause reaggregation."

52. But Dharmakīrti does not trouble to justify the Buddhist theory of saintly non-rebirth at this point. He presses his advantage against the materialist, insisting that some reason compatible with materialistic views be offered for the non-aggregation of the last thought.

Why should a doctrine be accepted if the matter cannot be established by a valid knowledge-instrument? If you suppose (that the last thought) does not reassemble) because of weakness of its cause, then why

do you not offer this (in your syllogism)? [48 : 47]

The materialist may be assumed to take as the cause of thought the breath, the sense-organs etc., and since these become weak at the time of death, he may argue that from weakness of its cause the thought is not reassembled. Dharmakīrti proceeds to refute such a theory in the following verses.

53. Mental cognition [manovijñāna] does not derive from the (body) as possessed of a sense-organ, for in that case it would apprehend its objects as sensual cognition [indriyadhī] does. [49a : 48a]

Its apprehension would be as vivid [spaṣṭara] as that of sensual cognition (M., p. 27, lines 13-14). And how could we explain our mental cognition of objects of sight when our eyes are closed (P., p. 65, lines 10-11)?

AbhK (p. 8, fol.3; LVP, I, pp. 60-61) distinguishes mental cognition [manovijñāna] from the five other sensual cognitions [indriyavijñāna] as

follows: 論曰。傳說。分別略有三種。一自性分別 [svabhāva-vikalpa]. 二計度分別 [abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa]. 三隨念分別 [anusmaraṇa-vikalpa].

1. svabhāva-vikalpa: intuitive discrimination which operates at the present time, directly connected with the object.

2. abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa: discrimination based on judgment which operates throughout the three divisions of time.

3. anusmaraṇa-vikalpa: retrospective or reminiscent discrimination which is connected with the past.

The first five sensual cognitions [indriya-vijñānas] possess only svabhāva-vikalpa, while the mental cognition [manovijñāna] has all the three vikalpas.

It is interesting to note that TSP (vol. I, p. 527) outlines the argument of this and the following verse in almost the very words of M.: nāpi sendriya iti pakṣaḥ // tathā hīndriyāt pratyekaṃ vā manomatiḥ syāt samastād vā / na tāvat pratyekam, ekaikeindriyāpāye 'pi manomater

avikalatvāt / tathā hi prasuptikādirogādinā kāryendriyādīnām upaghāte 'pi manodhīr avikṛitaikā 'vikalām svasattām anubhavati / na ca yasya vikāre 'pi yan na vikriyate tat tatkāryam yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / kiṃ ca cakṣurādivijñānavat pratiniyatārthagrāhitā nirvikalpakatvam artha-sannidhāna sāpekṣapravṛttikatā ca prāpnoti, abhinnakāraṇatvāt / yugapad anekavikalpotpatti-prasaṅgāc ca /

54. Nor does it arise from the (body as) possessed of all the sense-organs (collectively), because its power of producing cognitions is of a different sort. [49b : 48b]

Its power is not altered by harm done to the sense-organs.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 527: nāpi samastād iti pakṣaḥ ekendriyābhāve 'py abhāvaprasaṅgāt / ekasahakāryapāye 'ṅkurādyapāyavat /

55. Nor does it arise from the body differently conceived (viz. the body bereft of the sense-organs), because (the body so conceived) has no consciousness. [First half of 50a : first half of 49a]

Our hair and fingernails (M., p. 27, line 21) are certainly not causes of mental cognition.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 527: nāpy anindriya iti pakṣaḥ kalevaracyutasyāpi pāṇyādes taddhetutva-prasaṅgāt /

56. The materialist may object as follows (M., p. 28, line 7): If the body is not the source (of mental cognition), how is it that mental cognition and body co-exist? To answer this objection, the author says:

The co-existence (of thought and body) is due to their having the same cause (viz. karma). (This relation between the two) is like that between eye and colour, (tongue and) taste. [Second half of 50a-first half of 50b : second half of 49a-first half of 49b]

M. (p. 28, lines 10-11): The sense-organs and their corresponding objects do not stand in a relation of source and derivative [āśraya-āśrayibhāva], but nevertheless co-exist since they depend on a single set of causal factors [ekasāmagrī].

57. M. (p. 28, lines 12-15): However, an objector may insist that x is the source [āśraya] of y, if y is altered when x is altered. Similarly, since mental cognition is altered when the eye etc. is altered, the eye etc. must be a source of mental cognition. Again since mental cognition is altered when the body is altered by poison, phlegmatic humor etc., the body must be a source of mental cognition. To answer this objection, the author says:

> The alterations (of mental cognition) are due to its objects, (not to the body). [Second half of 50b : second half of 49b]

Note: Our thought is altered, becomes

terrified, by the cognition of a sword-stroke. It is the stroke as cognized, not as physical source, that brings about the alteration (M., p. 28, lines 15-16).

58. In the following verse, Dharmakīrti gives the definition of cause [hetu] in accordance with the Buddhist formula of causality.

> If the existence of x is assistant to y in the sense of being invariably bound to y, then x is the cause of y. It is expressed by the locative (i.e., in the formula asmin sati idam bhavati: 'x existing, y comes into being') and hence also (in the ablative formula asyotpādād idam utpadyate) 'from the origin (of x, y originates'). [51 : 50]

M. (p. 28, last line-p. 29, line 2): If x's existence is only occasionally assistant to y (see next verse), then x is the cause of a particular property [viśeṣa] (of y,) and not of the property-possessor [dharmin, i.e., y itself],

because in this case y may exist when x is non-existent. Thought [citta] is attached to thought only for its cause, but particular properties of thought have the body for their cause. Accordingly the body is not the cause (of thought), for thought does not cease to exist upon the cessation of the body.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 527: yaḥ kāryagatāśeṣaviśeṣānuyāyinaḥ svabhāvasya sadā cātmasattāpratyupasthānatas tadupakārī yasya vikārāpādanam antarena kāryam aśakyavikāraṃ sa eva kāraṇaviśeṣa upādānatvena prasiddhaḥ / yathā pūrvapūrvo mṛdātmā kalāpa uttarottarasya ghaṭasaṃjñitasya kāryakalāpasyopādānam /

The double formula of causality [asmin satīdam bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate] is regularly used in formulating the chain of dependent origination [pratītyasamutpāda].

cf. AbhK (p. 50, fol. 3; LVP, III, p. 79): 此緣起 [pratītyasamutpāda] 義即是所說。依此有彼有 [asmin satīdam bhavati]。此生

彼生 [asyotpādād idam utpadyate]。故應引彼釋緣起義。 For further reference to this formula, cf. LVP, Théorie des douze Causes, pp. 46 ff.

59. Let it be granted (that the body is) an occasional assistant to the thought-series [cittasantati]. This does not bring about the cessation (of what is assisted, viz., the thought-series, upon the cessation of what assists it, viz. the body), just as (the cessation) of a pot (which is assisted by fire) is not brought about by (the cessation) of the fire (which baked it). [52 : 51]

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 529: bhavatu vā sākṣād upakārī deho manomateḥ svopādānapravṛttāyāḥ kadācit. tathā 'pi na dehanivṛttāv api tasyā nivṛttiḥ siddhyati. yathā vahninivṛttāv api na ghaṭādivinivṛttiḥ svopādānapravṛttatvād iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ /

60. If (thought) were dependent on the body (for its cause), it would imply that thought could not perish (as long as the body remains). [53a: 52a]

M. (p. 29, lines 14-15): Because it is impossible that thought, if it is caused solely by the body for its cause and is independent of any homogeneous cause, should not come into being when its cause (viz. the body) remains unimpaired. Accordingly, thought could not perish so long as the body remains.

P. (p. 70, line 8): Thought would cease to function only in the absence of the body, that is, when the body is reduced to ashes, for only then would thought be without cause.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 541: atha tatra tathābhūte nirmūlam apagatavijñāne dehe punar-utpattir iṣyate vijñānasya tadā tatrotpattāv iṣyamāṇāyāṃ maraṇābhāvaḥ prāpnoti, mṛtasyāpi punarvijñānotpattiprasaṅgāt suptaprabuddhavat.

61. M. (p. 29, lines 17-18): If you propose that

inhalation and exhalation are the cause of thought,* supposing that there would be no appearance of thought in the state of death, because these two then cease, the author answers:

Inhalation and exhalation derive from that (viz. thought)** and not that from them, because the two exist by the existence of thought and are subject to its control. [53b : 52b]

*cf. TS, 1864: kāyād eva tato jñānaṃ prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt / yuktaṃ jāyata ity etat kambalāśvataroditam //

**cf. AbhK (p. 86, fol. 3; LVP, IV, p. 154): 息風名生。依身心轉 [prāṇo nāma vāyuḥ kāyacitta-samniśrito vartate]. 若有令斷不更續生。如滅燈者鈴聲名殺。AbhV, IV, p. 405, lines 2-4: katham citta-samniśrito vāyuḥ pravartate. citta-pratibaddhavṛttitvāt. tathā hi nirodhāsaṃjñisamāpattisamāpannasya mṛtasya ca na pravartate.

62. The opponent may object as follows (P., p. 70,

lines 22-23): Thought cannot be the cause of inhalation and exhalation because they operate when one is asleep. To answer this objection, the author furnishes further reasons:

(Not so;) how could there be expulsion and contraction of air without effort (which is a sign of a person's consciousness*)?

(If, however, inhalation and exhalation were the cause of the thought, then,) (1) shortness [nirhrāsa] or length [atiśaya] (of thought) would result from shortness or length of these, (2) and the same (undesirable) consequence as before** (See Ns. 60) would be implied with regard to the two. [54-first half of 55a : 53-first half of 54a]

*P. (p. 70, line 26): If consciousness [caitanya = buddhi] were an effect of inhalation and exhalation, then there would be expulsion and contraction of air without effort (which is an indication of consciousness).

**P. (p. 71, lines 5-7): Even if inhalation and exhalation were causes of thought, so long as

the body continued thought still would not cease. For inhalation and exhalation would not cease. They would not cease because they would be caused by the body. And from their not ceasing thought would not cease.

63. Objection (M., p. 30, lines 13-14): Let us suppose, (as you claim), that thought takes the (previous) thought for its cause. Since there would then be no cessation of thought at the time of death, thought would originate then (also), and there would be the (same undesirable) consequence that thought continues as long as the body.

(Not so:) This consequence (viz. non-cessation of thought) is not implied if thought takes the (previous) thought for its cause, because that (viz. karma or saṃskārabīja) which is a projector [āvedhaka]* of (thought's) continuity [sthiti] (in a body) is regarded as another cause.** [Second half of 55a-55b : second half of 54a-54b]

*āvedhaka = ḥphen . byed = ākṣepaka (See Ns. 46)

**M. (p. 30, lines 20-21): Accordingly, the continuity of thought in the body is caused [ākṣipta] by that karma for a certain length of time, after which thought does not function there any longer because of the departure of the cause (viz. the karma), but functions in some other body. cf

cf. (A) P. (p. 71, lines 13-14): Thought does not arise from the mere existence of a previous thought, for there is a further cause of its arising, namely that which is called the seed or acquired tendency [saṃskārabīja], which is of the nature of nescience [avidyā]. When this seed wakes the former thought then thought arises either there or in some other place, for these tendencies and awakening factors are multiform (and produce various effects).

cf. (B) AbhK (p. 26, fol. 2; LVP, II, pp. 216-217): 若爾何法說名壽体。謂三界業所引同分住時勢分 [nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālavedha] 說為壽体。由三業所引同分

住時勢分相續決定隨應住時。爾所時住故。此勢分說名壽体。如穀種等所引乃至熟時勢分 [sasyānāṃ pākakālāvedhavad][1]。又如放箭所引乃至住時勢分 [kṣipteṣusthitikālavedhavacca][2]。

[1] AbhV, II, p. 169, lines 5-7: yathā sasyānāṃ pākakālāvedhaḥ sāmarthyaviśeṣasvabhāvo bi bījenāṅkura evādhīyate / yaḥ kṣaṇaparamparayā ā pākakālāt sasyasantānahetur bhāvati. tadvad etad.

[2] AbhV, II, p. 169, lines 7-8: yathā kṣiptasyeṣoḥ śarasya sthitir ākāśadeśa-antarotpattiḥ santānānuvṛttiḥ.

64. If (you claim that) the body is not a cause (of thought only) when it is damaged, as a (damaged) lampwick (is not a cause of light), then, if the infirmity were dispelled in a dead body, life should return again. [56 : 55]

65. Objection (P., p. 74, lines 23-24): Even if the cause of damage ceases to exist, the damage does not necessarily cease to exist thereby. For example, when fire ceases to exist, the alteration in the fuel which has been caused by the fire does not disappear.

You may say that when the fire ceases the alteration in the fuel is not thereby repaired, and that just so this (alteration of death in the body) is not repaired (even if the fever etc. has been dispelled). But we answer: not so, because (your analogy) would imply the uselessness of medicine. [57 : 56]

66. Objection (P., p. 74, lines 30-31): But alteration (of the body) is caused by disease. A slight disease is curable, one that falls short of death. But the alteration, death, is not curable. The alteration is incurable because the disease is incurable. So (our analogy was) faultless.

67. (Answer:) In some cases, a certain thing produces

an alteration which allows no remedy, but in others a thing (produces alterations) of a contrary sort, just as fire with regard to fuel or gold.* [58 : 57]

*The alteration (e.g. charcoal etc.) in the fuel which has been caused by the fire is beyond remedy, while the alteration (e.g. fluidity) in the gold can be repaired upon the removal of the fire.

68. Of the first sort even a small alteration (e.g. black colour caused by combustion in the fuel) is incurable; but when the alteration brought about in x is removable, then there will be restoration of x, as in the case of solidity (which can be restored) in gold (upon the removal of the fire). [59 : 58]

69. Objection (M., p. 32, line 5): If the alteration caused by disease be curable (by the application of medicine), there would be no disease (read vyādhiḥ for vidhiḥ) without remedy.

A certain (disease) is said to be incurable (1) because a remedy cannot be obtained, (2) or because (the patient's) span of life is up.* But in itself no disease is incurable.** [60 : 59]

*M. (p. 32, lines 9-10): Because of the exhaustion of the life-span determined [ākṣipta] by the patient's karma or of that which causes the maintenance of consciousness in this body.

**M. (p. 32, lines 10-12): If we regard disease as do the materialists (that is, as caused simply by the gross elements) then no disease is incurable, for we see that disease caused by the gross elements is cured by medicine. And there is no special cause (i.e. why one such disease is different from others in being incurable).

70. If we grant the materialist's view that there are no non-material causes for disease affecting the body, then) when (a patient) has died, if the poison etc. be removed, or if the teeth (into which all the poison automatically collects) be extracted, since the cause of the

(physical) alteration has been removed, why should he not breath again? [61 : 60]

(Again, if the body be the causal substratum [upādāna] of thought,) then one cannot modify the superstratum [upādeya, viz. thought] without modifying the substratum [upādāna, viz. the body], just as (one cannot modify) a pot [= upādeya] (without modifying) the earth (of which it is made [= upādāna]). [62 : 61]

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 527: nāpy upādānakāraṇam iti pakṣaḥ.....(See note on Vs. 58 for the full quotation of this, and cont.) yathā pūrvapūrvo mṛdātmā kalāpa uttarottrasya ghaṭasaṃjñitasya kāryakalāpasyopādānam. ata eva yo yadvikārayitum icchati sa tadupādānavikāreṇaiva tadvikārayati nānyathā.

(Why so; because if) x is modified without modifying y, then y cannot be the causal substratum [upādāna] of x any more than a cow (is the causal substratum of) a buffalo. [63 : 62]

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 528: yat punar vastv adhikṛityaiva yadvikāryate na tat tadupādānam, yathā gavayam adhikṛitya gaur vikāryamāṇaḥ.

73. Just so of thought and the body. (Thought can be modified simply by the modification of its immediately preceding moment [samanantara-pratyaya] without the body having been modified. Accordingly, the two do not constitute a 'superstratum-substratum' relationship.)

(However,) the two stay together because their causes assist mutually in producing their effects just as fire and the liquidity of copper (stay together for the same reason)* [64 : 63]

cf. Vs. 56

*M. (p. 33, lines 19-21): The cause of thought, viz. the thought of the previous moment, and the cause of the body, viz. the embryonic state of the body, assist mutually in producing the thought and the body as their effects; just as the (preceding) fire as the cause of the (subsequent) fire and copper as the cause of the liquidity of copper

assist mutually to produce the liquidity of copper and fire. Whence the two stay together.



cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 529: hetubhedād api sahāvasthānasambhavāt. yathā 'gnitāmradravattayoḥ. tathā hi vahnisahakāritāmraṃ dravattām ārabhate, na kevalm, evam ihāpi dehasyopādānaṃ kalalādi manovijñānasahakāri deham uttaram ārabhate, ity atas tayoḥ sahasthānaṃ nopādānopādeyabhāvād iti....

74. Objection (M., p. 33, line 23): The body is the source [āśraya, that to which a thing resorts for its existence] of thought: whence the two co-exist.

(Not so: the body is) not the source (of thought) because neither an existent nor a non-existing thing has a source (other than its cause).*

If you say that its source is the cause of the continuity [sthiti] of an element, we say no; for the thing which continues [sthātṛ] is not distinct from the continuity.** [65 : 64]

*A non-existent thing has no source. It simply arises from the absence of cause. (P., p. 79, line 29, and cf. ŚV, II, 38-41) As for an existent thing, since it has already come into existence, it has no need of source (M., p. 33, last line - p. 34, line 1). The reproduction of what is already produced is impossible [utpannasya punarutpādāyogāt] (P., p. 79, last line, compare this with the next quot. lines 4-6).

AbhK (p. 50, fol. 2-3; LVP, III, pp. 78-79): 旦應反詰聲論諸師。法何時起。為在現在為在未來。設爾何失。起若現在起非已生。如何成現。現是已生復如何起。已生復起便致無窮。[utpannasya punarutpattau (kalpyamānāyām) anavasthā-prasaṅgaḥ] 若起未來爾時未有何成作者。作者

既無何有作用。故於起住即亦至緣。起住者何。謂未來世諸行正起。即於此住亦說至緣。又**聲論師妄所安立作者作用理實不成 [anişpannaṃ cedam (iti vistaraḥ.) śābdikānāṃ (śabdakīyaṃ) kartuḥ kriyāyāś ca vyavasthānam]。有是作者起是作用。非於此中見有作者。異起作用眞實可得 [bhavituḥ (kartṛrūpakalpitād)arthāt) bhūter (kriyārūpa-kalpitāyāḥ) anyatvādarśanāt]。 (For Sanskrit supplemented here cf. AbhV, III, p. 295, lines 7 ff.)

75. If the continuity [sthiti] were distinct (from the thing that continues), then what would the cause of continuity have to do with the thing which continues (that it should be called its source)? [66a : no number]

Note: The Sarvāstivāda school maintains that the four characteristics of existence, i.e. jāti (birth), jarā (decay), sthiti (continuity), and anityatā (impermanence), are distinct from that which possesses these characteristics. The

Sautrāntika, Vijñānavāda, and Śūnyavāda schools do not admit this distinction. cf. AbhK (p. 28, fol. 1; LVP, II, p. 230): 云何所相 [lakṣya] 法即立為能相 [lakṣaṇa]。如何大士相非異於大士。角耕胡蹄尾牛相非異牛。又如堅等地等界相非異地等。遠見上升知是煙相非異煙体。此有為相理亦應然。 ; MK, VII, Saṃskṛtaparikṣā.

76. Objection (M., p. 34, line 9): The continuity which belongs to an existent thing causes that existent thing to continue to exist; whence it is its source [āśraya].

(If a thing be caused to continue by a 'continuity' that arises in it) this would imply that destruction is impossible. If it be held (that destruction is) due to a cause of destruction (e.g. a hammer etc.), the same implication (viz. non-destruction)* would be involved in this case. (Thus, there being no destruction), there would be no use for a cause of continuity.** [66b-67a : 65]

*The same implication as in the case of continuity (See Vss. 74-75): either the destruction is not distinct from the thing to be destroyed or if it is distinct, then a cause of destruction cannot be supposed to destroy the thing to be destroyed.

**I have rendered this last part according to P.'s (p. 80, line 30) first interpretation. His second interpretation (p. 80, line 31) agrees with M.'s: (And if destruction be due to a cause of destruction) then there would be no use for a cause of continuity, (since the thing continues by itself as long as a cause of destruction is not brought about).

cf. TS, 357-362 and AbhK (p. 28, fol. 2; LVP, II, p. 234): 雖餘部說遇滅因緣滅相方能滅所滅法。而彼所說。應如有言眼淚藥天來令利。即滅因緣應滅所滅。何須別執有滅相為。

77. | If you say that the continuity of a thing up to

the moment of its destruction is caused by this (source), then (the destruction would be uncaused unless you admit) that destruction is an (innate) nature of the thing. In which case, destruction being ineluctable, what could a cause of continuity accomplish? [67b-68a: 66].

78. In the following verses the opponent interprets āśraya (source) as ādhāra (support). Dharmakīrti shows that the body cannot be considered as the support of thought.

Again if you claim that just as (the earth etc.) is a support [ādhāra] for water, (so is the body a support for thought), then the above criticisms still apply. (i.e., the example adduced cannot establish a relation of support-supported between the body and thought)* [68b : 67]

*P. (p. 81, lines 19-22): The earth is not really a support for water. ....A support is that which holds. One can hold only that which falls, but that which is falling is not held.

79. Since the elements are constantly passing out of existence, the source [āśraya, or according to P., the support (ādhāra)] is a continuum of elements [bhāva-santati]. It is so called since it is a cause [hetu] of elements' originating as they do, and not otherwise. [69 : 68].

Note: The notion here is that earth is not, properly speaking, a source or support of water. What occurs is a continuum of water elements and a continuum of earth elements. The continuum of earth elements, "although this is falsely conceived as a unity from superimposing a former and later elements (P., p. 81, last line)," may act as a cause [hetu] or concomitant condition [sahakāri-bhāva, M., p. 35, line 15] of water elements; whence arise our notions 'a pond resides or is contained in this piece of ground' etc.

80. So far 'source-derivative' relationship [āśryāśrayibhāva] has been refuted on a general basis. The following verses are intended to refute the same by reference to special cases.

Or suppose we admit there may be a support for water etc. since an entity may check the motion of this water. Still, how could there be a support for quality [guṇa], generic character [sāmānya], and action [karma] which are (by nature) motionless? [70 : 69]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school sets up the categories [padārtha] quality, generic character and action. These are said to inhere in substance [dravya] by a supporter-supported relationship, e.g., guṇa-guṇin (quality and quality-possessor), sāmānya-vyakti (generic character and individual), etc.

cf. VS, I.1,16 for guṇa, VS, I.1,17 for karma, and VS, I.2,7-9 for sāmānya.

cf. TS, 802: syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamana-pratibandhakaḥ / agatīnāṃ kim ādhāraiḥ sāmānyānāṃ prakalpitaiḥ //

81. Accordingly (= upon the denial of 'supporter-supported' relationship), inherence [samavāya], inherent

cause [samavāyikāraṇa], and the distributive subsistence [vyavasthitatva] of generic character [jāti = sāmānya] etc. must be rejected, for there is no resorting [apāśraya] of one element to another. [71 : 70]

cf. VS, VII,2,26 for samavāya, and VS, X.2,1ff. for samavāyikāraṇa.

82. The following three verses are to recapitulate the above discussions.

(1) If the destruction of an element is caused by external factors (e.g. an axe etc.), then of what use is a 'cause of continuity'? (For in this case the element would continue by its own very nature until interfered with by its destroyer.) While if an element perishes without (such external factors), then 'the causes of continuity' are utterly impotent. [72 : 71]

83. (2) (Or if you grant the effectiveness of a cause of continuity, then the result would be as follows:)

Everything which has a source (= a cause of

continuity) is possessed of continuity. And everything, when coming into existence, is possessed of a source. Accordingly, there can never be destruction of an element. [73 : 72]

M. reads sthitimān nāśrayaḥ sarvaḥ..., while P. reads sthitimān sāśrayaḥ sarvaḥ which agrees with Tibetan tr. [rten . bcas . thams . cad . gnas . ldan . dań]. The above tr. follows the latter reading.

84. (3) If (an element) perishes by its very nature, then what other thing could cause its continuity?

If it is indestructible by nature, then what other thing could cause its continuity? (Thus in either case, it is absurd to assume a cause of continuity over and above the thing that continues to exist.) [74 : 73]

85. Objection (P., p. 83, lines 4-7): A lamp and light are seen to constitute 'source-derivative' relationship [āśraya-āśrayibhāva] apart from 'supporter-supported' relationship [ādhāra-

ādheyabhāva]. For light has no nature of downward movement (like water, See verse 80), and yet there is a source (viz. a lamp) of light: when (the lamp) ceases to exist, the light also ceases to exist and does not go to another lamp. Thus, just as the light of a lamp ceases to exist upon the cessation of the lamp, so does cognition [vijñānaṃ] take the body for its source and cease to exist upon the death of the body.

(Not so.) Diminution [nirhrāsa] and increase [atiśaya] of wisdom [prajñā] etc. come from variations in the exercise of thought [buddhi] independently of diminution and increase of the body. [75 : 74]

cf. TS, 1904: nirhrāsātiśayau dṛiṣṭau tu buddhīnāṃ pūrvabhāvinaḥ / śrutaśilpādikābhyāsa-viśeṣahrāsavṛiddhitaḥ //

86. This (independence) is not observed in the case of derivative elements such as the light of a lamp. Granted that a certain excellence of it (wisdom) may proceed from it (viz. the body when vigorous etc.),

still this cannot occur without the aid of thought. [76 : 75]

87. Objection (P., p. 84, lines 2-3): Passion [rāga] is also a special form of thought. If thought (and passion) were not mutually connected, it would imply that wisdom also is different from thought. And passion follows from the vigorousness etc. of the body. Hence it is concluded that thought derives from the body[1].

The increase of passion which occasionally[2] follows from the vigorousness (of the body) is (regularly) produced by pleasure [sukha] and pain [duḥkha].

And pleasure and pain appear from the presence of an inner (i.e. mental) factor[3] which comes from the equibilium (or derangement) of the bodily humours. [77 : 76]

[1] cf. TSP, vol. 1, p. 528: nanu cāhārapākādinā dehasya puṣṭyādivikāre sati rāgādilakṣaṇā manomater vikārāpattir dṛśyata eva.

[2]The increase of passion etc. follows from the vigorousness of the body only as long as one is engaged in constant practice of untruthful thinking [ayoniśomanaskāra] (P., p. 84, line 7). And there is no increase of passion for a person who is strong in perfect knowledge [pratisaṃkhyāṇa even though his body is vigorous (M., p. 38, line 11).

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 528: na ca rāgādilakṣaṇo vikāro niyamena śarīrapoṣādito bhavati. kasyacit paripuṣṭaśarīrasyāpi pratisaṃkhyānavato 'sambhavāt. tathā parikṣīnavapuṣo 'py ayonisaumanaskārabahulasya puṃsas tiryaggatasya ca kasyacid apacitaparimāṇasya-apy atīva rāgādidarśanāt.

[3]P. (p. 84, line 14): Pleasure and pain arise from an inner factor. This inner factor is not a derivative [āśrayiṇ]of the state of the humors, but has them for its intellectual object.

88. In the same way are to be explained confusion of memory etc. due to the derangement of the bodily humors etc. For thought [dhīḥ = thought-moment] alone which is

produced by a particular inner factor modifies (the thought-series [citta-santāna], producing the loss of memory etc.). [78 : 77]

89. For instance, swoon etc. is sometimes caused when there is variation in the thought-series from one's hearing the roar of a lion or seeing blood. [79 : 78]

Note: The lion and the blood are objects of the thought, nor sources [āśraya] of the swoon.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 528: śārdūlaśonitādi-bībhatsaviṣayadarśanāt... (Quoted under Ms. 44)

90. Accordingly, thought follows invariably its own acquired tendency [samskāra] and not that of anyone else.* From all this, (it is concluded) that thought depends upon thought (on the basis of homogeneous succession). [80 : 79]

*Thought does not follow a bodily tendency since there need be no increase of passion in a

person who is strong in perfect knowledge despite his bodily vigor (See Ns. 87 and note). Nor does one thought-series depend on another thought-series.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 529: sajātīyapūrvabīja-(= sajātīyacittasaṃskāra)-pravṛttaya eva rāgādayaḥ. dehapuṣṭiyauvanakālādayas tu keṣāṃcit pratisaṃkhyānābhyāsavikālānāṃ tadvāsanāprabodhahetavo bhavanti.

91. So far 'source-derivative' relation of body and thought has been refuted on the premise that one is distinct from the other. The next verse is intended to show the incongruity involved in supposing that one is simply a power [śakti] of, and therefore non-different from the other.

(If the mind be non-different from the body,) then just as the acquired tendency [saṃskāra, i.e. the memory] of what one has heard etc. is manifested identically in one thought after another in the course of time, so would identical physical properties be manifested in the body. [81 : 82]

M. (p. 39, lines 17-18): Accordingly (because of the preceding arguments beginning with Vs. 39), since the body is denied to be the source [āśraya] of thought, it is proved that thought does not perish even when the body has perished; hence the repeated practice of compassion through continuous lives is possible (cf. note under Vs. 39).

92. M. (p. 39, line 20): (At this point, the materialist may ask:) 'How then is rebirth acquired?' In order to answer this, the author says:

> One who, having no creature for guide (other than God whose existence has been refuted), is attached to the self [ātmasnehavat], obtains this low station (i.e. birth) because of his thirst for the abandonment of pain and the attainment of happiness [duḥkhatyāgasuḥkhāptivāñcchā]. [82 : 81]

93. The misconception that pain is its opposite [duḥkhe viparyāsamati = avidyā], this and thirst [tṛṣṇā] are the

joint causes of bondage [bandhakāraṇa], that creature born who lacks both these does not undergo rebirth. [83 : 82]

Note: Dharmakīrti accepts the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra theory of karma and regards cetanā (consciousness, mental process) as the basis of all the three karmas (See note under Vs. 45). That is to say, there is no karma whatsoever over and above cetanā. According to him, the two aforementioned causes, avidyā (nescience) and tṛṣṇā (thirst), are nothing but two different characteristics of cetanā (See verse 276). Accordingly, avidyā and tṛṣnā should be jointly regarded as karma (See verse 277).

94. If you urge that the departing (from the present birth) and the entering (into the next birth) are not seen, we answer that this is due to the weakness of our sense-organs, just as subtle smoke is imperceptible to a dull eye. [84 : 83]

cf. TS, 1938: na ca śakyaniṣedho 'sāv

adṛṣṭāv api saṃśrayāt / syād eṣā mandanetrasya svacchadhūmādyadṛṣṭivat //

95. Objection (M., p. 40, lines 19-20): An embodied thing [mūrta] cannot enter into another embodied thing because of hindrances. Thus the body in the intermediary stage [antarābhāvaśarīra]* which is an embodied thing cannot enter into the womb.

*AbhK (p. 44, fol. 2; LVP, III, pp. 31 ff): 此中何法說名中有 [antarābhāva]。何緣中有非即名生。頌曰 (kārikā III, 10): mṛtyupapattibhavayor antarābhavatīñaṃ yaḥ / gamyadeśānupetatvān nopapanno 'ntarābhavaḥ // 論曰。於死有後在生有前 即彼中間有自体起。為至生處故起此身。二趣中間故名中有。

(Answer:) Some embodied things because of their subtlety are without hindrance [aśaktimat]* in respect to entering, or are without hindrance in respect to entering certain objects; thus, water (enters any container) and quicksilver (enters) into gold. One

should not claim the non-existence (of the 'subtle body' in the intermediary stage) simply because it is imperceptible. [85 : 84]

*aśaktimat = apratighātavat (M.) = thogs . med.

96. M. (p. 41, lines 7-9): Suppose the body is the causal substratum [upādāna] of thought [buddhi]. Would it be so as a single composite [avayavin] or as a plurality, an aggregate of atoms? Again, if it is a composite, is it nothing more than its parts, hands etc., or is it something distinct from them? The following verses are intended to refute these possibilities. (See Vs. 115 for the refutation of the last possibility.)

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 526: kiṃ ca manomater dehaḥ kāraṇaṃ bhavatu, eko 'vayavirūpo vā bhaved aneko vā paramāṇusaṃcayātmakaḥ....

(The whole cannot be the same as its parts,) for, when the hand etc. shakes, the whole (viz. the entire body) would shake, because a contradictory motion could

not subsist in one and the same thing. If (you do) not (allow this you must) admit that (the whole is) distinct (from its parts). [86 : 85]

There was great controversy between the Buddhists and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in regard to the 'whole'. The Buddhists denied the existence of a 'composite whole' apart from its 'component parts'. cf. NS, II.1,32, and commentaries; TS, 605-621 etc.

97. (Suppose that part and whole are the same. Then) if a single part is hidden the whole will be hidden. Or if the whole is not hidden then it (must be different from its parts and) will appear (even if all the parts are hidden). (Again, if part and whole are the same, then) if a single part be red, the whole will be red; while (if they were different) we may see the whole as not red (even when all of its parts are red)*. [87 : 86]

*TSP, Vol. I, p. 200: tadārambhake 'vayave vartata iti cet, yady evam avayavānām eva raktatvād

avayavirūpaṃ raktam iti raktāraktaṃ samaṃ dṛiśyeta.

98. Accordingly, there can be no single composite, while if whole and part are distinct there will be the same fault as shown above. [88a : 87a]

99. If you urge that (in the absence of a single composite) there would be no distinction (between the various aggregates) and they would be of atomic character; whence there could be no perception of them; we answer that non-distinction (of that sort) cannot be proved. [88b ; 87b]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who admit the existence of a 'whole' over and above the simple aggregate of component parts claim that since each atom is beyond the reach of senses, a mere aggregate of such atoms should be still atomic and imperceptible. Thus they set up a metaphysical entity called 'mahat' (medium dimension) which gives perceptibility to triads and larger groups of atoms. cf. VS, IV.1.6.

100. There is perceptibility [aindriyatva = indriya-grāhyatva] (of things) when they are distinguished (in certain conditions e.g. in an aggregate*) from this (perceptibility) there follows the non-atomicity (of aggregates). By this theory (that atoms may be distinguished when in certain conditions) we dispose of the objections that an aggregate could conceal nothing etc.** [89 : 88]

*M. (p. 42, last line-p. 43, first line): A body, when it is seen, is called a body and not atoms although it is a mass of atoms; just as threads, when they constitute a cloth, are called a cloth and not threads.

cf. TS, 579-580: prathamebhyaś ca tantubhyaḥ paṭasya yadi sādhyate / bhedaḥ sādhanavaiphalyaṃ durnivāraṃ tadā bhavet // prāptāvasthāviśeṣā hi ye jātās tantavo 'pare / viśiṣṭārthakriyāsaktāḥ prathamebhyo 'vilakṣaṇāḥ //

**It is objected by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that if there were no whole, no substance could conceal another, for the atoms which are the parts are imperceptible. But Dharmakīrti recognizes that

conjoined atoms function differently from the simple atoms.

101. How is it that a mixture of quicksilver and gold or a heated stone is perceptible?* Or how is there perception from sense-organs etc., each of which is separately incapable (of producing knowledge)?** [90 : 89]

*These are obviously aggregates and not wholes, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, against whom the argument in these verses is directed, admits that heterogeneous substances, here quicksilver (a form of water) and gold (a form of fire), stone (a form of earth) and fire, cannot form or bring about a single whole.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 196: tathāhi pānake taptopale sūtahemādau ca miśre paramāṇava eva tathopalabhyante. na hi tatrāvayavidravyam asti, vijātīyānāṃ dravyārambhakatvāt. na cāpi paramāṇubhyo 'vayavibhede saṃyogo dṛśya upapadyate, adṛṣṭāśrayatvāt....

**The previous examples emphasize the notion of an aggregate forming a new entity, and the present example shows that an aggregate causes a new entity: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas claim that a contact of eye, color, light, mind, soul etc. causes perception. But these factors can form only an aggregate, not a single whole.

102. If you urge (that perception is not brought about by the aggregate of sense-organ etc. but) by contact [saṃyoga]*, the same undesirable consequence would be implied.**

Again if you claim that the contact [saṃyoga] of gold and quicksilver is seen, we ask you; how can contact be seen when its substratum (viz. the atoms) is invisible?*** [91 : 90]

*The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas assign contact [saṃyoga] to the category of quality [guṇa] (cf. VS, I.1.16). According to their epistemology, perception is produced from the contact of Soul [ātman] with mind [manas] which is in contact with the sense-organ [indriya], which again is in contact with the object

(cf. NS, I.I.4, and commentaries).

**The sense-organ, color, light etc. are each unable by itself to produce contact. Nor can heterogenous entities combine into a single whole by virtue of which a new quality like contact could be brought about in them. Thus the same fault remains.

***The atoms of gold and quicksilver which are heterogenous cannot be composed into a composite whole. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' principles, the aggregate of those atoms should also be atomic.

Furthermore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' definition of quality, a quality is devoid of qualities [guṇānāṃ nirguṇatva] (cf. VS, I.1,16). However, in the case of mixed drinks, such qualities as taste [rasa], color [rūpa] etc. are mixed. As a result, their tenet 'guṇānāṃ nirguṇatva' is vitiated, since, in the given example, a quality, viz. contact, comes to subsist in other qualities, viz. taste, colour etc. (This note follows M., p. 43, lines 21-22.)

103. If you claim that the union of taste, color etc. is contact only in a figurative [upacāra] sense, then there should be a different sort of cognition (in this case from the cognition of what is contact in the full sense)*. Again, how could you speak of 'a long series'?** [92 : 91]

*That is to say, our perception of the link between sweet and red in 'his drink is sweet and red' should be a different sort of perception from our perception of the link between milk and water in 'his drink is milk and water'.

**According to P. (p. 95, verse 538), a series [paṅkti] is not a substance because its parts are not in contact, nor is it a generic character [jāti]; in fact it is not anything [na hi pāṅktir nāma kiṃ cit]. M. (p. 44, line 5) suggests it might be a sort of number, therefore according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, a quality. In either case it will be hard for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas to explain a 'long series', for a quality, length, cannot inhere in a nothing nor can it inhere in another quality.

104. Such notions as number [saṃkhyā], contact [saṃyoga], action [karma] etc. are distinct in language from the nature of the entity which possesses them, but they have no (independent) nature in actual cognition. [93 : 92]

105. Objection (M., p. 44, lines 15-16): If number etc. are non-existent by themselves, how is it possible to believe or to say 'one big pot in contact falls'? If number etc. were not distinct from (the thing to which it is applied), then the synonymity (of all words) would result.

(Answer:) The name and notion (of number etc. appear) in the constructed object in verbalized knowledge by the force of our mental construction which conforms to the distinctions of the thing (from those which are other than it)*, just as they appear in qualities and in what is past or future. [94 : 93]

*Vastubheda [= vastuno vijātīyād vyāvṛttiḥ]
In the Buddhist epistemology of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti objects of knowledge are classified into two sorts, svalakṣaṇa (the thing-in-itself,

the particular) and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal). Svalakṣaṇa is the thing stripped of all mental construction, a point-instant, unique, opposed to any sort of identity. Of such consists ultimate reality. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, on the other hand, is run through by identity, generalization, and other forms of mental constructions. It is illusive. As basic proof of the illusive character of this sāmānyalakṣaṇa, Buddhist logicians speak of apoha [= anyavyāvṛtti] exclusion from others). To explain, although every existent thing is different from each other if taken strictly as the thing-in-itself, we generalize or group these reals by mental construction through the exclusion of them from others. For example, we form the notion of 'cow' as referring to a group of animals which look alike by excluding them from certain others, while all cows are different from one another if taken as things-in-themselves. Thus the notion of 'cow' is fictitious. Likewise 'generic character' (e.g. cow-hood) of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas make great use is, according to the Buddhist logicians, simply an illusive mental construction which is due to apoha or anyavyāvṛtti.

The criticism levelled by this verse is basically that of the apoha argument. Number, contact etc. are not ultimately existent in themselves but appear as applied to the mentally constructed object [kalpyārtha = sāmānyalakṣaṇa] to distinguish it from those which are other than that object.

For apoha, cf. PV, Svārthānumāna section, texts 42-187, tr. by E. Frauwallner, WZKM, vol. 39, 1932, and vol. 40, 1934; NVTT, p. 681, lines 11 ff, tr. by Stscherbatsky, Buddhist Logic II, pp. 403 ff.; TS and TSP, Śabdārthaparikshā section, texts 867-1212, tr. by Gangānātha Jhā, GOS, vol. LXXX, pp.467-613; ŚV, pp. 566-614, Apohavāda section, tr. by Gangānātha Jhā, (B.I.) pp. 295-328.

106. If it be held that figurative usage [upacāra] is the cause (of the name and notion of number etc.) here (viz. as found in qualities etc.), why should not the same thing (viz. upacāra) be the cause of the name and notion (of number etc.) in all cases? [95 : 94]

i.e., Why should the verbal designation and

notion of number be any more true as applied to substance than as applied to quality?

107. (Objection:) Figurative sense cannot be present in all cases.* And if you (viz. the Buddhist) claim that (the distinction is this, that) where the qualifier is a separate entity (from the qualified) the primary sense is present (and elsewhere the figurative**), then (we Naiyāyikas ask), how could there then be any difference of meaning where (qualifier and qualified are) the same entity?*** [96 : 95]

*M. (p. 45, line 12): If there is a primary sense, then the secondary sense is present, but not everywhere. P. (p. 96, line 16): The secondary sense depends on the primary sense.

**e.g., When we say daṇḍī (staff-possessor), we use daṇḍa (staff) in its primary sense; the staff is one thing and the man who possesses the staff is another. But when we say rājā daṇḍaḥ (the king is the staff, i.e. the instrument of punishment),

then we use the word danda in a secondary sense, since danda here refers to one and the same thing.

***M. (p. 45, lines 15-16): When we say 'one large pot in contact is moving' all words would be synonymous.

108. (To this we answer:) Words do not all become synonymous even if the cause (viz. the object to which they are applied) is one and the same thing. Words join (the notion of) number etc. (to an object which is) white etc. [97a-first half of 97b : 96a-first half of 96b]

e.g., When we say 'one white horse', we can use the different words such as 'one', 'white' as referring to one and the same thing, since the words distinguish this 'horse' in different ways: 'white' distinguishes the horse from a black horse, and 'one' sets it off from two or more horses grouped. Yet the object designated by 'white' is not different from the object designated by 'one'.

109. If you say that in this case, (number etc.) is still a different thing (from its substratum, we answer; no,) there is no distinction between quality and substance.* But there are different (words and notions referring one and the same thing) because of differences in what we exclude from it;** as (may be clearly seen) in such words as 'non-motion' [akarma] and 'non-substance' [adravya], (both referring to one and the same thing). [Second half of 97b-98 : second half of 96b-97]

*That substance and quality are inseparable may be seen from the opponent's definition of substance, 'substance is possessed of quality and action and is an inherent cause' [kriyāvat guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam dravyam, VS, I.1.15]. Take the example of water flowing downhill because of its weight. Here substance functions as an inherent cause (viz. of the downward motion), only so far as the quality, weight, is present.

**cf. note on vastubheda under No. 105

cf. TS, 1043-1044: ity ādinā prabhedena vibhinnārthanibandhanāḥ / vyāvṛttayaḥ prakalpyante

tanniṣṭhāḥ śrutayas tathā // yathāsaṅketam evāto 'saṅkīrṇārthābhidhāyinaḥ / śabdā vivekato vṛttāḥ paryāyā na bhavanti naḥ //

110. Objection (M., p. 46, line 10): If there were no such things as number etc., then how could one speak of the 'singularity' of a pot or the 'conjunction' of a pot (as if singularity or the conjunction were distinct from the pot)? [99 : 98]

Such things as number etc. are indicated by words, which denote them as if they were separate entities from that which possesses them, but (actually these things such as number etc.) serve only to distinguish one aspect (of the putative possessor) from another. [99 : 98]

111. For the sake of one who wishes to know just this (particular aspect) sometimes a phrase speaks of (such an aspect) as if it were separate (from its possessor) without referring to all other (aspects), as when one says sometimes 'the contact of the finger'. [100 : 99]

112. On the other hand, the phrase 'the finger in contact', which denotes the aspect-possessor (viz. the finger) by implying all its properties, can be used in denoting the very same thing, for the choice (of speech) is based thus (on convention between speaker and hearer). [101 : 100]

113. Objection (P., p. 98, lines 4-6): If there were no whole (distinct from its parts) then there would be only color etc. (one should read rūpādaya for rasādaya), there would be no color etc. of a pot. For there cannot be color of colors, nor can there be a pot of a pot. In answer to this consideration the author says:

One speaks of 'pot' (referring to a fictitious aggregate*) without implying its various properties (lit. powers) such as color etc. when one would distinguish it from other things which are unable to achieve the same result (i.e. to distinguish it from horse which cannot be used to contain and carry water). [102 : 101]

cf. TS, 1034: kiṃ tv aneko 'pi yady ekakāryakārī ya īkṣyate / tatraikadharmāropeṇa śrutir ekā niveśyate // TSP: ...yathā bahuṣu rūpādiṣu madhūdakādyāharaṇalakṣaṇaikārthārthakriyā-samartheṣu ghaṭa ity eṣā śrutir niveṣyate; also TS, 1036-1037.

*Both M. and P. use the word 'samudāya' [aggregate heap] as referring to a mere aggregate of component parts in order to distinguish it from 'avayavī' (unitary whole) which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas allege to exist over and above the component parts.

114. Accordingly, although both words (viz. pot and color)) refer to the same object, we can say 'color is not a pot'.* And there is a similar distinction between a word which denotes a generic character and a word which denotes an aggregate.** [103 : 102]

*M. (p. 47, lines 17-18): 'Color' is an aspect-naming word, while 'pot' is an aggregate-naming word.

**e.g., gotva (cowhood) and go (cow).

115. Objection (M., p. 47, last line-p. 48, line 1): If color etc. alone are existent and no unitary whole, how is it that one speaks of such relation (between a pot and color) as in the phrase 'the color of a pot'? (P., p. 98, lines 16-18): Why should we say 'a forest of trees' rather than 'a forest trees,' 'the color of the pot' rather than 'the color pot'?

By such phrases as 'the color etc. of the pot', the various powers of color etc. (viz. the power of coloring etc.) are expressed as subordinate to a generic character (viz. pot-ness).* Thus different types of designation are made in different ways (with regard to one and the same object). [104 : 103]

*The meaning amounts to this: We make known the capacity of furnishing color (to the perceiver) which subsists in an aggregate of such objects as are known by the designation 'pot'.

116. So much for the refutation of the first alternative that the body in the form of a unitary whole is the cause of thought. (See M.'s introductory note to Vs. 96)

The following verse is designed to refute the second alternative that the body as an aggregate of atoms is the cause of thought.

If (the somatic atoms) were collectively the cause of thought, then there would be no mind if even one of the limbs were defective. On the other hand, if (these atoms) were severally capable (of producing thought), then (as) many thoughts (as there are atoms) would be produced at one time. [105 : 104]

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 527: te ca paramāṇavaḥ pratyekaṃ vā hetavaḥ syuḥ samuditā vā / na tāvat pratyekaṃ, pratibījāṅkurotpādavat pratiparamāṇuvikalpotpattiprasaṅgāt / nāpi samuditāḥ, nāsikādyekāṅgavaikalye 'pi mānasānutpādāpatteḥ, kṣityādīnām anyatarāpāye 'ṅkurānutpattivat /

117. Objection (M., p. 48, lines 21-22): A single

cognition is manifested by inhalation [prāṇa] and exhalation [apāna] as its regulators [niyāmaka]. Hence there are not many manifestations at one time.*

Inhalation and exhalation cannot be the regulators (of cognitions), because they are manifold just as (much as the body which is an aggregate of atoms). Even if they were unitary these would still be multiple manifestations of cognition, because of the constant presence of the cause (viz. inhalation etc.). [106 : unnumbered half verse-105a]

*From this verse through Ns. 124, Dharmakīrti's discussion is directed against the theory that thought (or cognition) is manifested by means of prāṇa (inhalation) and apāna (exhalation). We are unable to assign this theory to a specific school, although the prāṇas as bio-motor faculties occupy an important position in the Upanishads.

For close parallels, see TS, 1864; BS, II.4, 1-19; SK, 29; Deussen, AGP, Band I, Abteilung II, pp. 93 ff.

118. If you say that (breath) is not the cause of multiple (and simultaneous cognitions), then it could not be the cause of consecutive cognitions either, since there can be no variation (in its nature)*. [107a: 105b]

*That is to say, if breath, constantly present, is capable of producing cognitions at all, then it should produce multiple cognitions simultaneously. If it is incapable of so doing, it cannot be the cause of consecutive cognitions either.

The idea underlying this verse is the same as that adopted by the Buddhists to refute every eternal cause (see note under Vs. 13).

119. Nor can there be any rule (of one cognition to one breath) since there is the perception of many objects during one (breath). [107b : 106]

120. (However,) should you grant that multiple cognitions occur by one thought, then these cognitions should arise simultaneously since there would be nothing to prevent them; (or if you do not admit this,) then (one thought)

cannot be (the cause of multiple cognitions) consecutively either, because there is no variation in thought (whereby it might give rise to cognition one moment and be ineffective the next). [108 : 107]

cf. TS, 197-198: ekānugāmikāryatve paurvāparyaṃ virudhyate / rūpaśabdādicittānaṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ // ekānantaravijñānāt ṣaḍvijñānasamudbhavaḥ / yugapad vedyate vyaktam ata iṣṭaprasādhanam // TSP: yadaiva narttakīrūpaṃ paśyati, tadaiva murajādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, kuvalayādigandhaṃ ca jighrati, karpūrādirasam āsvādayati, vyajanānilādisparśaṃ cānubhavati, vastrādi manasādātum cintayati.

121. If numerous point-instant breaths pertaining to different points of time were the cause of thoughts of the same character (viz. thoughts which are numerous, existing at a point-instant, and related to different points of time), then (we ask you); how could these (breaths) be consecutive without a cause which is consecutive?* And if the preceding homogeneous breath were the cause of the (subsequent one), then the first breath (of the body) would not be produced (as it would

have no cause).** [109-110 : 108-109]

*M. (p. 50, lines 3-4): The cause of breath is the body which is (constantly present), not consecutively or intermittently so. And a consecutive effect cannot arise from a non-consecutive cause.

**It is implied here that the Buddhist cittasantāna (thought-series) theory does not involve this absurdity inasmuch as the thought-series is constant from birth to birth, and so is beginningless.

122. (If you say, to guard against the non-origin of the first breath, that breath comes in a continuous series from the previous birth just as the cittasantāna [thought-series] does, then we answer:) Such could not be the cause of thought. For, if so, there must certainly be a multiplicity of breath since it exists in different places*; whence the simultaneous occurrence of numerous cognitions** would be implied. [111 : 110]

*According to Indian theories of biology there were five or more breaths centered in separate regions of the body.

**See Vs. 125 for the Buddhist argument that this absurdity cannot arise in the case of the cittasantāna (thought-series).

123. Again if you say, (to avoid the absurdity of the simultaneous occurrence of numerous thoughts, that numerous breaths existing at the same moment are the cause taken as a set)* of one thought [caitanya], then no (thought) would arise when even one breath were imperfect as in the case of persons suffering from asthma etc. [112 : 111]

*sāmagrī, the unitary set of all necessary causes.

124. (Or if you take the breaths to be a cause as an aggregate rather than as unitary set [P., p. 101, line 11]), then there should be alteration in the cognition in

exact accordance with the state of the cause; for that is not the effect of x which does not vary as x varies.* [113 : 112]

*M. (p. 50, line 21): That is to say, as one of the breaths is increased or decreased the resultant cognition should be altered accordingly.

125. Objection (M., p. 50, last line): Why do numerous thoughts not appear simultaneously according to your theory (of thought-series)?

(Answer:) A single cognition is the cause of single cognition by rule of its power, because a cognition will not grasp one thing if the preceding cognition is indisposed thereto by its attachment to another thing. [114 : 113]

The capability or power [śakti] of the causal cognition consists, according to P. (p. 102, line 3), in the acquired tendency [saṃskāra] which it leaves when it vanishes, or in a particular form of attachment.

126. If (the various types of) cognition originate once (viz. at first) from the body and thereafter are regulated each by its own species*, how is it that the body which once was capable (of producing cognition) ceases to be (capable)?** [115 : 114]

*That is, if our first cognition in this life (viz. our first sight, hearing etc.) originate from the body and each succeeding cognition is caused by the preceding homogeneous cognition.

**The body which once was capable of producing thought should be able to do so at any other time, unless some new factor is introduced to put an end to its capability.

127. It may be objected that if the body is not the source [āśraya] of thought, then thought would continue to exist by itself upon the cessation of the body. (This objection would be valid) only if the cause for the continuity of thought (viz. former thought known as karma) did not cooperate as an auxiliary in bringing the cause of the (future) body to perform its causal function.

This cause is the pañcāyatana* of the present life. [116-117 : 115-116]

Dharmakīrti's view is that the causes of thought and body are auxiliary to one another. That is, thought and body besides being primary causes of the new thought and the new body, are auxiliary causes of the new thought and the new body. Hence the two effects, the new thought and the new body, are together just as were the two causes. (See Ns. 73)

*M. takes pañcāyatana as simply referring to the five sense organs [pañcendriya]. However, P. (p. 103, last line) takes dehahetu as kalalādi-saṃjñitadehopādāna as M. also does in his note on Ns. 73 (p. 33, line 19). If we follow P.'s interpretation, the pañcāyatana would be the five stages of the embryo, viz. kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, and praśākhā. cf. AbhK (p. 47, fol. 3; LVP, III, pp. 57-58): 薩耶那滅於輪轉無能。數習煩惱業所為故。令中有蘊相續入胎。----- 如聖說言； pathamaṃ kalalaṃ hoti kalalā hoti abbudaṃ/ abbudā jāyate pesī pesī nibbattati ghano // ghanā

pāsākhā jāyanti kesā lomā nakhāni ca / yaṃ cassa bhuñjati mātā.... See LVP's note.

The five sense-organs correspond to the first five sense-organs of the ṣadāyatana, which, in the Twelve Nidānas, are preceded by the nāmarūpa, to which kalala etc. are assigned.

In either case, pañcāyatana here is to be understood as referring to the body.

cf. M. (p. 53, lines 3-4): dehāntara = anāgatapañcāyatana, and TSP, vol. I, p. 538: tathā hi pañcāyatanalakṣaṇo dehasantānasyāvasthābheda evāyam āmutriko dehaḥ....

128. If, in order to deny karma as the auxiliary and pañcāyatana as the cause of the future body, you say that they are not seen as such, we have pointed out that this is an inconclusive argument.* And the sense-organs etc. are inconclusive like the rest [śeṣavat]**
[118 : 117]

*See Nss. 94-95 and notes which deal with a similar discussion: It is an inconclusive argument to assert the absence of something simply because

it is not seen [anupalabdhimātrād eva tadabhāva-niścaya iti aniścayakaraṇam, P, p. 104, lines 9-10], for it may be by nature invisible [adṛśya]. In the next statement the opponent chooses a hetu which he supposes must be visible.

**śeṣavat. An objector might offer such an argument as this, "The sense-organ of the preceding body does not bring about the sense-organ of the succeeding body, because it is a sense-organ. We see that Devadatta's eye does not bring about Yajñadatta's eye. Sense-organs act simply on their objects, the objects of sense. Here we have an entity which is visible and so, where we do not see it at work we may say that it is absent."

The answer to this objection is that the causal forces of the sense-organ is no more naturally visible than that of thought. P. (p. 104, lines 14-15) says, "The manufacturing of a sense-organ for the future body is something which is naturally invisible and so the fact that it is not seen is not conclusive of its non-existence."

129. (During the present life,) the power of the preceding sense-organs is seen in (the latter) homogeneous (sense-organs). (Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that the preceding sense-organs bring about the latter ones.) And since we see (constant) variation (in their acuteness etc., these sense-organs) must arise in a constant succession. (Then why cannot this inference be extended to the sense-organs of the next life [P., p. 104, line 33]?) [119 : 118]

130. Objection (P., p. 105, lines 3-4): The sense-organs are produced at first from the body, not from the (preceding) sense-organs, and thereafter are produced each by its (own homogeneous) sense-organ. (Compare this objection with Vs. 125.)

(Answer:) If the sense-organs were born from the body the same undesirable implication would result as before.* [120a: 119a]

*P. (p. 105, lines 7 ff.): notices numerous undesirable implications. Granted that the sense-organs are produced from the body, is it from the

body possessed of sense-organs or without sense-organs? In the first alternative (cf. Vss. 53-54), the sense-organs being produced from the sense-organs, we must postulate the other world to explain the production of the first sense-organ. In the second alternative (cf. Vs. 55), the sense-organs would be produced from the hair and fingernails, or from the dead body. And since the body consists of numerous parts (cf. Vs. 116), numerous sense-organs would appear nor would they be of any fixed size. And how is it that the body which was once capable of producing the sense-organs should later cease to be capable (cf. Vs. 126)? Etc.

131. If you say it is from thought that they are produced, so be it; and a future body too. [120b : 119b]

Dharmakîrti does not object to deriving the sense-organs from thought, which he has given an auxiliary cause in the preceding argument. But if the opponent admits so much, he must admit that thought also gives rise to a body for the next life, an admission which the materialist will not relish.

132. (Recapitulatory verse:) Accordingly, union with a future body cannot be disproved by 'all final thoughts being defective as causes', while the argument that they are just this (viz. final thoughts) proves nothing, for it is inconclusive like the rest. [121 : 120]

M., p. 53, lines 13-14: Thus, thought alone being the cause for the birth of another thought, the repeated practice of compassion is admissible through continuous birth even though a body comes to an end. This confirms the statement (Vs. 39), "Compassion is a proof (of the Buddha's validity), and this (is completely natural to him) from long repeated practice."

133. You may raise an objection as follows: Granted that there may be excellence (or intensity) [viśeṣa] by repeated practice, this excellence cannot transgress its inherent nature [svabhāva] as in leaping (by repeated practice, one can never come to leap a mile), or in the heating of water (one cannot bring water to a flame). Then we answer: (The given two instances are not proper.) If an imposed excellence requires further effort (to be

brought about again, as is the case with excellence in leaping)*; or if its substratum is inconstant, (as is the case with in the heating of water, for as the heat grows more intense the water boils away), then such an excellence or intensity does not increase nor is it 'natural'; because (in the former case) the causes (viz. strength and the particular exertion, etc.) which were capable of (forming the previous intensity) are incapable of forming the subsequent one; and (in the latter case) an intensity whose substratum is ever inconstant, even if this intensity increases, cannot be an 'inherent nature'.

But if an imposed intensity does not require further effort, then (any) further effort (that may occur) produces (an increase of) intensity.** (This is the case of compassion etc.) [122-125 : 121-124]

*cf. TS, 3168: daśahastāntaraṃ vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati / na yojanam asau gantuṃ śakto 'bhyāsaśatair api // This verse is given as a Mimāmsakas' objection against the Buddhist assertion that excellence of knowledge can lead a person to supernormal vision.

**cf. TS, 3421: ye vā sthirāśraye vṛttāḥ kathaṁcid api cāhitāḥ / tadbhāvāyāpunaryatna-vyapekṣāṁ bādhake 'sati //

134. Compassion etc., when produced in thought by repeated practice, acts by its own spontaneity [svarasa] (independently of further effort), just like (the variations produced) in wood, quicksilver, and gold by the application of fire and other means (viz. cāraṇa-jāraṇa [a particular metallurgic process] and puṭapāka [baking an object inside a covering]*) [126 : 125]

*All three examples are of partial transformations. Wood is first turned to charcoal, hence M.'s remark (p. 54, last line-p. 55, line 1) that one can paint with it in this condition, then to cinders and ashes. Apparently cāraṇajāraṇa and puṭapāka produce intermediate transformations of mercury and gold. P. and M. differ as to which process is applied to which mineral. The main point is that when heat is applied the second time, the chemist need not repeat the first transformation but begins with the transformation already acquired and

increases it further. "Likewise, compassion etc. which is produced by repeated practice acts by its own spontaneity since it does not stand in need of further effort for reproduction, nor is its substratum inconstant, (M., p. 55, lines 2-3)."

cf. TS, 3422: saṃskārotkarṣabhedena kāṣṭhāparyantavṛttiyaḥ / te sambhavanti vispaṣṭaṃ śātakumbhaviśuddhivat //

135. Accordingly, such a quality (as compassion) appearing in those (who practise it) becomes the 'inherent nature' (of the practioners' mind). Thus each further effort produces further intensity. [127 : 126]

136. Since such thoughts as compassion etc. grow intense by means of their preceding homogeneous causes, how should there be any limit (to their increase) when they are repeatedly practised? [128 : 127]

cf. TS, 3414: / samānajātīyapūrvabījapravṛttayaḥ/ (ye vā)
te 'tyantavṛddhidharmāṇaḥ saṃskārotkarṣabhedataḥ //

137. And leaping does not derive in this way from leaping (as does compassion from compassion). The limited nature of leaping is due to the limited power of its causes, namely strength and exertion. [129:128]

TS, 3424: laṅghanodakatāpābhyāṃ na ceha vyabhicāritā / na hi tal laṅghanād eva laṅghanaṃ balayatnayoḥ //

138. Objection (M., p. 55, lines 20-21): If leaping proceeds from one's strength and exertion only and not from its preceding homogeneous cause, then one would be able to leap as far before practice as after.

cf. TSP, vol. II, p. 893: syād etad yadi balayatnābhyām eva laṅghanaṃ bhavati na laṅghanāt evaṃ saty abhyāse yādṛśaṃ laṅghanaṃ puruṣasya bhavati tādṛgabhyāsāt prāg api prāpnoti.

(Answer:) Because of physical defects* one's leaping at first is not such as it is later (viz. after practice). When these have been gradually removed, the

|body reaches its proper strength. [130 : 129]

*M. (p. 55, line 24), such as heaviness of body caused by the phlegmatic humour.

cf. (Cont. of preceding TSP quotation): prāktanasya śleṣmādinā dehasya viguṇatvāt paścādvan na laṅghanam upajāyate. paścāt tu śanaiḥ prayatnena dehavaiguṇye 'panīte sati yathābalam evāvatiṣṭhate laṅghanam.

139. Objection (P., p. 107, lines 29-30): But if compassion requires only a homogeneous cause, since these extend backward in an endless series, it would always have been natural (and perfect, i.e., there would be no need for practice). In order to answer this objection, the author says:

| (It is) when compassion, (though) growing from homogeneous cause, is not obstructed by its opposites (viz. hatred etc.), which also grow from homogeneous cause, that it reaches naturalness (or perfection) in the thought (-series). [131 : 130]

140. For each preceding practice is the basis [mūla, i.e. cause] for the intensification of each subsequent mental property such as compassion [kṛpā], distaste for the world [vairāgya], enlightenment [bodha] etc. [132 : 131]

P. (p. 108, line 7): Practice is the cause of the intensification of compassion, not of its simple reproductions, which is caused by the preceding compassion.

141. (Accordingly) compassion as a natural or essential quality derives from its repeated practice in the same manner as do pity [ghṛṇā], distaste for the world [vairāgya], and passion [rāga]. [133a : 132a]

V. Śāstṛtva

Dharmakīrti proceeds now to discuss the third epithet, śāstṛtva (teacherhood), given to the Buddha by Diṅnāga.

142. The compassionate [one who is perfected in excellence of comiseration, urged by his unendurance of others' suffering],* applies himself to appropriate means [upāya] for removing (his own) suffering;** for it is difficult for one to whom the object to be striven for (viz. the Cessation of Suffering) and its cause (viz. the Path) are invisible to explain them (to others). [133b-134 : 132b-133]

*This bracketed part is missing in Tibetan translation.

**P. (p. 108, lines 19-20): The effort of the compassionate one to remove his suffering is natural. Without destroying his own suffering it would be impossible to remove the suffering of others. Accordingly, having realized the destruction of his

own suffering he then applies himself to realizing this for all creatures.

143. Reflecting by means of inference and scripture, he (viz. the Boddhisattva, "would-be Buddha" in the sense of Mahāyāna Buddhism) examines the cause of suffering and its impermanent nature (which he understands) because of the characteristics (such as impermanency etc.) of suffering itself. [135 : 134]

144. M. (p. 57, line 11): Why should the impermanent nature etc. of the cause of suffering be examined?

He sees that if the cause (of suffering) be permanent, there can be no cessation of (suffering). Hence he examines what opposes the cause of suffering for the purpose of destroying the effect (viz. suffering). And that which opposes the cause of suffering is ascertained by knowledge of the nature of this cause. [136-137a : 135-136a]

145. The cause of suffering is thirst* [sneha] which is produced by attachment to the self and what pertains to the self [ātmātmīya] and which constitutes the acquired tendency [saṃskāra] (for further birth). The belief in soullessness, as opposed to that, is what eliminates (the cause of suffering). [137b-138a : 136b-137a]

*cf. Nss. 92-93

146. (After he has ascertained the cause of suffering and what contradicts it in this manner through inference and scripture [M., p. 58, lines 6-7]), to him (viz. the Boddhisattva), from practising many and various means over a vast period of time, vices and virtues here (viz. pertaining respectively to the cause of suffering and what contradicts it) become perfectly clear. Hence and from his excellence of thought, the residual force [vāsanā] of the cause of his suffering is abolished. [138b-139 : 137b-138]

147. This characteristic (viz. the abolition of the residual force of the cause of suffering) distinguishes

the great sage (viz. the Samyaksambuddha, the Buddha in the sense of Mahāyāna Buddhism) who exerts himself for the good of others from the pratyekabuddhas (and the śrāvakas*). 140a : 139a]

*Pratyekabuddha, a Buddhist saint who has won enlightenment by himself and lives in solitude not working for others; Śrāvaka, a Buddhist saint who has been enlightened through others' teachings. In Mahāyāna texts, these two are often distinguished from the Boddhisattva, viz. candidate for the Buddhahood in the Mahāyāna sense, whose ideal is to enlighten others as well as themselves. In this verse, Dharmakīrti, as a Mahāyānist, speaks of the complete abolition of the vāsanā as a characteristic of the Mahāyāna Buddha which is not found in the other two. (cf. Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, p.'89)

148. Objection (P., p. 115, line 31-last line): The master (Diṅnāga) has shown (in his auto-commentary, see introduction) teaching as the means to the cessation of suffering and said that the appli-

cation [prayoga] (of the Buddha's intention [āśaya] of benefitting the world [hitāiṣitva]) of his being a teacher [śāstṛtva] by teaching the world. So how is it that the repeated practice of the means [upāyābhyāsa] is here discussed (where śāstṛtva [teacherhood] should be the topic)?

(Answer:) This 'repeated practice of the means' is held to be nothing but the teaching, for it has just that as its purpose. (And) these two (viz. hitaiṣitva and śāstṛtva) are spoken of (by Diṅnāga) as the cause (of the effect = sugatatva) because they come prior to the accomplishment (of the said effect). [140b-141a : 139b-140a]

VI. Sugatatva

149. Note: So far Dharmakīrti has discussed the twofold cause of Buddhahood, viz. hitaiṣitva (the Buddha's desire of the good of the world) and śāstṛtva (the Buddha's teacherhood). From this verse he sets out to discuss the twofold effect of that cause, as shown by Diṅnāga, viz. sugatatva (the Blessedness of the Buddha; literally sugata means 'who has left or fared well') and tāyitva (saviorhood).

He begins with sugatatva, which he takes to have three virtues, following Diṅnāga's auto-commentary.

The Blessedness of the Buddha [sugatatva] consists in his having left the cause (of suffering). It is threefold*: [141b : 140b]

*M. (p. 59, lines 8-9): Because the particle su has three meanings; (1) praisworthiness [praśastatā] as in a beautiful figure [surūpa], (2) lack of recurrence [apunarāvṛtti] as in a well-

cured fever [sunaṣṭajvara], and (3) completeness [niḥśeṣatā] as a well-filled (i.e. completely filled) jar [supūrṇaghaṭa].

150. (1) Praiseworthy, because suffering does not touch him because of his belief in soullessness or because of his meditation [yukti*]. [142a : 141a]

*P. (p. 116, lines 17-18) gives two alternatives for the meaning of yukti: meditation on the heap of impurities to be abandoned, or yoga.

151. (2) Without recurrence. The arising of birth and vices is called recurrence. Lack of recurrence [apunarāgama = apunarāvṛtti] derives from abolishing the seed (of these arisings, namely) the doctrine of soul*, since this (doctrine of soullessness) is true and different in nature from (the doctrine of soul.** [142b-first half of 143b : 141b-first half of 142b]

*At this point the opponent may object as follows (P., p. 116, line 31-last line): If you

say that the doctrine of soullessness sets aside the result of the doctrine of soul because the former contradicts the latter (see verse 146), one may point out that) each doctrine is equally contradictory to the other. Thus the doctrine of soul which is set aside by the doctrine of soullessness itself sets aside (the doctrine of soullessness). Accordingly there can be no lack of recurrence nor can there be cessation without remainder.

Accordingly, the Text adds the following statement beginning with 'since'.

cf. TSP, vol. II, pp. 870-871: syād etat, yathā nairātmyadarśanasamākrānte cetasi viruddhatayātmadarśanasyotpattum anavakāśas tathā nairātmyadarśanasyāpi ātmadarśanasamākrānte manasi, virodhasya tulyatvāt, tataś ca kasya cin nairātmyadarśanasyāsambhavād asiddho hetuḥ.

**P. (p. 117, lines 4-6): Because the doctrine of soullessness is true [sadbhūta], and because of a contradiction, namely, its contradiction to the doctrine of soul. That which is true sets aside that which is not true. By contradiction alone we

get simply contradiction (since neither term is able to set aside the other). But the doctrine of soullessness has a different nature (from the doctrine of soul, because the former is true). The doctrine of soul cannot be said to have a different nature from the other, (or to have any nature at all) for there is no soul, since the soul does not exist from the viewpoint of ultimate reality. So what remainder could there be? For remainder is not different from recurrence.

M. (p. 59, last line-p. 60, line 1) analyzes the compound tadbhūtabhinnātmatayā differently, viz., 'because it (the soul doctrine) is different in nature from the true doctrine (bhūta, i.e. the doctrine of soullessness)'.

cf. TSP, vol. II, p. 873: bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣanikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat. tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eveti tan nātmagrahaṇasvabhāvam. yat punar anyathāsvabhāvo 'sya khyātimūḍhānāṃ asāmarthyād āgantukapratyayabalād evety avatiṣṭhate, na svabhāvatveṇa yathā rajjvāṃ sarpapratyayasya. .....nairātmyajñānaṃ tu

svabhāvatvāt pramāṇasahāyatvāc ca balavad iti tulye 'pi virodhitve ātmadarśane pratipakṣo vyavasthāpyate. na cātmadarśanaṃ tasya tadviparītatvāt.

152. (3) 'Remainder'* here refers to what is not defilement or passion, such as deformity of body, speech and thought or clumsiness in speaking of the Path. (These can be brought to) destruction without remainder by repeated practice (of the doctrine of soullessness). [Second half of 143b-first half of 144b : second half of 142b-first half of 143b]

*The reading of P.'s text [śeṣakleśanirjaraṃ] is wrong, as shown by P.'s comment (p. 117, lines 8-10): "But when no defilements [kleśaṃ] are present, how could there be that which is produced by defilements? (Such a question) is wrong, because (there may still be) that which is not defilement and not passion but which results simply from contact with the residual force [vāsanā], like vulgar speed, lack of skill in the manifold analysis of the Path. How then, can this remainder [n.b.,

śeṣa not aśeṣa] be abolished? By the doctrine of soullessness, and there is no other cause of its abolition."

M.'s reading of nirjvara as against P.'s nirjara agrees with Tibetan translation [nad . med].

153. Some (viz. the Mimāṃsakas) claim that the faults involved in (human) speech are indestructible, (and that omniscience is therefore impossible).

(However, in their favorite inference) the exclusion [vyatireka = vyāvṛtti] (of the probans, viz. 'human speakership', from the contrary of the probandum, viz. all persons who are faultless) is doubtful. Accordingly this inference is non-concomitant. [Second half of 144b-145a : second half of 143b-144a]

The Mimāṃsaka inference in question is: 'A man possesses faults such as passion etc., because he is a human speaker.' The probans, viz. 'human speakership', of this inference, to be valid, must not be found in any case contrary to the probandum [vipakṣa], viz. in any man who is faultless. This,

however, is doubtful. Therefore the inference in question is regarded as non-concomitant.

The inference and this criticism of it are found in NB, III, 70-72, where they are used to establish Dharmakīrti's new category of fallacies sandigdha 'naikāntika.

cf. TS, 3369b-3370a: vaktṛtvam yat tu lokena matam ādhyavasāyikam / tatra tādṛśi hetoḥ syāt sandigdhavyatirekitā //

154. And should they claim that the indestructibility of the faults (of speech) may be shown by (1) their eternity, (2) the absence of means (to destroy them), and (3) the absence of the knowledge of the means (even if such did exist), (we may refute these claims by (1) the fact that faults have a cause (viz. the doctrine of soul, and so are not eternal); (2) (the fact that) they are destroyed by the practice of the opposite (viz. the doctrine of soullessness) of their cause (so there is a means to destroy them), and (3) (the fact that) knowledge of this (means to destroy the faults) is reached by knowing the true nature of their cause (viz. the doctrine of soul). [145b-no number-147a : 144b-146a]

VII. Tāyitva

155. Dharmakīrti now takes up tāyitva (The Buddha's saviorhood) which is given by Diṅnāga as the second effect of the twofold cause of the Buddha (see introductory note to Vs. 144). In expounding tāyitva, he follows Diṅnāga's distinction of sugatatva and tāyitva as characterized respectively by svārtha (beneficial for himself) and parārtha (beneficial for others). That is to say, sugatatva with three virtues refers to the aspect of the Buddha's accomplishment of his own aim, and tāyitva derives from his exertion for others.

> Tāya (salvation) means the proclamation of the Path which he has himself seen. He does not speak untruth since there is no fruit for him to strive for and because of his pity, because his exertion in all his undertakings is for the good of others. Therefore, (= because of this salvation which he gives), the Buddha is authoritative.
>
> Or tāya means the revealing of the Four Noble Truths. [147b-148 : 146b-147]

156. Ending his discussion on hitaiṣitva, śāstṛitva, sugatatva and tāyitva, Dharmakīrti now proceeds to discuss the truthfulness of the Four Noble Truths, which the Buddha expounds as a savior [tāyin].

Catvāryāryasatyāni (Four Noble Truths)

1. Duḥkhasatyam

(The five) element-groups [skandha]* of one who is in the mundane existence is suffering [duḥkha]. [First half of 149a : first half of 148a]

*The five element-groups are rūpa (the physical elements, matter), vedanā (feeling), sanjñā (ideation, conception), saṃskāra (volition, will) and vijñāna (consciousness without content).

In Buddhism, all the saṃskṛtadharmas (things composite, or phenomenal world in modern terms) are supposed to consist of these five element-groups. Hence they do not admit such a thing as the eternal soul over and above these five element-groups.

157. At this point, the opponent may object as follows (M., p. 62, lines 13-14): If only the (five) element-groups originate interdependently (cf. Vs. 58) and there is no (eternal) soul that is subject to mundane existence, it would be (implied) that passion etc. originate adventitiously and without cause.

To this objection the author answers:

> (Not so:) Since we see that passion etc. are intensified by repeated practise, (we must admit that) they do not originate adventitiously nor without cause, for (that which has no cause) is contradictory to its birth. [Second half of 149a-149b : second half of 148a-148b]

cf. TS, 1948: rāgadveṣādayaś cāmī paṭavo 'bhyāsayogataḥ / anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bhavantaḥ pariniścitāḥ //

158. The following verses deny the explanation that is offered by the school of physicians. cf. Wise, Hindu Medicine, pp. 42-49, 214-219.

M. (p. 62, line 21-last line) puts their theory thus: "A man whose nature is ventous (i.e. who suffers from the humor wind) is stupid, a man whose nature is bilious is hateful and one whose nature is phlegmatic is passionate."

Note that the Indians associate phlegm [ślesman] with the opposite characteristic from that taught by the ancient physicians of the west.

(Stupidity, hatred and passion) are not properties of the humors wind (bile and phlegm), because there is no concomitance. If you say no fault is involved (in this humor-theory) because there is a commingling of the humors (in each person), then why is it that no other properties of the humors are seen? [150 : 149 misprinted as 148]

M. (p. 63, lines 3-8): A man suffering from the humor wind may be found to be not very stupid, a bilious man may not show sharp hatred, and a phlegmatic man may not manifest strong passion. Accordingly, stupidity etc. are not concomitant with the humors. Again, if the faults are properties of the three humors and these humors all exist

in every man, why is it that only these three properties are made manifest? Why not also the hardness, the smell (Vibhūticandra's note) etc.?

cf. TS 1960 and TSP (p. 549): balāsādiprabhāveṇa na ca teṣāṃ samudbhavaḥ / pūrvavad vyabhicārasya sarvathā 'py upalambhataḥ // -- tatra balāsaḥ śleṣmā. ....kiṃ ca śleṣmādyupacayāpacayābhyāṃ na rāgādīnām upacayāpacayau bhavataḥ. na ca yad bhedād yasya bhedo na bhavati tat tasya kāryaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt. tathā śleṣmaṇo 'pi tīvradveṣo dṛṣṭo na tu tīvrarāgaḥ, pittaprakṛtir api tīvrarāgo dṛsto na tīvradveṣādir iti sāṅkaryaṃ dṛśyate. na ca yam antareṇa yasya bhāvaḥ sa tasya hetur yuktaḥ. yadavastho rāgī dṛṣṭas tadavastho 'pi dveṣīty ato 'pi vyabhicārān na śleṣmādidharmā rāgādayaḥ.

159. (Again,) it is impossible that each of the faults is a property of all (three humors), for in this case passion (could not vary but) would always be the same. If you say that there is no fault involved because the case is like that of color etc., (we answer that the same reproof would be applicable there too, unless you

admit the power of particular karma (as an auxiliary to cause variations of color etc.). [151-152a : 150 misprinted as 149-no number]

"The case is like that of color": (M., p. 63, lines 13-14:) Just as color etc., though caused by the gross elements only, sometimes increases and sometimes decreases, so does passion etc.

160. M. (p. 63, lines 19-20): But it might be objected that passion etc. do not come simply from the humors but from special alterations of the humors just as do (various forms) of sickness. Thus the sameness of passion etc. would not be implied. To this the author says:

(No,) because there is no special alteration (in passion etc.) when there is a special alteration (of the humors). [first half of 152b: first half of 151a]

161. Objection (M., p. 64, line 3): But your probans (viz. 'because there is no special alteration in passion etc.') is contrary to fact, for we see that when phlegm etc. are increased, passion etc. are also increased.

(Answer:) The probans here is not contrary to fact, because there is an alteration (in hatred and not in passion etc.) for the alteration of all the (humors, which is painful). (Passion, hatred and stupidity, however, are not all) produced from all (the humors, since this would imply the sameness of passion etc., as has been pointed out in Vs. 159). [Second half of 152b-153a : second half of 151a-151b]

162. (Furthermore,) when the cause increases the effect cannot disappear, as we see in the case of fever. [153b-first half of 154a : 152a-first half of 152b]

In the case of a serious illness phlegm may increase greatly, and at the same time passion disappears. Thus, phlegm cannot be the cause of passion. When bile, which is truly a cause of

fever, increases, the fever increases also.

163. Objection (M., p. 64, lines 14-15): Very well, but passion etc. appear when the humors are in equipoise, and hatred etc. appear when they are not equipoise. Accordingly, your probans that passion etc. are not altered when the humors are altered is contrary to fact.

To this the author says:

> And the alteration (= increase) of passion comes from pleasure (and only indirectly from the equipoise of the humors which gives rise to pleasure). [Second half of 154a : second half of 152b].

See Vs. 87 which deals with the same subject.

164. If you say that passion fails to arise because of pain brought about by disequilibrium (of the humors), you must explain why passion arises (in other cases). --(If you answer that) from equipoise of the humors there comes an increase of semen, and from this arises

lust, (then we will point out) that a man may be passionate while his humors are not in equipoise; likewise, a man (who is strong in perfect knowledge) may have no passion while his humors are in equipoise. There are even some men (who are still passionate) when they are passing blood from loss of semen. Furthermore, semen is not restricted (for its object) to one particular woman. [154b-156a : 153a-154]

165. Accordingly, (by your theory,) a man's passion would never be sharper for one woman (than for another). If you say that beauty of limbs etc. (is an auxiliary cause), we answer, no, because a man is not necessarily attracted by all (beautiful women), and passion (wherever it is found) is never unrestricted. [156b-157a : 155]

"A man is not necessarily attracted by all beautiful women": A man may be attracted by a woman who lacks beauty (M., p. 65, lines 14-15). And even if beauty does attract him, it is never beauty in general. His passion is restricted to one or a certain number of specific women.

166. And passion would arise even in a man who takes no notice of women's virtues. If you say notice of the virtue of a woman is an auxiliary cause, then everyone (who is passionate) would take notice of virtue, for the cause would be the same in all cases. [157b-158a : 156]

cf. TS, 1952: śubhātmīyasthirādīṃś ca samāropyāṅgāṇādīṣu // rāgādayaḥ pravartante tadrūpā viṣayā na ca //

167. (Again, according to the doctrine of the humors,) a hateful man cannot be in the same (phlegmatic) state as the lustful man, because hate and lust are different in nature. But no actual rule can be observed in this effect. [158b-159a : 157]

168. Dharmakīrti now shows that these faults, viz. implication of the sameness of passion etc., are not found in the Buddhist theory.

These faults are not implied in the doctrine of one

who holds that passion etc. proceed in accordance with differences in the residual force [vāsanā] left by the (preceding) homogeneous moment.*

By the same argument we deny that passion etc. are properties of the gross elements. [159b-first half of 160b : 158-first half of 159b]

*Vs. 90, and TS, 1954-1956: viṣayopanipāte tu sukhaduḥkhādisambhavāḥ / tasmāt samānajātīya-vāsanāparipākajāḥ // rāgadveṣādayaḥ kleśāḥ pratisaṅkhyānavidviṣām / ayoniśomanaskāra-vidheyānāṃ yathābalam // sākṣāt tu viṣayā naiva rāgadveṣādihetavaḥ / ekaḥ kleśo hi tatra syāt sarveṣāṃ tasya bodhavat //

169. An objector may admit with the Buddhist that the cause of passion is the preceding moment of passion, but may still insist that the source [āśraya, niśraya] of passion is the body, just as earth etc. are the sources of white color etc. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti says:

White color etc. do not take earth etc. for their

source, for we have refuted the notion of source (cf. Vs. 74). [Second half of 160b-161a : second half of 159b-160a]

170. At this point it may be objected that the Buddha himself used the notion of source, for he said, "Depending on the gross elements", that is, taking them as its source [āśritya], "color arises" (M., p. 66, line 21; P., p. 124, line 17).

For the above-quoted Buddha's statement, cf. AbhK (p. 8, fol. 3, 又契經說。苾芻當知。眼謂以處四大種所造淨色。···· ; LVP, I, p. 65); AbhV, I, p. 66, lines 25-27: spraṣṭavyāni bhikṣo bāhyam āyatanaṃ catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya rūpy anidarśanaṃ sapratigham.

To this the author answers:

The phrase 'depending on that (viz. the gross elements') is used in the sense of cause [hetu] (and not source).

(Or we may admit the concept) source but only when

the derivative is inseparable from its source, and never otherwise. [161b-162a : 160b-161a]

As Vibhūticandra notes, the second sentence is a concession. M. (p. 67, lines 2-3): "Since color forms a single congeries with the four gross elements, that is, is inseparable and never found apart from them as its source, the four elements may be (called) the source (of color)." Actually, the Buddhist does not admit the separate existence of substance (e.g. earth) and quality (e.g. white). There is just one entity here, viz. the visible thing. But this will not furnish an analogy for passion etc. The gross elements are not the 'source' of passion etc. because there is no such inseparability.

P.'s reading 'āśrayo 'yuktam anyathā' agrees with the Tibetan translation 'rten . yin . gshan . du . hphad . ma . yin .' and is to be preferred to M.'s reading.

171. If you say that (consciousness [caitanya] takes the gross elements as its source and yet is) separate from

them just as the intoxicating power of wine (is separate from the wine itself), we answer that the power is nothing other than the thing. It is this thing which perishes. So long as it remains intact the 'derivative' does not depart from the 'source'. [162b-first half of 163b : 161b-first half of 162b]

When we speak of wine turning sour, what has really happened is that the wine, which was capable [samartha] of producing certain effects, has perished, and a new entity which is incapable [asamartha] has been produced. As long as the wine remains intact, that is, as long as it remains wine, it cannot be incapable of producing its effects. 'Derivative' [āśrita] and 'source' [āśraya] are here used in the sense admitted in the last verse, not of two things really distinct but of two aspects of one and the same thing.

172. If you say that the case in question is the same, we say, no; because of the difference of consciousness and the gross elements, for they are apprehended in different sorts of cognitions and because, (if so,) as

long as the body remained unaltered, thought would remain the same, just like color etc.* [Second half of 163b-first half of 165a : second half of 162b-first half of 164a]

"The case in question is the same" : That is, there is identity of consciousness and the gross elements, like that of the power of wine and wine. When this material consciousness has existed it perishes, and a new non-conscious material is produced. To this we say, no (M., p. 67, lines 16-17).

*Color, being only an aspect of the matter which forms the body, cannot change unless the matter changes. But thought is different. cf. Vs. 71.

173. One might object as follows (M., p. 68, lines 4-5): Even though body and cognition are identical, cognition may vary in accordance with the various objects (presented to it). Hence the author asks: (one should read dehasyārthānām for dehasvārthānām)

What dependence can there be of mental knowledge [vikalpa] on objects? [Second half of 165a : second half of 164a]

Mental knowledge (vikalpa = manovijñāna, mental cognition, e.g. pleasure etc.) is independent of the objects which may be present. It arises from the residual force [vāsanā] of former thought.

174. But if a given cognition [jñānaṃ kiñcit] of a given man has as its cause the awakening of his residual force [vāsanā] (of previous cognition) and is independent of the body, then one cognition (simply) comes from another cognition. [165b-166a : 164b-165a]

This is the theory which Dharmakīrti accepts. M. (p. 68, lines 12 ff.) interprets the verse somewhat differently, taking vāsanābodhakāraṇam as a tatpuruṣa rather than a bahuvrīhi and supplying utpadyamānasya jñānasya with kasyacit. This forces one to contrue kāraṇam in two directions and also seems to misinterpret Dharmakīrti's theory. Cognition does not awaken the vāsanā but

is awakened by the vāsanā.

175. If someone should say, "We grant that (cognition does not come from that which lacks cognition), for the reason that all things in the world are connected with the power of cognition,"* then we should answer, "Who other than an ox of a Sāṃkhya philosopher, a man without shame, would wish to say such a thing? (It is as much as saying,) 'That exists which has never been seen: a hundred elephants stand on the tip of a grass blade.'" [166b-168a : 165b-167a]

*This is Sāṃkhya doctrine. Cause is simply the manifesting of what already existed before in an unmanifested state. Cognition derives ultimately from original nature [pradhāna or prakṛti], from which all things in the world derive.

176. The form in which an entity appears is not seen prior to this appearance. Even if you cut the cause into a hundred pieces it cannot be found there.* [168b-169a : 167b-168a]

This is the Buddhist doctrine. That which is not manifested simply does not exist.

*P. (p. 128, line 17): Accordingly, cognition derives from the cognition occuring within its own series. Whence the existence of another world is established.

177. If it be held that (the thought-series does not come from another birth and that) it arises without any history, this would imply a random distribution of passion etc. [169b : 168b]

M. (p. 69, lines 11-13): Just as there is no certain rule in regard to eyes, hands, feet, darkness of complexion, for occasionally a man is born without one or more of these, no one man would possess passion etc. and another lack it. P. (p. 128, lines 21-22): A man might be (born) entirely lacking in passion. But if (we assume that) he comes from another birth, then since craving [tṛṣnā] alone can be held to be the cause of his birth, it is impossible that he should be born

lacking in passion. For without passion there is no birth.

178. If you say that everyone is nothing more than the gross elements of which he is composed and so possesses passion etc., then the passion of everyone would be the same unless there were some additament to the elements. [170 : 169]

179. (Again,) since there is no variation among the material elements in regard to vitality (i.e., one man is not more alive than another), this difference (with regard to the passions) would have to depend on some source, and just as this source causes the decrease or increase of the (passion-making) elements, it might cause them to depart entirely from their nature (in which cause some man would be passionless; but this is not so). [171 : 170]

180. If despite the difference (in additament) you insist that equality among the causes of passion etc. is

not harmed, (and thus the total absence of passion etc. in some people would not be implied), then passion would be the same in all men from the sameness of its causes. [172 : 171]

181. Of the notion 'cow' which arises from common causes (viz. the various cows which one sees) there is no variation: (one notion is not more bovine than another). (Likewise,) in the present case (i.e. in the materialist's view), there can be no variation in the vitality of earth: (one lump of earth cannot be more living or more passionate than another.) [173 : 172]

182. If you say that although there are variations in heat, no fire is not hot, and such is the case under discussion; we answer that the example does not fit, because we deny that fire is different from heat. [174 : 173]

"No fire is not hot": In the same way, although there are variations in passion etc., no one entirely lacks passion (M. p. 70, lines 13-14).

"Deny that fire is different from heat": Bright color, hot touch etc. are called fire. Accordingly there can be no fire where there is no heat. But passion etc. are distinct from the gross elements because the gross elements may be present even where there is no passion etc. (M., p. 70, lines 15-16).

183. Qualities which are distinct from their substance and which undergo alterations are sometimes totally destroyed, just as white color etc. (is destroyed) when its substance (e.g., a jar) is altered. [175 : 174]

The verse is drawn according to the theory of the realists. As P. (p. 130, lines 11 ff.) points out, the white color and the jar are not really distinct. However, there is a distinction between the white-jar relation and the heat-fire relation. In the first case the continuum [santāna] of white color may be interrupted without interruption of the continuum of jar. If the gross elements were the cause of passion, this is the relation which the gross elements and passion would

obtain. Accordingly, the continuum of passion might be interrupted while the continuum of elements continued. In which case some people would lack passion entirely, which is impossible.

184. Objection (M., p. 71, lines 2-3): Very well, (particular colors such as whiteness etc. may sometimes be totally destroyed). But color (in general) etc. which is a quality of a substance is always present. Such is the case of passion etc. of a living being.

(Answer:) There is no invariable conformity (of passion etc. to the gross elements) as in the case of color (in general) etc., because they (viz. color in general etc.) are inseparable from the gross elements. [176a : 175a]

P. (p. 130, lines 21-22): Passion etc. are not inseparable from the gross elements as color, taste etc. are, because the gross elements can exist without passion etc., but not without color etc.

185. If you say that (passion etc. also are inseparable from the gross elements) like that (viz. color in general etc.), then we answer, no, because this would imply the simultaneous origin (of passion etc. with the gross elements). [176b : 175b]

186. (If you say that no simultaneous occurrence is implied because passion etc. conform to the presence or absence of its objects,) we answer that (external) objects are not the determinant (of passion etc.) because the objects of passion are constructed (by thought).* Or we may say there can be no determination of the passions etc. in your theory, because they lack a homogeneous cause [sabhāgahetu]. [177 : 176]

*P. (p. 131, lines 5-6): Passion etc. are not in a series which accords strictly to the presence and absence of objects, for we experience their rise even in the absence of objects. (Read na khalu viṣayānvayavyatirekānuvidhānasaṃbaddhāḥ santānā rāgādayaḥ.)

"There can be no determination": There can be

no rule to explain why a certain type of passion occurs to a certain person at a certain time and place.

"Homogeneous cause [sabhāgahetu]": This is one of the six causes set up by the Buddhists to explain the relation between dharmas. The sabhāgahetu is that cause which permits a continuum of constantly changing dharmas to appear to exist continuously in one and the same form. The notion of identity in time is due to a relation of homogeneity between preceding and subsequent moments of a series. Accordingly, the entity of the preceding moment is called the homogeneous cause [sabhāgahetu] of the subsequent entity which belongs to the same series.

Thus passion at a certain moment is the homogeneous cause of passion at the subsequent moment of the same series.

cf. AbhK (p. 31, fol. 1; LVP, II, p. 255): 第三同類因相云何。頌曰 (Kārikā, II, 52): sabhāgahetuḥ sadṛśāḥ svanikāyabhuvo 'grajāḥ / anyonyaṃ navabhūmis tu mārgaḥ samaviśiṣṭayoḥ //; Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of

Buddhism, pp. 33 ff.

187. (Or if you say that the gross elements alone are the cause of thought, then) each thought would arise constantly because of the (constant) presence of the cause (viz. the aggregate of the gross elements).

[178a : no number]

M. (p. 71, line 20-last line): Thus, the four non-material element-groups (viz. feeling, ideation, volition and consciousness; see note under Vs. 156) having been proved to be the homogeneous-cause (for all thought-series) by such arguments as 'because we see passion etc. are intensified (by repeated practice)' and so forth (= Vs. 157), the mundane existence of the (five) element-groups is established. And it is precisely these (five element-groups) that are spoken of as suffering (in Vs. 156).

188. The following verse is designed to show the truth concerning suffering [duḥkha, that is, the

world considered as suffering; the first of the Four Noble Truths].

This Truth is considered in its four aspects, (1) from all objects in the world being transitory [anityataḥ], (2) from their being painful [duḥkhataḥ], (3) from their being void [śūnyataḥ] and (4) from their being selfless [anātmataḥ].

These are the first four of the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, according to AbhK (p. 119, fol. 2; LVP, VI, p. 163): 觀苦聖諦修行相 一非常 [anitya] = 苦 [duḥkha] 三空 [śūnya] 四非我 [anātman]. See AbhK (p. 137, fol. 1-2; LVP, VII, pp. 30-39) for Vasubandhu's four different interpretations of the sixteen aspects.

(1) It (viz., suffering, the world considered as suffering) is transitory, because of its occasional occurrence; (2) It is painful because its source is the impurities (viz., passion etc.) and because it is dependent on cause; (4) It has no self; (3) nor is it based on anything. [178b-179a : 177]

As regards the first aspect of suffering, P.

(p. 132, line 25) remarks that one cannot experience all things all the time. It is the nature of experience that things must be experienced momentarily. An eternal object could not be experienced at all. As regards the second, both P. (p. 132, line 29) and M. (p. 72, line 6) quote the maxim sarvam paravaśam duḥkham, "Everything dependent on an extraneous factor is suffering." The third and fourth aspects are mentioned by Dharmakīrti in reversed order. P. (p. 132, line 30) comments, "It is not a self nor is it even based on anything which is not a self."

189. An objector may ask (M., p. 72, line 9): "Why is not the (eternal) self the basic controller?" To which the author replies:

> That which is not a cause cannot be a basic controller; nor can an eternal entity be a cause.*
>
> Accordingly, the many things (of the world) cannot arise each in its different time from a single (cause).**
>
> [179b-180a : 178]

*It has been shown (Vs. 13 and note) that

eternal entity can act neither simultaneously nor consecutively.

**If there were a single cause, it would produce all things at once.

190. When a number of causes in combination fail to produce an effect one infers a further cause; but this cannot be in the case of eternal things. [180b-181a: 179]

This is an interesting argument which Dharmakīrti has not used before.

We recognize a cause only by positive and negative instances [anvayavyatireka]. Color, light and attention are all present, but a man sees nothing if he lacks eyes (cf. M., p. 72, lines 19-20). From this we judge that the eye is a cause of sight. But these negative instances, necessary to prove a thing as a cause, are lacking for eternal entities. If God or the soul were the cause of perception once, the same would hold everywhere forever, so we can never prove that it

holds even once.

191. 2. Samudayasatyam

M. (p. 72, line 24-last line): Having commented on Suffering in its four aspects, the author now proceeds to comment on suffering-origination [samudaya, the origination of the world considered as suffering; the second of the Four Noble Truths]. The four aspects of suffering-origination are: that it has a cause [hetutā], that its cause is multiple [samudayatā], that it comes into being [prabhavatā], and that it arises from conditions [pratyayatā].

This is the second group of the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths. cf. AbhK (p. 119, fol. 2; LVP, VI, p. 163) 觀集聖諦修行相 一因 [hetu] 二集 [samudaya] 三 生 [prabhava] 四緣 [pratyaya].

Note that the word samudaya has two meanings: 'origin' and 'manifold character'.

Dharmakīrti's references to the four aspects

are far from specific, and the commentators disagree as to which verse refers to which aspect. P.'s scheme, however, is far superior to M.'s. According to P., Vss. 191-194 deal with hetutā, Vs. 195 with samudayatā, Vss. 196-197 with prabhavatā, and Vs. 198 with pratyayatā. Vss. 199-202 answer a number of objections. M., on the other hand, takes everything up through Vs. 198 under the heading hetutā and crowds the other aspects into the verses which answer objections.

By its occasional occurrence suffering (i.e., the world as suffering) is proved to have a cause. (Only) a permanent entity and a non-entity derive from no cause, they being independent of external things. [181b-182a : 180-181a]

The second line (182a : 181a) should read, as in P., nityam satvam asatvam vā 'hetor = ...rtag • tu • yod • ba baham • med • par • hgyur •

192. Some people say that it might be without a cause

just as there is no cause for the sharpness etc. of thorns etc. [182b-183a : 181b-182a]

This is the svabhāvavāda of the Lokāyatas. Things are the way they are simply because that is their nature: thorns are sharp, parrot's wings are green. The example of the thorn is an old one. cf. NS, IV.I.22: animittato bhāvotpattiḥ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādidarśanāt.

193. (But) if x is produced only when y is present and if x is altered only when y is altered, then one allows that y is the cause of x. And such (a pattern of causal relation) is found in the case of thorns. [183b-184a : 182b-183a]

cf. Vss. 58, 71, 72. M. (p. 73, lines 14-16): Thorns too are produced only when seed, water, earth etc. are present, and are altered, being increased or diminished, only when they are altered.

194. As for tangibility, since it is a cause [hetu] of

visibility, it is an indirect cause [nimitta]. [184b : 183b].

This half verse is added to forestall an objection that might be made to the empirical definition of cause given in the verse above. Sight is produced when its object possesses tangibility: we cannot see space or atoms. Hence tangibility would seem to be a cause of sight. But everyone knows that visibility is a cause of sight. Dharmakīrti sticks to his definition. Tangibility is a cause of sight, but not so direct or logically important a cause as visibility. Thus he terms it a nimitta rather than a hetu.

P. (p. 134, lines 20-21) remarks at the close of this verse: "By so much has the author denied causelessness, and thus established the first aspect of (suffering-origination), namely that all objects in the world have a cause, viz., that the objects in the world arise from manifold causes."

195. Since we have shown that eternal things cannot (be causes), the origin (of the objects in the world) cannot

be from God or the like, for they are unable to produce. [185a-first half of 185b : 184a-first half of 184b]

Eternal things cannot produce either simultaneously or consecutively (see Vs. 13). P. (p. 134, lines 23-26) remarks, "Since a single, eternal cause is impossible, the (second) aspect (of suffering-origination, viz.) the fact that the objects of the world arise from manifold causes, is established. ...The third aspect of suffering-origination is the aspect of craving [tṛṣṇā]. Of this the author now speaks."

196. Accordingly, the cause (of the world considered as suffering) is the craving for becoming [bhavavāñchā], for man's attaining of a given position is brought about by his desire for winning it. [Second half of 185b-186a: second half of 184b-no number]

Dharmakīrti is reconciling the traditions. The third aspect of suffering-origination is listed by AbhK as prabhava (becoming or coming into existence. But scripture speaks of a threefold

craving as follows:

"What is the Noble Truth concerning the suffering-origination? (It is) this craving, potent for rebirth, accompanied by passion and pleasure, seeking satisfaction here and there, viz., the craving for sensual pleasure [kāmatṛṣṇā], the craving for becoming [bhavatṛṣṇā] and the craving for non-becoming [vibhavatṛṣṇā]*."

*"katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkha-samudayaṃ ariya-saccaṃ? yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobhavikā nandi-rāga-sahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī, seyyathīdaṃ kāma-taṇhā bhava-taṇhā vibhava-taṇhā." (PTS, Dīgha Nikāya II, p. 308), p. 309)

197. By the term 'craving for becoming' [bhavavāñchā = bhavatṛṣṇā] Dharmakīrti reconciles these traditions. He goes on to explain:

This craving for becoming may also be considered as a craving for sensual pleasure [kāmecchā] or a craving for non-becoming [vibhavecchā] since all creatures (i.e. as soon as they have come into existence, M., p. 74,

lines 15-16) act on the desire to attain pleasure and the desire to avoid suffering. [186b-187a : 185]

198. Craving is the source of all becoming, for it is craving of the self which is the cause in every case of man's turning to [sampravartane] what is not pleasure under the mistaken notion that it is pleasure. [187b-188a : 186]

Sampravartane is the reading given by P. in his commentary, and makes excellent sense. The kārikā in P., as in M., reads sampravartate. If we read this we must take tṛṣṇā as subject of the verb, and sukhasaṃjñasya as śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī, which is awkward. M. and P. differ in their comments.

M. (p. 74, line 22-p. 75, line 2) wants to extend the verse to cover the four mistaken notions. These are: applying the notion of pleasure to what is not pleasure [suḥkhaviparyāsa], applying the notion of purity to what is not pure [śuciviparyāsa], applying the notion of the self to what is not the self [ātmaviparyāsa], and applying the notion of eternity to what is not eternal [nityaviparyāsa].

For the four mistaken notions, cf. AbhK (p. 100, fol. 2; LVP, V, p. 21) and Nāgārjuna as quoted by Nakamura, HJAS, vol. 18, 1955, p. 90.

P. wants to show that the verse covers the fourth aspect of suffering-origination, viz. pratyaya, that the objects in the world arise from conditions [pratyaya, interdependent causation]. "Since craving is an auxiliary cause [sahakārin] of our turning to these objects, it is a condition [pratyaya] rather than a material cause [upādāna]. Thought [citta] alone is the material cause here. Its condition [pratyaya] is craving, and sometimes compassion. Thus the author has covered the aspect (of suffering-origination as) considered from the viewpoint of condition." (P., p. 135, lines 14-15)

Both commentators are far more specific than Dharmakīrti himself.

199. (The opponent might argue as follows:) The masters (of Nyāya) have said, 'Because there is no birth of one without passion', and because there is no passion on the part of that which lacks a body, passion arises from the body. [188b-189a : 187]

"Because there is no birth of one without passion," NS, III, 1, 24.

200. (To this we reply:) If they mean that the body is a condition [nimitta] (of passion), we accept their statement. But we deny that it is a material cause [upādāna]. (Furthermore) if (the materialists) follow up this argument, they will deny their own doctrine. [189b-190a : 188]

cf. Vss. 73 and 127.

M. (p. 75, line 21): The body being a cause of passion, and passion being a cause of the body, from this mutual causation there must result a series of rebirths.

(But the materialists deny rebirth.)

201. If (the materialists claim that passion is not a cause of the body, but that) it comes into existence at the moment of birth, since we see that those who are born have passion, then passion must have come from a

previously existing cause homogeneous with it. [190b-first half of 191a : 189-first half of 190a]

202. M. (p. 76, lines 5-6): One may ask why craving [tṛṣṇā] alone is spoken of as the origin, when nescience [avidyā], craving and karma are all three causes of rebirth. The author explains:

Nescience is not listed (as the origin of suffering) even though it is a cause (of rebirth). Craving alone is listed because it impels the series (of five element-groups) into existence and because it is the immediate cause (of rebirth). Nor is karma (listed) because (rebirth) does not occur even where it is present (if there is no craving). [Second half of 191a-192a : second half of 190a-no number]

cf. AbhK (p. 116, fol. 1-2; LVP, VI, pp. 136-139) 即苦行体亦名集諦。此說必定違越契經。契經唯說愛[tṛṣṇā]為集故。經就勝故說愛為集。理實所餘亦是集諦。如是理趣由何證知。餘契經中亦說餘故。如薄伽梵伽他中言 業[karma] 愛

愛 [tṛṣṇā] 及無明 [avidyā] 為因招後行令諸有相續，名補特伽羅 ----

然經中說愛為集者。偏說起因 [abhinirvṛttihetu]。伽他中說業愛無明皆為因者。具生[因] [upapattihetu] 起[因] [abhinirvṛttihetu] 及彼因因。----- 愛為起因何理為證。離愛後有必不起故。謂有愛離愛二俱命終。唯見有愛者後有更起。由此理證愛為起因。起有起無定隨愛故。又由愛故相續趣後。現見若於是處有愛。則心相續數趣於彼。由此比知。以有愛故能令相續趣後有。又取後身。

3. Nirodhasatyam

203. P. (p. 136, line 26) gives the four aspects of cessation [nirodha] (of suffering, viz. the third of the Four Noble Truths). They are: that it is simply cessation [nirodha], that it is tranquillity [śānti], that it is the highest excellence [praṇīta], and that it is definitive cessation [niḥsaraṇa].

These four aspects make up the third group of

the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths. cf. AbhK (p. 119, fol. 2; LVP, VI, p. 163) 觀滅聖諦修四行相。一滅 [nirodha] 二靜 [śānti] 三妙 [praṇīta] 四離 [niḥsaraṇa].

Suffering is not eternal, for it is possible to bring its cause (viz. craving) to an end etc. [192b : 191a]

M. (p. 76, lines 17-18): By 'etc.' is meant that one may also remove nescience which is an auxiliary cause (of suffering).

204. (One may object that) there is no possibility of liberation since we are in the world of transmigration; but this argument does not affect us, since we agree that (there is no liberation) because it is not proven (that we are in the world of transmigration). [193a : 191b]

P. (p. 137, lines 2-6): We agree that no one attains liberation. There is no liberation for him who is bound, for it is his nature to be bound.

Nor is there any bondage for what is liberated. For it is its nature ever to be liberated....

In the absolute sense [paramārthataḥ] there is no one in the world of transmigration, for transmigration cannot apply to what is momentary, and as for the continuous series (of momentary elements), such a series does not exist in the absolute sense. Hence the inference, "there is no possibility of liberation since we are in the world of transmigration," is one in which the probans is false.

205. One may object as follows (M., p. 77, line 2): But if there is no one who transmigrates, who would desire liberation, and who would put forth effort? To this the author replies:

> As long as one does not renounce attachment to oneself, so long as one passes through a round of craving [paritsyati], falsely ascribing suffering to (oneself), (so long as) one is not in one's true state. Effort is in order to renounce the false ascription, this despite the fact that there is no one who is

liberated [moktṛ]. [193b-194 : 192-193]

"Paritasyati": M. glosses duḥkham āste (suffers), but I prefer to take it as a variant of paritṛṣyati (see Vs. 287). The Tibetan word for paritasyati here is yons. su. gduṅ. ḥgyur. ba which means to desire and to suffer.

Moktṛ here means 'one who experiences mokṣa', not deliverer. See P. p, 137, line 6.

M. (p. 77, lines 11-13): Empirical activity [vyavahāra] depends not on truth but on one's judgment. Thus when one judges a rope to be a snake, one seeks to avoid it. Similarly, when one believes "I am bound; I shall free myself," it is because of this false ascription that one puts forth effort for liberation.

206. M. (p. 77, lines 15-16): Let it be granted that the world of transmigration, which is characterized by activities caused by the desire for pleasure, belongs to those who erroneously conceive

belief in the self. But how is it that those who have completely uprooted all the vices which are caused by attachment to the self should still remain (in mundane existence)? To this the author says:

> Those who are free from passion may continue (in worldly existence) due to their compassion or due to their karma.** [195a : 194a]

"Due to their compassion": due to their desire to save the world from suffering and its cause. "Due to their karma": due to that form of karma which causes the body to be bound to a certain duration of time. (M., p. 77, lines 18-19)

207. Objection (P., p. 138, lines 3-4): If one remains (in the worldly state) due to karma, he would accumulate (new) karma for a future birth and so he would be reborn. Or if karma has no power (to continue the existence) of one without passions, how should he remain (in the worldly state because of karma)? To this the author says:

Although (their bodies) produced (by karma may remain in worldly existence) since they will not cease to exist, still the karma of those who have crossed over the craving for existence is not capable of forcing them to assume another birth, for the auxiliary cause (of rebirth) has been destroyed. [195b-196a : 194b-no number]

208. Objection (P., p. 138, lines 9-11): Compassion can occur only if there are souls which are to be saved from suffering and not otherwise. But there are no souls. Furthermore, those who have destroyed the view that souls exist know that there are no souls. Accordingly, (it would seem that) compassion cannot occur in those who have destroyed the view that souls exist. The author now refutes this.

Compassion appears in one in whom it is not contradicted (by hatred), upon his knowledge of suffering (viz., the knowledge of fourfold suffering). This compassion is brought about by the current of his acquired tendencies [saṃskāra], and is a property (which depends

on) reality, not one which depends on (the fancied belief in) souls. [196b-197a : 195]

209. Objection (M., p. 78, line 12): If such is the case, passion also would arise in those who are liberated. (P., p. 138, line 19): What is the distinction between passion and compassion?

Passion arises from the superimposition of (the notion of) self as distinct (from the five element-groups) upon the thing (viz., the five element-groups) which really is not the self. But the appearance of compassion is due simply to the direct perception of suffering-series. [197b-198a : 196]

210. M. (p. 78, line 19): (One might suppose) that just as compassion arises from perceiving suffering, so would hatred arise towards whatever stands in the way (of one's perception). To this the author replies:

Delusion [moha] is the root of all vices, and this

(delusion) is nothing but belief in the soul. When delusion is absent there can be no hatred toward that which was its basic cause. Accordingly, we say compassion (arises, not hatred). [198b-199a : 197-198a]

211. The following verse, according to the commentators, answers an objection to liberation while on this earth, what is elsewhere called jīvanmukti. P. (p. 139, lines 8-9) phrases the objection, "But if the man without passion continues in the flesh, he cannot at that time be liberated." For that time at least he is not in nirvāṇa, he is in the worldly state (M., p. 79, line 4). To this the author answers:

There is liberation (even at that time), for there is no reaggregation (with a future body) when the previous tendencies [saṃskāra] have been destroyed. But the faultless ones (viz., the wholly enlightened Buddhas) whose tendencies remain in force stay (in the worldly existence). [199b-200a : 198b-199a]

(Because of their great compassion), they have

no wish to destroy their karma for non-reaggregation (P., p. 139, line 13).

212. If pity is but slight (as with the śrāvakas), then effort to be reborn will not be great. But those of great pity (viz., the wholly enlightened ones) remain for the good of others. [200b-201a : 199b-200a]

For śrāvakas, cf. note on Vs. 147.

213. The following verse answers an objection which is put in the following form by P. (p. 139, lines 20-24): "If the path (to the cessation of pain) is effective, then (the bondage of further birth) would disappear in the first path [ādyamārga = darśanamārga] of the initiate [śrotāpanna], because the belief in the self disappears (in that path). For a man attains the status of initiate from his renouncing the belief in the self [satkāyadṛṣṭi], scepticism [vicikitsā] and the observance of superstitious rites [śīlavrataparāmarśa]. Furthermore, it has been said (see Vs. 210) that delusion is the

root of all vices, and that delusion is attachment to the soul. Accordingly all further paths would be useless."

This objection is based on the scheme of attainment laid down in AbhK (p. 121, fol. 1 ff.; LVP, VI, pp. 179 ff.); cf. Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thoughts, pp. 89-90. According to this scheme the candidate for sainthood passes through four paths to attain four successive statuses or goals. The first path is that of sight [darśana-mārga] comprising fifteen moral and mental attainments. While on this path the traveler is termed a śrotāpattiphalapratipannaka (one who is headed for the goal of initiation). On acquiring the sixteenth attainment he is termed an initiate [śrotāpanna, literally one who has entered the stream]. The candidate is given other titles as he progresses further, along the second, third and fourth paths, thus:

While on the stage	Having attained the goal of the path
sakṛdāgamiphalapratipannaka	sakṛdāgamin
anāgāmiphalapratipannaka	anāgāmin
arhattvapharapratipannaka	arhat

The point of objection is that the candidate must have overcome belief in the self in order to attain the first goal; what then can be the use of the second, third and fourth paths? Dharmakīrti now answers the objection:

If you say that (the bondage of further birth) would disappear on the first path, belief in the existence of the self ceases on that path, we answer; not so, because the congenital type of belief in the self [sahajasatkāyadṛṣṭi] is (usually) not destroyed (on the first path). If, however, (a candidate shows extraordinary wisdom so that the congenital belief in the self is) destroyed (on this path), then (indeed) further existence will cease. [201b-202a : 200b-201a]

A distinction is here made between abhisaṃskārikā satkāyadṛṣṭi, acquired or conscious belief in the self, and sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭi, congenital or unconscious belief in the self. Except in the case of extraordinary persons it requires more than the first path to eradicate the second type of belief.

214. Congenital belief in the self is (present in) any notion which implies an ego, as of a man who desires, 'may I be happy' or 'may I not suffer'. [202b-203a : 201b-202a]

215. M. (p. 80, line 3): The author now shows how it is known that the initiate's congenital belief in the self is not destroyed.

Without experiencing an ego no one is attached to the self; without love of the self, no one, seeking happiness, runs to (rebirth). [203b-204a : 202b-203a]

216. M. (p. 80, line 11): But it may be objected that bondage and liberation must reside (successively) in one and the same thing, and this is possible if there is a soul. The author denies this by saying:

Bondage is the productive cause of pain. How could it belong to what is eternal? (Likewise,) liberation is the absence of the productive cause of pain. How could

it belong to what is eternal? [204b-205a : 203b-204a]

P. (p. 140, lines 19 ff.) furnishes an elaborate demonstration of the impossibilities. The main points are these. The soul cannot cause its own suffering and happiness, because an eternal thing cannot cause anything. On the other hand, nothing other than itself can cause its own suffering or happiness, "for one thing cannot become happy by a happiness which is distinct from itself (P., p. 140, lines 26-27)".

Nor can the objector claim that suffering and happiness inhere in the soul, for the same arguments may be used against inherence as against suffering and happiness. If the inherence is distinct from the soul, it cannot affect it. One is left with the possibility that suffering is identical with the soul. But in that case the soul can never cease to suffer.

217. M. (p. 80, lines 17-19): The author now speaks against the Vaibhāṣikas, who contend that bondage and liberation belong to the person [pudgala], but

that this person is not describable as either permanent or impermanent.

Actually this pudgala (personality) theory is more specifically ascribed to the Vātsīputrīya school. This school applies the name of pudgala to a continuous entity which experiences mundane existence. Although not called a soul, this pudgala is similar in definition to the soul of which the non-Buddhist schools speak. cf. TS, 336-349; AbhK (p. 155, fol. 1-p. 157, fol. 3; LVP, IX ff.)

That which cannot be described as impermanent cannot be the cause of anything. Nor can bondage and liberation belong to that which is indescribable. [205b-206a that is missing in M : 204b-205a]

M. (p. 80, lines 23-25): If it is not impermanent, it must be permanent, and if it is not permanent, it must be impermanent, by the law of mutual exclusion. The denial of the one being prohibited by the denial of the other, it is impossible for both to be denied of one and the same thing. Accordingly, such pudgala is an impossibility,

and there can be no cause here. Thus, bondage and liberation cannot apply to an indescribable pudgala.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 128. na hy ubhayākāra-vinirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam, nityānityayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt. vastuny ekākāratyāgaparigṛahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganā antarīyakatvāt.

218. M. (p. 81, lines 1-2): Again, if you say that no fault is involved because (the pudgala) cannot be described as permanent either, the answer is that it must then be called impermanent. The author says as much:

> Wise men call that nature permanent which does not perish. Accordingly, one should abandon this embarrassing view (of the pudgala) and admit that it is impermanent. [206b-207a : 205b-206a]

4. Mārgasatyam

219. The four aspects of the path [mārga, viz., the fourth of the Four Noble Truths] are the path itself [mārga], propriety [nyāya], entrance (into liberation) [pratipatti] and the removing (of mundane existence) [nairyānika]. cf. AbhK (p. 119, fol. 2; LVP, VI, p. 163) 觀道聖諦修四行相。一道 [mārga] 二如 [nyāya] 三行 [utpatti] 四出 [nairyānika].

The path (which is characterized by the doctrine of soullessness) has been taught (see Vs. 148). By the practice (of this path), the source (of continued existence) is transformed. [207b : 206b]

M. (p. 81, lines 16-19): The source, that is to say the store-consciousness [ālayavijñāna] which consists in the residual force of impurities, is transformed, that is, from the cessation of the impure state, it develops into a thought-series which is divorced from impurities.

This verse shows the (first) aspect of the path, namely the path itself.

220. If you say that vices would arise even in one who has identified himself with (the path) just as the path (arises when one is still identified with the vices), we answer; no, because (vices) are unable (to arise in the thought of one who is identified with the path). [208a : 207a]

M. (p. 82, lines 2-3): Because the belief in the soul, which is the cause of the vices, is uprooted (by the path).

This sentence expresses the (second) aspect of cessation [nirodha], namely cessation considered as tranquillity, because the vices are here completely tranquillized. (For the second aspect of the cessation, cf. Vs. 203.)

221. P. (p. 142, last line-p. 143, line 2): One may object that just as there is contact with merit when there is contact with vice, so there will be contact with vice when there is contact with merit. Accordingly, there can be no escape from mundane existence. But this is wrong, because the vices are prevented by the appearance of merit.

Why should the opposite not be true? Because the merits are what is true. (cf. the discussion in Vs. 151) This the author now shows:

> Apprehension of an object is a property of thought: just as (an object) is, so is it apprehended (by thought). And that (viz., object) gives rise to thought by the form in which it (truly) is. [208b-209a : 207b-208a]

222. Such (viz., the apprehension of a thing in the way it is, and the giving rise to a thought which apprehends itself) is the nature (of thought and object respectively). That (thought) which arises from any other cause [nimitta] than this is wrong and cannot maintain itself, for it is dispelled by recourse to (correct) understanding [pratyaya], as is the notion of a snake (with regard to a rope). [209b-210a : 208b-209a]

M. (p. 82, lines 19-22): The notion of a snake may arise with regard to a rope by reason of error. This notion, when dispelled by correct understanding, which apprehends the rope in its true

form, cannot arise again. In the same manner, when soullessness is perceived to be the truth through the removal of the causes of error, belief in the soul can no longer arise, for knowledge always tends toward the apprehending of objects as they are, and objects are always proven to transmit their true image (to the thought which apprehends them).

cf. TSP, vol. II, pp. 872-873. tathā hi viṣayaviṣayibhāvam icchatā cittaṃ viṣayagrahaṇa-svabhāvam abhyupeyam, anyathā viṣayajñānayor na viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ. arthagrahaṇasvabhāvatvenāṅgī-kriyamāṇe yas tasya svabhāvas tenaiva ātmano 'ṃśo 'arthatas tena gṛhyata iti vaktavyaṃ. anyathā katham asau gṛhītaḥ syāt. yady asatākāreṇa gṛhyeta tataś ca viṣayaviṣayibhāvo na syāt. tathā hi yathā jñānaṃ viṣayīkaroty arthaṃ na tathā so 'rthaḥ, yathā so 'rtho na tathā taṃ viṣayīkarotîti nirviṣayāny eva jñānāni syuḥ. tataś ca sarva- padārthāsiddhiprasaṅgaḥ. tasmād bhūtaviṣayākāra-grahītāsyaya svabhāvo nija iti sthitaṃ. bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣanikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat. tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam

eveti tan na ātmagrahaṇasvabhāvam. yat punar anyathāsvabhāvo 'sya khyātimūdhānāṃ sāmarthyād āgantukapratyayabalād evety avatiṣṭhate. na svabhāvatvena, yathā rajjvāṃ sarpapratyayasya.

223. By nature thought shines clearly; its impurities are accidental. [210b : 209b]

M. (p. 82, last line-p. 83, line 2): By nature thought shines clearly without contamination from such faults as (belief in) the soul. The faults of thought are accidental, for they are brought on by means of error; they are not natural to thought, any more than darkness and mist are natural to the sky.

224. What power could these vices have in a person who has identified himself (with the path), when they lack power even before he has reached that stage? [211a : 210a]

M. (p. 83, lines 4-5) notes that the vices are robbed of their power by even a slight cultivation

of scripture, thought and meditation.

225. Even though an entity had power, it cannot grow far in that within which its opposite can arise. (The vices will not grow far in a thought-series ready to renounce belief in the soul,) just as fire (will not grow) on wet ground. [211b-212a : 210b-211a]

226. M. (p. 83, lines 17-21): How can the opponent suppose that impurities arise in one who has renounced belief in the soul? Surely not the actual presence of a cause, because the cause, namely belief in the soul, is absent (in his case). But the opponent may suggest that belief in the soul may arise simply from imagination [bhāvanā] just as does belief in soullessness. Against this one may ask whence this imagination could derive. Could it derive from the fact that the doctrine of soullessness is harmful (whereby one's thought might cast about for a healthier view)? Or that it is untrue, being due to error, or that it can be erased as being contrary to the nature (of thought)?

The author now shows these three possibilities to be nonsense:

> That which is not harmful and which is true and natural (viz., belief in soullessness) cannot be obstructed by its opposite even with effort, for thought will naturally take its part. [212b-213a : 211b-212a]

M. (p. 84, lines 3-4): By this verse, the (third) aspect of cessation, viz., cessation as the highest excellence, is shown. For the third aspect of cessation, cf. Vs. 203.

227. P. (p. 144, lines 29-30): An objector may point out that desire and hatred also form a pair of opposites, but the one is never obstructed without the other, for we see that when desire is obstructed hatred is obstructed also, and vice versa. The same should be true of belief in soullessness and belief in the soul. The author shows that this is not the case:

Desire and hatred, although they are different, do

not obstruct each other, for the source of both is belief in the soul, and the one may be the cause of the other. [213b-214a : 212b-213a]

M. (p. 84, lines 12-14): If a man loves something and it hurts him, this love becomes hatred. Again, he may hate something, but if it helps him (read upakāriṇi for apakāriṇi) his hatred will turn to love. Thus desire and hatred may act as mutual cause and effect.

228. Benevolence [maitrī] etc. do not entirely suppress the vices because they do not contradict delusion. All the impurities are rooted in delusion, which is (nothing other than) belief in the soul. [214b-215a : 213b-214a]

229. M. (p. 85, lines 1-2): But one may ask how delusion can be nothing other than belief in the soul. For delusion is absence of cognition [asamprakhyānarūpa], while belief in the soul is a case of apprehending something contrary to fact. To this the author says:

Nescience [ajñāna = moha = belief in the soul] is false knowledge (not non-knowledge), because it is opposed to (true) knowledge and because it is apprehended (by the senses) as a mental phenomenon [caitta]. Nescience which is other than what is taught (by the Blessed One as attachment to the self [= ātmābhiniveśa = sattvadṛṣṭi]) is not real (nescience). [215b-216a : 214b-215a]

The Tibetan gives the correct reading of the second line: (mithyopalabdhir ajñānaṃ) ukteś cānyad ayuktimat = gsuṅs. phyir. gshan. ni. rigs. ma. yin.

"Not non-knowledge": M. (p. 85, line 6) and P. (p. 145, line 19) point out that asaṃprakhyāna (non-cognition) exists in the state of nirvāna. Accordingly, this is not what is meant by nescience. The prefix a in avidyā has a positive, not a substructive value. It is used like the prefix in adharma. "Dharma (right action) means helping others; adharma (wrong action) means not simply absence of dharma, it means hurting others (P., p. 145, line 22)".

"Mental phenomenon [caitta]": In the Buddhist psychology, citta and caitta go together, referring to two different aspects of thought. Citta refers to mental function in its general form, and caitta, that is the derivative of citta, is applied to mental function in its particular form. Nescience is experienced in the form of particular wrong notions.

The commentators also point out that citta and caitta are furnished by a combination of common factors. These factors are: source [āśraya], object [ālambana], aspect [ākāra], time [kāla] and substance [dravya] (cf. M., p. 85, lines 8-9 and P., p. 146, lines 3-4). Obviously, such factors as object and aspect cannot belong to non-cognition.

cf. AbhK (p. 21, fol. 3-p. 22, fol. 1; LVP, II, p. 178) 依何義故名等和合。有五義故。謂心 [citta] 心所 [caitta] 五義平等故說相應。所依 [āśraya] 所緣 [ālambana] 行相 [ākāra] 時 [kāla] 事 [dravya] 皆平等 [samatā] 故。

The commentators furnish the pertinent passage from the words of the Buddha: yāḥ kāścana lokavyavahāropapattayaḥ sarvās tā ātmābhiniveśato

bhavanti ātmābhiniveśavigamato na bhavanti. "All occurrences of mundane activity are due to attachment to the self, and their absence is due to the cessation of attachment to the self." (M., p. 85, lines 11-12 and P., p. 146, lines 6-7)

230. There remains an apparent contradiction between the author's view and the text of scripture. Scripture speaks of nescience as dṛṣṭisamprayukta (furnished with a combination of false views), while the author has claimed that nescience consists in one false view only, namely, belief in the soul.

Accordingly, he adds (cf. M., p. 85, lines 15-17):

> Whatever contradiction (with scripture may appear) here can be explained, and the belief in the void (i.e., in soullessness) does indeed suppress all vices because it suppresses that (belief in the soul) from which they all derive. [216b-217a : 215b-216a]

M. (p. 85, line 19-p. 86, line 5): One may explain the contradiction by the principle of

synecdoche, as when one speaks of a forest of palāśa trees (although the forest may contain other trees as well). Furthermore the purpose of referring to nescience as identical with belief (in the soul) is to show that this belief, as being the chief factor of nescience, is the cause of all the impurities....

Belief in the void suppresses all vices, just as fire, by suppressing cold, suppresses all its effects such as the bristling of the pores of the skin etc. (TSP, vol. II, p. 870, gives the same example of fire suppressing cold in the same context: ato nairātmyadarśanasyātmadarśanavirodhāt tanmūlair api rāgādibhiḥ saha virodho bhavati, dahanaviśeṣeṇeva śītakṛtaromaharṣādiviśeṣasya.)

M. (p. 86, lines 5-6): By this verse, the (fourth) aspect of cessation, namely cessation considered as definitive cessation, is described, because of the definitive cessation of vices (brought about by the view of soullessness). cf. Vs. 203.

231. If you argue that passion etc. are imperishable because they are (necessary) properties of living beings, like form and color, (your syllogism is) wrong, the conclusion being contrary to fact, for we see these properties depart on contact with their enemy (viz., the belief in soullessness). [217b-218a : 216b-217a]

N. M. and P. do not agree on the reading of the second half of this verse. The correct reading must be sambandhe pratipakṣasya tyāgasya darśanād api = gñen. poḥi. phyogs. daṅ. ḥbral. ba. ldog. pa. dag. kyaṅ. mthoṅ. phyir. ro.

232. Vices do not reappear like the solidity (of copper after the fire is removed) because their enemy (viz., belief in soullessness) has become one's natural state and will not depart, and because (your instance) is inconclusive as (seen by the contrary instance of wood which never reappears when reduced to ashes. [218b-219a : 217b-218a]

cf. TSP, vol. II, pp. 873-874 nāpi tāmrādi-kāṭhinyādivat punarutpattisambhavo doṣāṇām,

tadvirodhinairātmyadarśanasyātyantasātmyam upagatasya sasādānapāyāt. tāmrādikāṭhinyasya hi yo virodhī vahnis tasya kadācitkasannihitatvāt kāṭhinyāder tadabhāva eva bhavataḥ punas tadapāyād utpattir yuktā. na tv evaṃ malānām. apāye 'pi vā mārgasya bhasmādibhir anaikāntān nāvaśyaṃ punarutpattisambhavo dōśāṇām, tathā hi kāṣṭhāder agnisambandhād bhasmasādbhūtasya tadapāye 'pi na prāktanarūpānuvṛttiḥ, tadvad dōṣānām apīty anaikāntaḥ.'

233. Objection (M., p. 86, lines 25-26): But liberation is attained also by meditating on the self, as the scripture declares, "The Self is to be thought upon, to be meditated upon." (Br. Up. II. 4, 5.) Then, what is the use of meditating on soullessness? The author answers:

> In that man who sees the self there arises constant attachment to that (self) in the form of an ego. From that attachment he craves for pleasure, and that craving hides the vices (from his sight). [219b-220a : 218b-219a]

234. A man who sees virtues in an object will desire it and seek the means for making it his own. Thus, so long as one is attached to the self, one will (seek rebirth and so) remain in mundane existence. [220b-221a : 219a-220a]

235. Believing in his own self, he will acquire the notion of others. And from distinction and others will arise his greed and hatred. Connected with these two do all the vices arise. [221b-222a : 220b-221a]

This verse and the following (Vs. 236) are quoted by Nārāyanakaṇṭha in MTT, p. 85.

236. M. (p. 87, lines 18-19): It might be supposed that even though one is attached to the self, he might turn away from selfish pleasures and so escape the mundane existence. The author shows this is impossible.

It is a rule that as long as one is attached to the self, one will not turn away from what belongs to the

self (viz., the means of pleasure). Nor, so long as one believes that the self is faultless, can there be any cause of renouncing attachment to it. [222b-223a : 221b-222a]

237. If you say that it is the attachment (to the self) that is faulty (and not the self), still, how could one escape this attachment? One cannot escape attachment so long as its object is unfaulty. [223b-224a : 222b-223a]

M. (p. 88, lines 4-5): Attachment is neither conceived nor abandoned by reason of its own virtues or vice but by reason of the virtue or vice of its object. (cf. Vs. 240)

238. The way to escape desire and hatred, since these are concomitant with the virtues and faults (of the object) is to cease to see these (virtues and faults) in the object. [224b-first half of 225a : 223b-first half of 224a]

239. But it may be objected that an external (material) thing can be abandoned even though it possesses virtue (P., p. 148, line 19), simply by our indifference. To which the author replies (M., p. 88, line 13):

> The process (of renunciation by indifference) that occurs in regard to external things will not apply (to internal things like attachment). [Second half of 225a: second half of 224a]

M. (p. 88, lines 16-17): One can dismiss that which depends on an external thing by indifference to that external thing, but not that (viz., attachment to the self) which depends on belief in the self, for the cause of the latter is present in full force.

240. For attachment does not arise from the virtue of attachment but from seeing the virtue of an object. So long as the cause remains in full force (i.e., so long as one remains convinced of the virtue of the self) how can the effect (viz., attachment to the self) be

avoided? [225b-226a : 224b-255a]

241. Or, let us ask what fault there is in attachment. That it is the source of suffering? Even so, one cannot turn away from it any more than one can turn away from the self because of (i.e., so long as there persists) belief in the self. [226b-227a : 225b-226a]

P. (p. 148, lines 30-31): The self is the primary cause of suffering; when the self is present, attachment (to it) appears as the cause of suffering. When it is absent, who is there to suffer?

242. If you say that the self is not a cause of suffering without them (M., viz., attachment, cognition, sense-organ etc.), then they too would be similar (viz., would not be causes of suffering without the self). Both factors then would be faultless. Accordingly, detachment from both would be impossible. [227b-228a : 226b-227a]

M. should read vairāgyaṃ na.

243. If you say that (attachment might be renounced) by considering the suffering (that it causes), just as one cuts off a limb when it is bitten by a snake, we answer: one abandons (the limb bitten by a snake) by renouncing the notion that it belongs to oneself, but not otherwise (viz., not so long as that notion persists). Now, so long as the sense-organs etc. are apprehended as the source of enjoyment, how can one abandon the notion that they belong to the self, and how can one, therefore, escape attachment? [228b-230a : 227b-229a]

244. It is a matter of common perception that we are indifferent toward the hairs which have been removed from our body but are attached to others (which still grow there. [230b-231a : 229b-230a]

245. Objection (M., p. 90, line 6): The notion of 'mine' would be abandoned by the consideration of suffering. This is wrong,

For (according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school,) the notion of 'mine' (in knowledge etc.) is produced by inherence and other relations, and that (inherent relation) remains as such (permanently). Therefore, that (viz., the notion of 'mine') would not be vitiated even if (faults) were seen therein. [231b-232a : 230b-231a]

The second line should probably read sambandhaḥ sa tathaiveti dṛṣṭāv api na hīyate = ḥbrel. te. de. bshin. ñid. gnas. phyir. mthoṅ. du. jin. kyaṅ. spon. mi. ḥgyur.

Inherence is (the relation) in virtue of which one has the notion that an effect x is in its cause y (VS, VII. 2, 26). In other words, it is the inseparable relation of generic characters to substances, qualities and actions, of actions and qualities to substances, and of substances to their parts.

The notion of 'mine' that is a knowledge [buddhi]. Like pleasure [sukha] and pain [duḥkha] it is a quality abiding in the eternal soul by inherence. Since this inherence is eternal (cf.

Tarkasangraha 68) such a quality in the soul cannot be destroyed.

cf. TS, 854. nityatvenāsya sarve 'pi nityāḥ prāptāḥ (ghaṭādayaḥ). ādhāreṣu sadā teṣāṃ samavāyo na saṃsthitēḥ.

This is a rather high-handed treatment of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The Vaiśeṣikas speak of the permanency of inherence to distinguish inherence from contact. Contact is a quality which inheres in pairs of substances, e.g., a shuttle and thread which are in contact. But contact is transient because it is destroyed before the destruction of the substances as when the shuttle is separated from the threads. Unlike contact, inherence, e.g., of a cloth in its threads, is permanent insofar as it is not destroyed as long as the entities are not destroyed. Thus the permanency of inherence, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, does not imply the permanency of entities which give rise to inherence. cf. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic, pp. 74-75.

246. (According to the Sāṃkhyas) there is no such thing as inherence, but even so (according to them), there is aid [upakāritā] (of the soul [puruṣa]) everywhere (viz., on the part of everything belonging to matter [prakṛti]). [232b : 231b]

According to the Sāṃkhya school, the primordial matter, from which the intellect [buddhi], I-principle [ahaṅkāra] etc. all manifest, labors for the benefit of the soul. cf. SK, 56, 60.

247. If you say that the notion of 'mine' would disappear from the cause of suffering, as it does in the finger (bitten by a snake), we answer; The suffering (in attachment) is not unmitigated; usually it is like food mixed with poison. [233 : 232]

M. (p. 90, lines 20-21): Food mixed with poison, although it is a cause of suffering in the end, may be an immediate cause of pleasure.

248. But the objector may rephrase his thesis (M.,

p. 90, lines 22-23): Food mixed with poison furnishes some pleasure but is still an object of aversion to those who seek their own good. The same should hold true of attachment (to the self). To which the author replies:

> From being attached to a supreme pleasure one may form an aversion to whatever opposes it (even though there be some pleasure in the latter). One leaves a slight pleasure out of craving for a supreme pleasure. [234 : 233]

M. (p. 91, lines 4-5): But so long as one believes in the self nothing is pure pleasure; rather everything is pleasure mixed with suffering. In this case, how can one abandon (attachment to the self)? To what (supreme pleasure) can one form an attachment?

249. It may be asked how the author can explain action at all (M., p. 91, lines 7-8). According to his view of soullessness, everything is suffering, and the cessation of this suffering is the supreme

pleasure. What then could one desire whereby one might act? To which he answers:

> Although the self does not exist (M.; we superimpose the notion of self on non-self and) act toward the objects that we obtain out of attachment to the self. Even when no object is obtained one may observe desire, as amongst animals in the case of the female in rut. [235 : 234]

250. M. (p. 91, lines 17-19): If, (as the Sāṃkhyas do), one seeks isolation of the soul (from matter) by aversion to and abandonment of the intellect, sense-organs, body etc., (which are all manifested forms of matter), because they are the cause of suffering, then one is seeking simply the annihilation (of the soul), for there is no difference between the lack of every determinant of the soul, of all objects of its enjoyment etc., in the state of liberation, and simple annihilation. And this is folly, as the author explains:

> How would one to whom the soul is dear desire the

annihilation of the soul? How would affection (for the soul) seek a goal where all experience, worldly activities and the source of the three qualities has ceased? Such is not the nature of affection. [236-237a : 235-236a]

To judge from M.'s commentary, he may have read samāśrayam for guṇāśrayam. This would give a more normal compound.

According to the Sāṃkhyas, liberation of the soul consists in its isolation from matter. This is brought about by knowledge of the distinction between soul and matter. cf. SK, 64-68.

The three qualities [tṛguṇa] are those of which matter is composed according to the Sāṃkhya view, sattva (goodness), rajas (passion), and tamas (darkness). cf. SK, 11-13.

251. Belief in the self invariably strengthens attachment to the self, and the seed of attachment to what is connected with the self grows in precisely the same way. [237b-238a : 236b-237a]

252. Despite one's effort, as long as this (belief in the self) continues, it hinders aversion to an object connected with the self if this object has even a grain of virtue, and it hides the faults in these objects. [238b-239a : 237b-238a]

253. The man who feels aversion to the self, if you grant that aversion to the self be possible, would not forthwith abandon the self (while his belief in the self continues). Accordingly, his consideration of pain is in vain. [239b-240a : 238-239a]

The interpretation of this verse is highly doubtful. I take P.'s reading of the second line [ātmany api virāgaś cet nedānīṃ yo virajyate], which agrees with the Tibetan [gal. te. bdag. laṅan. chags. bral. na. da. ni. chags. bral. gaṅ. yin. med.]. The text of P.'s commentary is hopelessly corrupt. M.'s comment is clear but improbable, and his text is most likely wrong. Reading ced idānīm for cen nedānīm, he interprets as follows: "If you claim that one may feel detachment to the self, we answer that it is the man who is (now)

detaching himself (and not the man who is [already] detached) that abandons the self. Accordingly, the consideration of suffering is in vain."

254. For by meditation on suffering one simply brings suffering to mind. Suffering was sufficiently obvious in the first place, and still one had developed no aversion (to the self). [240b-241a : 239b-240a]

255. Or even if one's thought escapes (attachment) for a moment by seeing faults in one thing, one will not be averse (to everything) then, just as a lover (who has become averse to a mistress does not become averse) to another mistress. [241b-242a : 240b-241a]

256. If one distinguishes what should be abandoned and what should be taken, that attachment which applies to one of the two (viz., attachment in the form of hatred or affection) is the seed for every sort of attachment to rise in turn. [242b-243a : 241b-242a]

M. (p. 93, lines 19-20): By attachment in the form of hatred of something (we should say, by involvement in hatred of something) there appears antagonism [pratigha] and sympathy [anunaya], respectively, to what is agreeable and what is disagreeable to our hatred. Likewise, by attachment in the form of affection for something there arise sympathy and antagonism, respectively.

257. Attachment to an object which is faultless (viz., the faultless self) must itself be faultless, and so would be its instruments (viz., sense-organs, body, sense-objects). These make up the whole world; how could one feel aversion thereto? [243b-244a : 242b-243a]

258. If you claim that there are faults in this attachment as well (as virtues), then the same must apply to the self. [244b : 243b]

That is to say, if the self possesses the attachment, it must possess also the faults of the attachment.

259. M. (p. 94, line 5): Lest it be supposed that that one would abandon the faults of the self by a mental effort of aversion to them, the author says:

> How should one who is not averse to (the self), become averse to its (faults) at this time (M., while he still holds to belief in the self)? [245a : 244a]

M. (p. 94, lines 7-9): Just as one does not become averse to the self, even though it is faulty, because of belief in the self, so one would not become disattached from the faults of the self because of belief that they belong to the self.

260. (If you claim that) attachment (to the sense-organs etc.), which is produced by seeing virtues in them, would be obstructed by seeing faults (in them, we must point out that) attachment to the sense-organs etc. is not of this sort, because it is found even in children (who are incapable of judging virtue and vice), because it attaches to faulty objects (which are one's own), and fails to attach* to excellent objects which belong to

others and finally because it is abandoned when the notion of 'belonging to oneself' has ceased. [245-b-247a : 244b-no number]

*Tibetan reads yon. tan. ldan. yaṅ. gshan. dag. la. med. phyir. = tv abhāvāt guṇavaty api anyatra. This reading accords with P.'s interpretation.

261. For these reasons, the perception of virtues is not the cause of the notion 'belonging to oneself'; accordingly, this notion is not removed by the perception of faults. [247b-248a:246]

M. (p. 95, lines 3-4): The entity which counteracts the cause of something is the remover of that thing, as fire (by counteracting cold) is the remover of gooseflesh. Belief in the self is the cause of attachment and of the notion 'belonging to oneself', and it is not counteracted by the perception of faults.

262. Again, we see that non-existent virtues are attributed to an object because of attachment. Accordingly, how can an injunction (to meditate on suffering) cure this attachment when it does not cure the cause of it (viz., belief in the self). [248b-249a : 247]

263. M. (p. 95, lines 11-12): The Sāṃkhyas, however, hold as follows: As long as one considers that soul and matter, which are respectively sentient and insentient, are identical, one possesses attachment and is bound. But when one has realized the distinction of the two, one is bereft of attachment and released from bondage. (cf. SK, 37, 56-66) To this the author says:

Any man recognizes himself as different from his senses etc. from the fact that he desires new and better senses (but does not desire a new self); also because he sees that they flourish and decay (while his self remains unchanged). Therefore, attachment does not arise from a belief that (soul and matter) are identical. [249b-first half of 250b : 248-first half of 249b]

264. (Again,) one (who believes in the soul), attaching himself to the self, naturally feels attachment to the factors of experience. [Second half of 250b-251a : second half of 249b-250a]

"Factors of experience": The sense-organs, which are the instruments of the soul's enjoyment (M., p. 95, line 24).

265. Should one develop antipathy [nirveda] to them because of being confronted with suffering, this antipathy is a sort of hatred [dveṣa], not detachment. For at the very time one feels it (viz., antipathy), he is attached, since he is seeking a different state, (viz., a state where suffering is less). [251b-252a : 250b-no number]

266. Since hatred is caused by suffering, it will continue as long (as the suffering is present); and when the suffering has ceased, one returns to his own nature (i.e., to approval of the objects of sense). [252b-253a: 251]

267. What is called true detachment, on the other hand, is the indifference to all things which comes from giving up both renunciation and acceptance and which belongs to those who do not care whether (they be stroked with) sandalwood paste or an axe. [253b-254a : 252]

For indifference to sandalwood paste or an axe, cf. Edgerton, SBH, p. 479. The phrase is frequent in Jain texts and belongs to a fairly large number of Sanskrit expressions for one who has overcome all pairs of opposites (e.g. sama-dukkha-sukha, sama-loṣṭāśma-kañcana, Bhagavad Gītā XIV, 24. etc.).

268. M. (p. 96, lines 20-21): But if meditation on suffering does not lead to the renouncing of attachment etc. and so to liberation, how is it that the Blessed One speaks of meditation on suffering? The author now answers:

(The Blessed One) speaks of meditation on suffering, having in mind the nature of suffering of acquired

tendencies [saṃskāra-duḥkhatā, not suffering itself]. The nature of suffering of acquired tendencies, according to us, is their dependence on causes, and this is the source of the belief in soullessness. [254b-255a : 253b-254a]

M. (p. 97, lines 3-4): That is to say, all entities are occurrences in a cause-result sequence, perishing every moment. They are neither in the form of a soul nor administered by a soul. Accordingly, meditation on suffering tends to a belief in soullessness, and this is the cause of liberation.

269. Liberation is obtained by the view of voidness (= the view of soullessness). All the meditations are in order to effect this view.

It is on this account that (the Blessed One) speaks of suffering because of impermanency, and of soullessness because of suffering. [255b-256a : 254b-255a]

The commentators furnish the words of the Blessed One (corresponding to PTS, Majjhima

Nikāya I, p. 232; tr. by I.B. Horner, PTS, Middle Length Sayings, vol. I, p. 286). "O monks, is material shape permanent or impermanent?" "Impermanent, sir." "Is what is impermanent suffering or is it happiness?" "Suffering, sir." "Is it fitting for the perceiver to regard that which is impermanent, suffering, liable to change, as 'this is mine, this is I, this is myself'?" "It is not, sir."

270. One who is not unattached, who possesses desire, who engages in all (mundane) affairs, is not liberated from his impurities and karma; it is such person that transmigrates. [256b-257a : 255b-256a]

271. The following verse is directed against a doctrine very similar to Śankara's. P. puts the doctrine thus (p. 157, lines 26-27): Let us say that 'that which belongs to the self' does not exist in the ultimate sense. So how can there be any attachment to it? Attachment arises toward an object, not toward a non-object."

He who denies 'that which belongs to the self' must deny the existence of the enjoyer also, in which case there can be no self, for the characteristic of the self is action and enjoyment. [257b-258a : 256b-257a]

The phrase ātmīyaṃ yo necchet = ātma-nirūpita-viṣayaṃ yo na svikurute, the verb icchati having the sense of 'accept, admit'. cf. the phrase '....iti ced iṣṭam eva' = if you say....., we accept it.'

P. furnishes a more detailed argument (p. 158, lines 1-4): "When that which belongs to the self is the object of our perception, how can you say it does not exist? Is it because everything depends on nescience [avidyā]? But this is wrong; nescience does not occur except in connection with the self. Nescience is nothing other than the soul [puruṣa], for (your) scripture says 'the soul [puruṣa] is the whole universe.' Accordingly, since the soul's very nature is nescience, its error will never cease. For this would imply the cessation of the soul."

272. Therefore, oh ye who desire to attain liberation,

root out that belief in the self which grows from a beginningless series of homogeneous causes. [258b-259a: 257b-258a]

See Vs. 121 and notes for the Buddhist account of homogeneous thought-series.

273. Dharmakīrti now turns against the theists who argue (M., p. 98, lines 17-18): God has declared in the scriptures that the self exists and that its liberation is gained by the rite of purification. Why should you suppose that a mental rite will have the same effect?

He who says that liberation comes simply from scripture will not satisfy those who do not regard scripture as infallible. [259b-260a : 258b-259a]

274. The theist rejoins (M., p. 98, line 24-last line): But scripture is in accordance with reason, for we see that what has been touched by a rite of purification does not grow. Just as a seed which

has been touched by a rite of purification does not grow, so does the man who has been purified not pass to rebirth.

> The ceremony which works on seeds (for preventing their growth) is not capable of preventing the rebirth of men, for, if it were, one might receive liberation from the application of sesamum oil or from roasting in a fire. [260b-261a : 259b-260a]

275. M. (p. 99, lines 7-8): Very well, says the theist. But as one who was heavy with sin prior (to his purification) becomes lighter in weight thereafter, we can observe a substraction of sin. Thus scripture is in accordance with reason. The author replies:

> No removal of sin is brought about by the lightening of one who was heavy before (his purification). We grant that a man may lose weight (through a ceremony), but sin has no weight, for it is incorporeal. [261b-262a : 260b-261a]

276. M. (p. 99, line 16): Now if it be asked how on the Buddhist view belief in soullessness can prevent rebirth, the author says:

> The passing to this miserable condition, that is to say, birth, arises from a mental process [cetanā] consisting of craving [tṛṣṇā] and false knowledge [mithyājñāna = ajñāna] which is the source of craving. Accordingly, one who cuts off these (viz., craving and false knowledge) is not reborn. For these two alone are capable of producing rebirth, since (rebirth) arises from them only. [262b-263 : 261b-262]

277. M. (p. 100, line 1): But the Buddhists accept karma as a cause of rebirth. Why then has the author mentioned just nescience (= false knowledge) and craving? He explains:

> This twofold mental process (viz., craving and false knowledge) is nothing but karma itself; accordingly, there is only one cause of rebirth. [264a : 263a]

Note: In Vs. 93 Dharmakīrti calls nescience

[avidyā] and craving [tṛṣṇā] the unitary cause [akhaṇḍakāraṇa = bandhakāraṇa] of rebirth. Of these two, he says in Vs. 202, that craving alone may be regarded as the origin of suffering [samudāya] because of its directness in causing rebirth. In the present verse, he interprets nescience and craving as two different aspects of mental process [cetanā] which is nothing but karma.

From this, we may summarize Dharmakīrti's position on karma as follows: In the first place, he follows the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra theory of karma, that is, that there is no karma over and above mental process [cetanā] (see note on Vs. 45). This mental process, according to him, is a composite of nescience and craving which in turn is a derivative of nescience. To be explicit, as long as one remains in nescience, his craving operates towards all objects, producing karmic impurities which give rise to further mundane existence. Because of this functional directness of craving, although it is derivative of nescience, Dharmakīrti calls it the origin of suffering in the same manner as does Vasubandhu (see quotation from AbhK on Vs. 202). Again, nescience and craving, being two different

aspects of a mental process which is nothing other than karma, are also essentially the same as karma. Thus, Dharmakīrti envisages karma, craving and nescience the three causes of mundane existence in the Buddhist tradition in a single synthetic form.

278. (One might object as follows:) The senses and faculties are the source of our motions and knowledge. And these in turn arise from the unseen force [adṛṣṭa]. When the unseen force has been destroyed (by purification), there can be no more motion (viz., rebirth). This (unseen force) is the acquired tendencies [saṃskāra] of the soul and not a mental process. [264b-265a : 263b-264a]

"The senses and faculties are the source": M. (p. 100, line 8): because one sets out to act after discriminating an object by knowledge which has been produced by the senses and faculties.

"Unseen force [adṛṣṭa]": All the orthodox Hindu systems make use of this concept. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is identified with merit [dharma]

and demerit [adharma], which are produced as latent force in the soul. cf. VS, V. 1, 15; V. 2, 2., 7., 13., 17., etc.

279. (To which we answer:) The ability to produce the senses and faculties belong to thought, as we see by positive and negative concomitance, and to nothing else. Since thought (still) exists (after the purification), how should the senses and faculties not pass (to rebirth)? [265b-266a : 264b-265a]

The second half of the second line of this verse is incorrectly printed in both M. and P. The correct reading is probably sāsti tāni na yanti kim which accords with Tibetan [de. yod. de. dag. cis. mi. ḥgro.].

280. (To this one might object again as follows:) When one's thought has become incapable after purification the sense would become incapable to concentrate [dhāraṇa], to go forth to their objects [preraṇa], to agitate [kṣobha], or to withdraw [nirodha], abilities which

depend upon thought. Or (even if we grant that thought remains capable during one's present life), those (abilities of the senses) would disappear (after his death) because of the absence of thought at that time. (To this we answer:) Thought is reconstructed (after one's death) because of its impurities (viz. false knowledge, attachment to the self etc.). [266b-267 : 265b-266]

281. (Again), if, (by the purification), all impurities were made incapable of reconstructing thought (after one's death), then they should be unable (to do so) even while one is alive. [268a : 267a]

282. Since the impurities are lessened by what opposes them (viz., belief in soullessness) and increase by excess of what favors them (viz., incorrect judgment), these impurities, continuing by their own homogeneous causes, will not be prevented in the man who has been purified by a rite. [268b-269a : 267b-262a]

For "incorrect judgment" [ayoniśomanaskāra;

不如理作意], cf. AbhK (p. 49, fol. 2-3; LVP, III, pp. 70-71).

283. The objector might put his argument as follows (M., p. 101, lines 15-16): There is an activity of the soul toward producing senses and faculties which run to another birth. This activity is prevented by purification, and hence there is no rebirth. To this the author says:

> The successive production of (senses and faculties) is in contradiction to an eternal cause (viz., the soul), because such a cause is independent (of any auxiliary factor which can explain the succession). And the action of an unchanging soul is in contradiction to action and non-action. [269b-270a : 268b-269a]

The second half of the first line should read kriyā ca sadṛśātmanaḥ with P.

284. Again, there would be identity of cause (viz., the soul as creator) and effect (viz., the soul as enjoyer).

On the other hand, if it were distinct from these, then its creator-ness and enjoyer-ness would disappear (M., as not being its essential nature), and its capability (for creation) could not be proved. [270b-271a : 269b-270a]

285. M. (p. 102, lines 6-7): But the doctrine of soullessness seems to lead an impossiblity. One person would experience the deed, and another would remember having done it and enjoy the result.

For the controversy on this topic, cf. SDS, III, 2 ff.; MDB, pp. 19-23; NS, III. 1, 13 and 14, III. 2, 40; BS, 11-2-25; AbhK (p. 156, fol. 3 ff.; 若一切類我体都無。刹那滅心於曾所受久相似境何能憶知。……; LVP, IX, pp. 273 ff.)

To this the author says:

The implication that another person would then remember or enjoy (what one man has perceived or earned) does not destroy (our theory of soullessness), for no person remembers. Thus, memory springs simply from experience. [271b-272a : 270b-271a]

A semicolon is given after asmṛteḥ in both M. and P. But if it is to be employed it should be after kasya cit.

The point of this verse is that remembrance can be explained without the postulation of a person who remembers, so the difficulty of different persons need never arise. As M. (p. 102, lines 13-16) puts it, "A sharp experience is real and gives rise to remembrance by planting the seed of remembrance. These seeds are mental process plus acquired tendencies [cetanāś ca saṃskārāḥ], and these produce sensations of enjoyment. There is no need to postulate a rememberor or enjoyer. All we have is a thought-series, the successive moments arising by the law of interdependent origination in this or that form. There is no transmigrating soul."

286. M. (p. 102, line 17): But if there is no (eternal) soul, how can one explain the belief in the self (read satkāyadṛṣṭi for sa kopadṛṣṭi) or transmigration?

It is by superimposing the sixteen false aspects, viz., permanency, happiness, possession, selfhood, etc., upon the Four Noble Truths, that one continues in a round of craving [paritṛṣyati]. [272b-273a : 271b-272a]

The sixteen true aspects of the Four Noble Truths are the four aspects of each Truth, see Vss. 188, 191, 203, and 219. The sixteen false aspects are the opposites of the sixteen true aspects.

287. But in these (Four Noble Truths), the right view (vis., the belief in soullessness), carefully cherished and perfected, the view which accords with the truth and which serves to contradict false aspects, destroys craving and its accompaniments. [273b-274a : 272b-273a]

In the first line, P. reads tadviruddhātma-tattvākāra..., while M. reads tadviruddhārtha-tattvākāra which agrees with the Tibetan tr. de. ñid. las. ni. de. ḥgal. don. de. ñid. rnam. pa.... In either case, however, the meaning of the verse is not much affected.

288. M. (p. 103, line 11): Now it may be objected that even though craving is destroyed, rebirth will not cease, since there still remain karma and the body which are causes of rebirth? To this the author replies:

> Since the cause of rebirth is triple (viz., craving, karma, and the body), there will be no rebirth (if craving is destroyed) even though karma and the body remain, for one (of the necessary causes will be absent). Just as there is no growth of a plant if there is no seed (even though there be earth and water). [274b-275a : 273b-274a]

289. Objection (M., p. 103, lines 17-18): If no rebirth occurs when any one of the three causes is absent, why not seek to destroy either karma or the body? And there are those who claim liberation is gained by the destruction of karma. To this the author says:

> Karma and the body are not destroyed because there is nothing to oppose them, and (even if there were) it

would be impossible to apply it so long as craving remains; hence there would be no rebirth.

If one strives for the destruction of both (karma and craving) one's effort for the destruction of karma would be useless, (for one's end can be gained by the destruction of craving alone). [275b-276 : 274b-275]

290. M. (p. 104, lines 5-6): It is said that by undergoing self-torture and affliction one can destroy the karma which has been previously acquired. There, then, being no cause of further karma, liberation is gained. (Vibhūticandra ascribes this doctrine to the Jains). But this is folly, as the author shows:

Since we observe a variety in the effects (of karma), we may infer the existence of various (karmic) forces. How then could one use up (all) karmas by (undergoing) pain and affliction which is (an effect) of one sort only?

Granted that the effect produced from that sort (of karmic force) might be reduced, but not so are the effects deriving from heterogeneous (karmic) forces. [277-278a : 276-277a]

P. (p. 163, lines 7-8): A given karma must produce a given homogeneous effect. By undergoing a bit of this effect, the effect is reduced, for one has undergone it; but there is no reduction in the effects of heterogenenous karma.

291. If you claim that karma is destroyed by a certain amount of pain [kleśa], its forces being absorbed or used up by the force of asceticism [tapas], we would point (a dilemma): if you take asceticism as something other than pain, karma could be destroyed through little or no pain; or on the other hand, if asceticism is nothing but pain, then it must be a karmic effect, in which case it cannot absorb (or use up a heterogeneous) karmic force. [278b-280a : 277b-no number (to be correct 279a)]

292. (In our doctrine) these things (like belief in soullessness) which oppose the vices by their preventing vices about to arise, have a power to destroy the karma which would arise from these (vices). (However,) they do not destroy (the effects of) what has already been

done. [280b-281a : 279 (numbered as 278 by error)b-280 (numbered as 278 by error)a]

293. M. (p. 105, lines 21-22): But one might object that just as karma is produced from vices, so are vices produced from karma. In this manner a man cannot gain liberation until this karma is destroyed. To this the author says:

> Vices arise not from action [karma]; the vicious man acts (i.e., accumulates karma); otherwise not (i.e., one who is not vicious does not accumulate karma). [281b : 280 (numbered as 278 by error)b]

294. M. (p. 106, lines 4-5): The objector may argue that good karma produces happiness, happiness gives rise to affection [abhilāṣa] and affection to passion (cf. VS, VI. 2, 10. "sukhād rāgaḥ"); thus karma produces vice. To this the author replies:

> Without false knowledge happiness does not produce affection. [282a : 281a]

False knowledge, according to M. (p. 106, line 8, cf. Vs. 286), refers to the sixteen false aspects imposed upon the Four Noble Truths. M., lines 8-11) continues, "It is incorrect judgment [ayoniśomanaskāra] and not karma that is the cause of vices. Hence even if karma remains, if a man has rooted out his belief in the self and is without vice, that man is in a state of nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is characterized by the cessation of suffering. It is by understanding suffering and avoiding its origin by cherishing and perfecting the path that nirvāṇa is attained, and not otherwise.

VIII. Recapitulatory Verses

295. Dharmakīrti has now completed to expound the five epithets given to the Buddha in Diṅnāga's introductory verse (see Introduction, p. iii) viz., 'who is valid knowledge-instrument', 'who desires the good of the world', 'the teacher', 'the Blessed One', and 'the savior'. The discussion has followed the order of Diṅnāga's verse.

Henceforth, Dharmakīrti shows that the five epithets may be taken in reverse order and that there will then obtain a prover-proved [liṅga-laingika] relation between each term and its neighbor. He first shows how the Buddha's being a savior proves or implies that he is the Blessed One.

> From (his being a) savior [tāya] may be proved his (being the Blessed One [sugata], which consists in his three) specific (forms of knowledge, viz.,) knowledge of the truth, his firm knowledge and his complete knowledge, for the root gam (in sugata) has the meaning of understanding. [282b-first half of 283a : 281b-first half of 282a]

The reader will remember that in Vss. 149-152 sugata was said to be threefold according to the three meanings of the prefix su-. In the present verse, 'knowledge of the truth' corresponds, according to M., to the first meaning of su-, viz., praiseworthy, for the truth is momentariness and soullessness, and knowledge of this is praiseworthy. 'Firm knowledge' corresponds to the second meaning of su-, viz., lack of recurrence, for the Buddha's knowledge is such that he will not be reborn. Finally, 'complete knowledge' corresponds to the third meaning of su-, viz., completeness. The root gam has the meaning not only of going but of understanding, as in avagacchati, adhigacchati etc.; accordingly 'knowledge of the truth' etc. are simply particular instances of sugatatva. All these instances are implied by the Buddha's being a savior, for one could not save creatures without these forms of knowledge.

296. From these (forms of his knowledge may be shown the Buddha's) superiority: (his superiority) over non-Buddhists (from his knowledge of truth; his superiority)

over Buddhist initiates [śaikṣa] (from his firm knowledge that leads to no-rebirth; and his superiority) over Buddhist adepts [aśaikṣa] (from his complete knowledge). [Second half of 283a : second half of 282a]

For 'initiate' [śaikṣa, literally one who is undergoing training] and 'adept' [aśaikṣa, literally one who is no longer undergoing training], cf. AbhK (p. 126, fol. 3 ff. 如是盡智至已生時復成無學阿羅漢果…; LVP, VI, pp. 230 ff.). Dharmakīrti borrows the whole sentence from Diṅnāga's auto-commentary on the opening verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (see Introduction, p. iii).

297. From that (characteristic of knowledge that gives him the title of Blessed One [sugata]) we may infer that he is a teacher [śāsana = śāstṛ] whose effort toward knowledge is for the sake of others.

From this we infer his compassion and his consideration of others' good [dayāparārthatantratva = jagaddhitaiṣitva], for he does not desist from (working for others) even when his own aim has been accomplished

[siddhārtha]. [283b-284a : 282b-283a]

The sentence beginning with 'for he does not desist' etc., according to M. (p. 107, lines 15-16) is to forestall the following objection: One may object that effort in the path to liberation is not peculiar to a man of compassion, for such effort might be intended for one's own good, as it is in the case of non-Buddhists. How then can one infer the Buddha's compassion for others from his practice of the path?

There is a pun in this verse: Siddhārtha, 'one whose own aim has been accomplished' is also the worldly name of Gautama Buddha.

298. He speaks what is best because of his compassion; because of his knowledge he tells the truth and how to reach it.

Again he exerts himself to speak thus. Hence he is a valid knowledge-instrument. [284b-285a : 283b-284a]

The inference may be analyzed as follows:

'Being a valid knowledge-instrument' (the first epithet in Diṅnāga's verse) is implied by the combination of compassion (cf. the second epithet, jagaddhitaiṣin), knowledge (cf. the fourth epithet, śāstṛ) and exertion in teaching how to reach the truth (cf. the firth epithet, tāyin).

299. The truthfulness of his teaching has been praised so that we may establish the nature of valid knowledge-instrument on the basis of his teaching. (This procedure is permissible,) for inference is not (specially) forbidden (by the Blessed One), and because various applications of inference are seen (in his teachings), such as the proposition "whatever comes into existence is subject to destruction" etc. [285b-287a : 284b-286a]

The sentence beginning with 'for inference is not (specially) forbidden' etc., according to M. (p. 108, lines 14-15) and P. (p. 166, lines 7-8), is added to remove the following possible objection: The Blessed One recognized perception [pratyakṣa], but he did not specially recognize inference [anumāṇa], as it is known from his statement "It is

the person who is endowed with (the ocular) sensation (of blue) (read nīlajñānasamaṅgī as in P. or cakṣurvijñānasaṅgī as in TSP quoted under Vs. 300 for nīlasamaṅgī in M.)." Accordingly, we cannot establish Buddha's nature of valid knowledge-instrument on the basis of his teaching because it is an inferential procedure.

M. (p. 108, lines 18-19): It is only inference from words etc., not inference from true facts, that is rejected (by the Blessed One) as when he says, "Vain are all the heretical doctrines" etc. (cf. PTS, Majjhima Nikāya I, p. 63.)

"Whatever comes into existence": cf. Oldenberg, Mahāvagga, p. 18.

300. The source of a (valid) inference is a probans that is concomitant with a probandum. Since one may show the vyāpti (concomitant relation) of probans with probandum (in the above proposition, 'whatever comes into existence' etc.), inference has already been taught by the Blessed One. [287b-no number : 286b-no number.

cf. TSP, vol. I, p. 12: tatra pratyakṣasya lakṣaṇaṃ bhrāntikalpanābhyāṃ rahitatvaṃ. tac ca bhagavatoktam eva. yad āha "cakṣurvijñānasaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti, no tu nīlam" iti. tathāhi nīlaṃ vijānātīty anenāviparītaviṣayatvakhyāpanatvād abhrāntatvam uktam, no tu nīlam ity anena nāmānuviddhārthagrahaṇapratikṣepāt kalpanārahitatvaṃ. anumānasyāpi lakṣaṇam uktam evānumānāśrayaṃ liṅgaṃ darśayatā. tathāhi sādhyārthāvinābhūtaṃ liṅgaṃ viniścitaṃ sadanumānajñānasya kāraṇaṃ, tac ca "yatkiñcid bhikṣavaḥ samudayadharmakaṃ sarvatra nirodhadharmakam" (see Vs. 299) iti. evaṃ sādhyena hetor vyāptim upadarśayatā sphuṭataram eva prakāśitaṃ. yathoktam "anumānāśrayo liṅgam avinābhāvalakṣaṇaṃ vyāptidarśanād dhetoḥ sādhyenoktaḥ sa ca sphuṭa" (= Vs. 300) iti.

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Note: The verse numbers have been rearranged throughout the contents in accordance with the sense. The reader will find the verse numbers as given in M. and P., respectively, in brackets at the end of each verse.

Reference numbers in the Index are in accordance with M.

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